Novel Cryptographic Authentication Mechanisms for Supply Chains and OpenStack by Rahaeimehr, Reza
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Doctoral Dissertations University of Connecticut Graduate School 
12-2-2019 
Novel Cryptographic Authentication Mechanisms for Supply 
Chains and OpenStack 
Reza Rahaeimehr 
University of Connecticut - Storrs, reza.rahaeimehr@uconn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations 
Recommended Citation 
Rahaeimehr, Reza, "Novel Cryptographic Authentication Mechanisms for Supply Chains and OpenStack" 
(2019). Doctoral Dissertations. 2362. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/2362 
Novel Cryptographic Authentication
Mechanisms for Supply Chains and
OpenStack
Reza Rahaeimehr, Ph.D.
University of Connecticut, 2019
ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, first, we studied the Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tag
authentication problem in supply chains. RFID tags have been widely used as a low-
cost wireless method for detecting counterfeit product injection in supply chains. We
open a new direction toward solving this problem by using the Non-Volatile Mem-
ory (NVM) of recent RFID tags. We propose a method based on this direction that
significantly improves the availability of the system and costs less. In our method,
we introduce the notion of Software Unclonability, which is a kind of one-time MAC
for authenticating random inputs. Also, we introduce three lightweight constructions
that are software unclonable. Second, we focus on OpenStack that is a prestigious
open-source cloud platform. OpenStack takes advantage of some tokening mecha-
nisms to establish trust between its modules and users. It turns out that when an
adversary captures user tokens by exploiting a bug in a module, he gets extreme
power on behalf of users. Here, we propose a novel tokening mechanism that ties
commands to tokens and enables OpenStack to support short life tokens while it
keeps the performance up.
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A proper authentication mechanism is of importance to a system in which the security
and privacy of its users, assets, or resources matter. According to the Oxford dictio-
nary, authentication means “the process or action of proving or showing something
to be true, genuine, or valid.” In this dissertation, we focus on the authentication
mechanisms in two areas: supply chains and OpenStack. In a supply chain, the goals
of an authentication mechanism are to authenticate the products that are being deliv-
ered to customers and gathering valid data about the process of product delivery. In
OpenStack, an authentication mechanism validates incoming requests to OpenStack
modules.
1.1 RFID-based Supply Chains
According to a 2016 report by the OECD and the EUs Intellectual Property Office,
the value of imported counterfeited and pirated goods is worth nearly half a trillion
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dollars a year, which is around 2.5% of global imports with many of the proceeds
going to organized crime. Close to 5% of goods that are imported into the European
Union are fakes[61, 60]. The report analyzes about half a million customs seizures
around the world between 2011 and 2013, covering all kinds of physical counterfeit
goods that infringe trademarks, intellectual property rights, or copyright, in order
to obtain rigorous estimates of the scale of trade in counterfeit and pirated goods
(not including online piracy). These fake products appear everywhere – the most
dangerous ones are auto parts that fail, drugs that make people sick, medical instru-
ments that deliver false readings, etc. It is therefore of crucial importance to make
supply chains secure by incorporating proper mechanisms for detecting counterfeit
products. Some supply chains are enhanced by RFID technology (called RFID-based
supply chain) to promote real-time monitoring of products while traveling through
the supply chain. The RFID-base supply chains are benefiting from this technology
in detecting counterfeit products [27]. An RFID technology consists of three main
components. 1) RFID tag: A wireless tag that is attached to an object and has a
unique identifier. 2) Reader: A device that communicates with RFID tags and can
read/write data from/to the tag. 3) Back-end server: A server that communicates
with the readers to store data provided by the reader or provides data to the readers.
We consider supply chains in which each product enters the supply chain at an entry
node (back-end), travels through several other nodes (partners), and finally sinks at
an end node where the product is delivered to the client. The back-end can be the
main supplier or the owner of the supply chain. A partner is a wholesaler or a dis-
tributor that gets products from the back-end or another partner, stores the product
for a while, and then sends the products to another partner or an end-point. The
ultimate goal of a supply chain mechanism is to deliver genuine products to customers
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in an efficient, timely manner.
Whenever a product is delivered to a partner, the partner interacts with the RFID
of the product and creates a reader event. A reader event shows which product at
what time was in which partner. Gathering the reader events in a secure way is
another important goal of a supply chain. To achieve these goals, state-of-the-art
methods have followed two strategies as follows:
On-Line Oriented: In this strategy, there must be a persistent on-line connection
between the back-end server and every partner of the supply chain[20, 94, 71]. The
main advantage of this strategy is that the back-end server has the most updated
state of the products moving through the supply chain. But, there are two important
issues in practice which cause one to seek alternative strategies. First, the persistent
on-line connection between readers and the back-end server is vital. However, this is
not always possible due to limited or no internet connectivity. Second, several ele-
ments are involved in each Reader-RFID interaction, including: the back-end server,
network connection between the back-end server and the partner, the partner’s net-
work facilities, the reader, and the RFID. They all must be working properly at the
same time. If any of them malfunctions, the process will be delayed or failed, which
in turn can lead to late product delivery.
Off-Line Oriented: In off-line oriented approaches, every supply chain partner must
have local database facilities to temporarily store reader events[22, 9, 105, 104]. The
data stored in the local databases of all partners is gathered and aggregated into a
back-end server whenever an on-line connection is available between the back-end
server and the partner. The mechanisms implemented in this way are reasonably
resistant against network and connectivity issues and tolerate temporal inaccessibility
of the back-end server. The main disadvantage of this approach is that all supply
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chain partners must provide a reliable infrastructure and hire some experts to keep
the local database running (usually 7 days 24 hours a week), maintained, and secured.
All the above requires extra cost of management for the supply chain [78]. In addition,
any new local database involved in the verification process introduces a new attack
surface and security concern.
First, to eliminate the cost of local databases in off-line oriented solutions, we
propose to use as an alternate storage, the non-volatile memory (NVM) of RFIDs.
We call this strategy the connectionless approach. The main idea is to properly
store each reader event in the NVM of the corresponding RFID tag and upload all
the reader events to the back-end at the end-point where the RFID tag exits the
supply chain. As a consequence, the only thing a partner needs is a reader. When
a product is going to exit the supply chain (i.e., at an end-point), the content of the
RFID NVM attached to the product will be verified by the back-end to see whether
the RFID tag is legitimate or fake. Therefore, as a requirement, every end-point
must be able to set up a connection with the back-end server for RFID verification
– we notice that this is a minimum requirement needed in any other supply chain
management solution. Unlike other solutions, having a connection with the back-end
is not necessary for intermediate partners.
A connectionless mechanism must store reader events in the RFID memory, guar-
antee the authenticity of data, preserve partners’ privacy (i.e., the reader events cre-
ated by a partner must remain confidential between the partner and the back-end),
and prevent fake product delivery to customers of the supply chain. The main chal-
lenge of such a mechanism is that it should be implementable in an EPC Gen 2 RFID
(the commonly used RFID in supply chains)[23]. The main restrictions with EPC
Gen 2 RFID are: 1) They have a few electronic gates available for security purpose
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Figure 1.1: The structure of an RFID in the NVM-based method.
(less than 2000 gates) 2) The memory capacity of them do not exceed 3kB.
Second, within the above restrictions, we also propose a connectionless mechanism
that we call the NVM-based method. Figure 1.1 shows the big picture of our scheme.
We generate enough random keys {k1, ·, kn} for every RFID and store them in the
RFID and corresponding profile in the back-end. Whenever a partner i gets a product,
it creates a reader event wi that is enough for tracking a product and signs it using
a symmetric key known to the back-end. Then, the partner sends the result to the
RFID. The RFID gets the input and fetches a fresh key and applies a cryptographic
function Ski(.) on the HMAC of the reader event hi using key ki from NVM and
replaces the key with the result ci. The crypto function must bind the record to
the partner and the RFID. We define the minimum requirements of such a function
as a Software Unclonable Function1. Whenever the RFID reaches an end-point, the
content of the RFID is sent to the back-end. Since the back-end has all the keys, it
can verify if the RFID and the tracking pass are correct.
Third, we introduce three structures that can be used as a software unclonable
function. We present how many gates are needed to implement these.




Nowadays, every service that you get from the Internet is somehow related to cloud
computing. Tech giants like Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and IBM are racing to offer
better and novel cloud services to customers, and everyday more businesses move
to cloud platforms [83]. Many cloud experts believe that hybrid cloud computing is
the future of cloud computing where each company wishes to combine the scalability
of public clouds with the secrecy and privacy of a private cloud [28]. Among those
cloud platforms which are used for establishing a private cloud, OpenStack is the
most popular[74].
OpenStack comprises several distinct modules that offer different features like
Virtual Machine (VM) computation, object storage, identity authentication and au-
thorization, block data storage, networking, and VM image management. Modules
are independent, differing both in development, where services have separate teams,
and in deployment by cloud providers, where modules can be managed and scaled
separately.
The identity module, Keystone, links other modules by serving as a common
method for authenticating and authorizing users to the different services. Keystone
codifies permissions for users based upon the projects they may access and the roles
they have on these projects. A project is an identity that groups users and resources,
and a role represents a specific set of operations that a user can perform (see section
3.3 for details).
To determine a user’s project and role, Keystone gives the user a bearer token after
authenticating with their credentials (e.g., username and password); users include this
token in API requests to other modules for authentication and authorization. Modules
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pass this token to Keystone, which returns back a (project,role) tuple if the token was
valid. Modules then make all authorization decisions based on that tuple.
The token mechanism enables a user to delegate his authorization to a module.
Module interactions on behalf of a user allow for more complicated tasks such as
attaching storage volumes to a compute node. For example, the compute module is
able to send a user’s token to the storage module which can in turn verify with the
identity module that this token has access to the requested volume and attach it to
a node without needing to check with the user himself.
If an adversary exploits some bugs in a module and steals the input tokens of a
module, we say that the module is corrupted. Once a module is corrupted, it can be
malicious in at least two important ways:
• A module can use a token to obtain unrequested service charged to the user.
For example, the adversary can create some dummy volumes or servers that
effects the user’s bill.
• A module can use a token to access other resources at another service like
exporting a disk with sensitive information that does not effect the user’s bill.
The above problems are known as the bearer token problems.
For reducing the impact of a leaked token, two approaches are recommended [36]:
• Scoping down the tokens: which limits the attack surface to the smaller scope.
• Reducing the lifetime of tokens: which shortens the amount of time that a stolen
token can be abused.
Nowadays, all the token-based authentication mechanisms like OpenID Connect
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[72] and OAuth [86] support short life and scoped tokens. However, there are two
shortages with all of them:
• First, remarkably shortening the lifetime and scope of tokens increase the need
for getting new tokens from the identity module, and in practice, the identity
module turns to a bottleneck. Hence, system designers have to make a trade-
off between system performance and security. In OpenStack, the default token
lifetime is one hour, and the smallest scope is a project [64].
• Since there is no relation between tokens and commands, no matter how much
a system shortens the lifetime of a token or limits the scope of the token, a
stolen token can be very dangerous. For example, if you get a 1-second life
token for deleting a server in a project and the token is leaked to an adversary,
the adversary can delete all your servers in the project during that 1 second.
We propose a mechanism that ties tokens to user commands, prevents replay
attack, and blocks illegitimate commands. Our mechanism relies on three elements:
• A novel token that we call Recursive Augmented Fernet Token (RAFT) on
top of which commands can be added to tokens without requiring additional
Keystone interaction. RAFT is an extension to the Fernet, which is the current
token format in OpenStack.
• A blacklist structure that prevents replay attack.
• A policy enforcer component that prevents malicious command execution.
Our mechanism limits the impact of service corruption by preventing replay at-
tacks and scoping tokens only to handle the request desired by the user. As a result,
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even if an attacker captures a token submitted to a non-Keystone module by a user,
he cannot do anything more on behalf of the user.
Besides, our mechanism is backward compatible, which is very imports for Open-
Stack users. The backward compatibility of our mechanism allows users to continue
using their scripts and tools that they may have developed for themselves, and up-
grade them on their wish.
We have implemented the concept of RAFT, and examined the performance of
the new token through the imaging module.
1.3 Dissertation Contributions
We make the following main contributions in this dissertation:
• We propose a novel strategy for RFID based clone detection mechanisms that
rely on the NVM of RFID. We demonstrate a cost-effective method that im-
proves the availability of a supply chain mechanism and beats the-state-of-the-
art methods in many aspects.
• We propose a new, backward-compatible Fernet extension that we call RAFT,
on top of which commands can be added to tokens independently without re-
quiring additional Keystone interaction. The RAFT token mechanism guaran-
tees that If an adversary corrupts a module, other modules just do whatever
requested to do by the users, nothing more.
• We implement a proof of concept for the RAFT, which shows the effectiveness
of the solution. We modify the identity module and implement a client library,
9
the whole system works either with RAFT or Fernet tokens, which shows the







Counterfeit product injection into the supply chain causes important problems for
both supply chain partners and final consumers, bringing billions of dollars financial
losses to people and companies each year. The International Chamber of Commerce
expected the value of counterfeit goods globally to exceed 1.7 trillion dollars in 2015
[30]. Making supply chain management secure is a crucially important task.
In order to detect counterfeit product injection into the supply chain, Radio-
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags have been used as a low-cost wireless identi-
fication method. In an RFID-based supply chain, each product is equipped/tagged
with an RFID tag. Each RFID tag has a unique identifier (ID) and is initialized in
11
the supply chain back-end server with product information. Supply chain partners
use RFID tag readers to interact (i.e. read or write data) with these RFID tags.
The result of interactions between readers and RFID tags are collected in the supply
chain’s back-end server and used for RFID tag authentication. The genuineness of a
product is evaluated by the authenticity of its RFID tag.
If an adversary can fake the RFID tags of a supply chain, s/he can inject fake
products in it and fool the RFID monitoring scheme of the supply chain. Attacks such
as tag separation and re-apply attack can not be applied in large scale [55, 37]. Attacks
involving hardware inspection or side channel analysis are costly and need laboratory
environment [69, 68]. It is important to keep in mind that RFID-based clone detection
mechanisms are used mostly for inexpensive products. Therefore, an economically
motivated adversary will not engage in the afore mentioned type of attacks, and we
do not cover these here just like the majority of other RFID-based clone detection
mechanisms do not deal with these either [33, 8, 67, 77, 5, 56, 93, 26, 25].
The main challenge is how to protect against an adversary who is able to clone the
RFID tags themselves as such clones can be applied to counterfeit products by the
adversary in a safe location for the adversary. An RFID monitoring scheme needs to
protect against the adversary who may listen to legitimate readers interacting with a
legitimate RFID tag, and who may use his own reader to interact with a legitimate
RFID tag in order to collect information with which an adversarial (or adversarially
produced) RFID tag can be programmed (after which it can be attached/applied to a
counterfeit product and injected into the supply chain). This attack allows an adver-
sary to use legitimate RFID tags as black-boxes, i.e., s/he is restricted to interaction
with legitimate tags by exploiting the wireless communication of legitimate RFID tags
and readers. Adversarially produced RFID tags are programmed (”software-cloned”)
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with the purpose to pass future authentication protocols when in transit through the
supply chain.
Generally, each RFID monitoring scheme needs a back-end database to store prod-
uct data, tag information, and RFID reader events, such as the data that is sent or
written into RFID tags and the data that is read from RFID tags. This data is
needed to trace the location of products and authentication purpose. One way for
the readers to communicate with the back-end server is the use of an online connec-
tion. This is not always the case due to limited or no internet connectivity. If you can
provide a network connection with 99% up time, it means each supply chain partner
cannot proceed at least 4 days in a year. In a supply chain, half an hour delay can
cause missing a plane, and consequently the actual delay will be much longer than
the connection down time. In addition every delay at a partner site will create a
cascading delay effect to subsequent partners in the supply chain [100]. Therefore, as
an alternative method, local databases are used to temporarily store reader’s events.
Then, the data is collected into the back-end database at the proper time. However,
each partner must provide expensive hardware and software. In addition, they must
also hire some computer specialists to setup, maintain and secure the database server.
Maintenance cost and security of local databases are two main disadvantages of using
local databases.
In summary our approach is base on the following assumptions:
• Supply chains are using EPC Gen 2 RFIDs.
• The back-end is trusted, i.e., the back-end keeps data confidential and follows
our protocol as is.
• We do not consider side channel and re-apply attacks.
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• The adversary has the following capabilities (for more details see section 2.4.1):
– Can listen to legitimate readers interaction with RFID tags.
– Can interact with RFID through their own readers.
– Can program a fake RFID in order to clone a legitimate RFID tag and
attach it to their counterfeit product.
• RFID tags have additional 2-3 kb Non-Volatile Memory (NVM).
• The adversary is successful if its clone RFID tag can pass our authentication
mechanism.
Our guarantees are as follows:
• No need for online connection between the partners and the back-end. Only
online connection at end-points is needed. Therefore, network disconnection
does not effect our approach.
• No need for local database, therefore, no extra cost for supply chain partners.
• Confidentiality of stored data in RFID tag’s NVM.
• Our solution fits the gate limitation of the EPC Gen 2 RFID technology (at
most 2,000 gates).
• Privacy of the partners (track preserving) are preserved (details in section 2.3.1).
Contributions and Organization
In Section 2.2, we give a brief introduction to the RFID-based supply chain and
explain clone detection requirements. Different types of clone detection mechanisms
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are explained in section 2.3.2. In Section 2.3.3, we compare these mechanisms based
on properties which have been discussed in Section 2.3.1.
Next, in Section 2.4, we introduce a new approach for clone-detection in supply
chains which takes advantage of current RFID technologies offering a 2-3kb Non-
Volatile Memory (NVM) per RFID. The new approach allows a supply chain to
eliminate the need to have online persistent connections among all partners and the
back-end server, and vthe need to have local databases. We define “software un-
cloneable function” (Section 2.4.4) and show that it is possible to securely store all
the necessary data into the small NVMs embedded into RFID tags. These data are
kept secure and confidential, and will be transferred to the back-end server during a
verification phase when authentication is needed; all the necessary data in the NVM
of an RFID fits a single TCP packet. Even though it is possible to verify RFID tags
at some check points in the supply chain, verification just needs to be done at the
end-points where the products are delivered to customers.
The trust point in the supply chain is its back-end, therefore, the need to have
an online connection between the end-points and back-end server is unavoidable dur-
ing a verification phase just like this is unavoidable for any other RFID monitoring
scheme approach. We notice however, that generally end-points are retailers and
not having a persistent connection at end-points / retailers is not an important is-
sue as it does not interrupt supply chain operations; there are no cascading effects
and small internet connectivity delays are tolerated by end-points / retailers. Our
approach allows a supply chain to proceed smoothly and securely without reliability
vulnerabilities caused by network connectivity or security vulnerabilities due to local
databases. Our approach does not inflict extra cost to supply chain partners. In
addition, our approach guarantees the privacy of each partner against other partners
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assuming they are honest but curious. Section 2.4.7 shows the proposed architecture
for our approach. In Section 2.5 we provide very light-weight constructions for the
software uncloneable function that we have introduced in the previous sections. The
first, called MULTIPLY-ADD, is based on a simple multiplication with addition over
integers. The second, called ADD-XOR, combines xor with addition-with-carry over
binary vectors. The third, called S-Box-CBC, uses the idea of Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) mode with a specially designed S-box. In Section A.4 we compare the differ-
ent solutions and we show ADD-XOR and S-Box-CBC lead to dramatic reductions
in total circuit size for reasonable security.
2.2 Background
RFID tag RFID Reader Trusted Back-End Server
Figure 2.1: An RFID monitoring scheme consists of three main components: an RFID
tag with a unique identifier attached to a product, an RFID reader which communicates
with an RFID tag in order to read/write data from/to tag, and a trusted back-end server
which stores all the data needed for clone detection.
A supply chain is a network of partners such as manufacturers, retailers, trans-
porters and distributors that cooperate in the production, delivery and sale of a
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particular product. Each product enters the supply chain at a start node, travels
through several other nodes and finally sinks at an exit node where the product is
delivered to the client. The supply chain does not end its life cycle when the product
is delivered to the client; a product (e.g. because of misdelivery) can be recalled and
can reenter the supply chain at a recall node. Conceptually, a supply chain can be
represented by a directed graph with several start (source) and several exit (sink)
nodes (each supply chain partner may control several nodes).
The supply chain is either static or dynamic. In a static supply chain the partners’
cooperation is fixed while in a dynamic supply chain the partners in the chain can
vary from one market opportunity to another [41].
An RFID-based supply chain is enhanced by RFID technology to promote real-
time monitoring of products while traveling through the supply chain [84, 96]. This
improves supply chain visibility which aids the targeted product recalls, regulation
of production rate, enforcement of safety regulations and counterfeit detection. An
RFID-based monitoring scheme consists of the components depicted in Figure 2.1
and explained below:
RFID tags: An RFID tag is a wireless transmitter attached to a product. In general,
it consists of a small microchip with an RF antenna, basic functional capabilities and
limited memory. Each RFID tag includes a 96-bits Electronic Product Code (EPC)
which serves as a unique identifier (ID) for the physical object to which the tag is
attached; it consists of an 8-bit version EPC, a 28-bits manufacturer identifier, a
24-bits product identifier, and a 36-bits item serial number [23]. RFID tags come in
different flavors: RFID tags can be read-only, write-once read-many, or write-many
read-many. Based on the powering method, an RFID tag may be passive, i.e. it does
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not have any power source of its own and derives its power from the RFID reader,
active, i.e. it has its own power source (battery) and can initiate communication
with reader, or semi-passive, i.e. it has its own power source but does not initiate
communication with readers [16]. In practice, EPC Class 1 Gen 2 RFID tags [23] are
commonly used in RFID-based supply chains. This kind of RFID tag is a low-cost
passive write-many read-many tag that has a minimum memory of 256 bits, with
possible extension to larger memory.
RFID reader: RFID readers represent the nodes in a supply chain graph. An RFID
reader is a network connected device with an antenna with which the reader is able to
communicate with RFID tags over a radio frequency channel and to transmit power
to RFID tags.
Readers communicate with an RFID tag with identity ID through its read and
write interface. The wireless transmission between tag and reader is imperfect and
can lead to misreading and/or miswriting. A misread happens when the data of a
tag is not read by the reader while a miswrite happens when a reader is not able to
successfully write data to a tag.
Trusted Back-end Server: A back-end, a.k.a trusted back-end server, constitutes
a database DB which contains data related to the tags and their corresponding prod-
ucts. The communication between readers and the back-end system is done through
a secure channel. Mostly, the back-end system shares secret keys with each of the
readers. Whenever the authenticity of a product with RFID tag needs to be verified,
the trusted server engages in an authentication protocol with the RFID tag using a
reader as intermediary.
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Misreading and miswriting may lead to an authentication failure of a legitimate
RFID tag or lead to authenticating a cloned/fake RFID tag as a legitimate one.
Therefore, the authentication protocol should minimize the probabilities of these
false negatives and positives, in particular, authentication of a cloned/fake RFID
tag should only happen with negligible (or very small) probability.
2.3 Clone Detection Mechanisms
In this section, we first list the essential factors that are important when we compare
authentication and clone detection mechanisms. Next, we provide a detailed overview
of the existing mechanisms and compare them.
2.3.1 Important Factors
Recently a variety of approaches, discussed in Section 2.3.2, have been proposed
to realize clone detection in RFID based supply chain. These approaches diverge
in many features such as hardware requirements, performance, security and privacy
properties. In this section, we identify each one of these features for evaluating the
state-of-the-art clone detection approaches.
Hardware Requirements
The low cost RFID tag’s aim is to keep the tag price as cheap as possible. Therefore,
the tags should have minimalist design with few bits on-board memory and less than
2000 gates for security and privacy approaches [23]. We compare some of the most
interesting mechanisms based on:
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Computational Gates: As a rule of thumb every extra 1,000 gates will increase
manufacturing cost by one cent [98]. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate each
approach based on the number of extra gates that are needed and whether it is
compatible with the current RFID technology.
Storage Requirements: We consider memory size on tag, memory size needed for
each tag entry in the back-end database, and the need for having a local database
on partner sites.
Performance
We evaluate the performance of different approaches from the following perspectives:
Communication Cost: This includes data transfer between the reader and server,
data transfer between the reader and tag, and the need for online communication
with the back-end server at each node.
Computation Cost: We enumerate the kind of operations that are used for clone
detection.
Initialization: The time required by the scheme to initialize the tag with the back-
end server.
Security
We analyze the security of these approaches against relevant attacks:
Physical Attack: In this type of attack the adversary spends time to physically
clone a legitimate RFID tag or even software clone a legitimate RFID tag by
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using side channel analysis (like power consumption, heat map, microscope
scanning, etc.) and programming an adversarial RFID tag with the collected
information.
Replay Attack: In this type of attack, the adversary eavesdrops the communication
between the reader and the tag to impersonate the tag in the future by using
the messages that have been captured.
Man-in-the-middle attack: In this type of attack, the adversary listens for com-
munication between an RFID and reader and then intercepts and manipulates
the information. The adversary impersonates the RFID and sends false data
on his benefit.
Desynchronization Attack: In this attack, the adversary blocks the communica-
tion between the reader and the tag in order to desynchronize the key stored in
the tag’s memory and the back-end sever.
Disclosure Attack: This attack indicates whether the attacker is able to retrieve
the underlying (master) secret(s) used in the clone detection protocol of the
supply chain.
Privacy
The anonymity of a tag is very essential in some supply chains which produce sensitive
products such as military or luxury equipment. Two aspects are important in this
area [42]:
Trace Preserving: Prevents the attacker to trace the product while moving from
one reader to another in the supply chain which is done by changing the tag
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identifier over time.
Track Preserving: This property indicates that the attacker is not able to find the
path that a tag has gone through which is done by obfuscation of the data
related to the path.
2.3.2 Existing Mechanisms
Trace-based anti-counterfeiting solutions were primarily developed for the pharmaceu-
tical industry; Koh et al. [42] suggested to record track and trace data of pharmaceu-
tical product tags to create drug history. Staake et al.[87] discussed the usage of track
and trace data in RFID enabled supply chains for counterfeit detection and stressed
the attack possibilities when partners are not willing to record or share tracking data
and emphasized its negative effects on counterfeit detection solutions. Followed by
this initial research, several RFID-based counterfeit detection methods were proposed
that can be classified into two categories:
• Cryptographic Verification based Counterfeit Detection
• Evolving Tag Trace based Counterfeit Detection
In the following, we study the state-of-the-art of each category and compare them
using the clone detection requirements outlined in Section 2.3.1.
Cryptographic Verification based Counterfeit Detection
Counterfeit detection based on cryptographic verification aims at making cloning at-
tacks hard by using embedded cryptographic primitives such as an encryption scheme,
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(keyed) hash function, PRNG, etc. Authentication is done by sending a random nonce
as challenge to a tag, receiving back from the tag the keyed hash (or encrypted value)
of the nonce with a shared secret, and verifying the hash (or encryption) based on
knowledge of the shared secret. These methods provide resilience against clone at-
tack, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and provide mutual authentication.
Some of the approaches also provide user privacy. However, these methods require
extra hardware resources which increases the cost of RFID tags [85]. A hash function
like SHA-1 takes roughly 5,500 gates [62] and a hardware implementation of AES-128
takes on the order of 2,400 gates [56]. Solutions using lightweight cryptographic prim-
itives require > 2000 gates and are studied in [53, 33, 8, 67, 77, 5, 52, 56, 93, 26, 25].
Hash-based schemes are studied in [15, 18, 103, 101, 102].
Citing “RFID protocols must be lightweight, taking into account the severe con-
straints imposed on the available power (induced at the antenna), the extremely
limited computational capabilities, the small memory size, and the characteristics of
the IC design (e.g., the number of gates available for security code)” [14, 97] and
“few gates – on the order of hundreds – remain for security functionality” [38] indi-
cate that only very lightweight solutions can successfully be implemented in current
RFID technology and that the above methods require too many gates (> 2000). This
explains the crypto-based column in Table 2.1: the only hurdle to adoption is the
lack of compatibility with current RFID technology.
In order to bring authentication circuitry on the RFID side down to at most 2000
gates, three approaches have been developed: key-evolving RFID schemes, PUF based
RFID schemes, and the XOR operation-based scheme (the middle columns in Table
2.1). We explain each technique in more detail below:
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Key-Evolving RFID Schemes [35, 92, 4, 17, 65] have been introduced by Peris-Lopez
et al. [65] and allow ultralightweight cryptography in that the additional circuit
overhead is only in the 100s of gates. During authentication the RFID tag computes
(1) a response given a challenge using a shared secret and a couple basic bit wise
operations and (2) evolves the shared secret to a new one (which is synchronized
with the authentication server). To the extend of our knowledge all of the suggested
schemes are shown to be broken with respect to full “disclosure attacks” that leak
the underlying evolving secret and/or “desynchronization attacks” [81, 50, 66, 49].
The main reason is that none of the suggested schemes proved or legitimized their
security with respect to a formal definitional framework.
PUF-based RFID Schemes [20, 94, 71] also have a much lower complexity (100s of
gates). RFID tags embed a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) which upon receiv-
ing a challenge creates a response [20]. An ideal PUF is one which implements a
random function from challenges to responses which is hard to predict or learn. The
back-end authentication server stores a list of challenge-response pairs for each RFID
PUF. Each time an RFID tag is being authenticated, the reader sends a challenge
which has not been used previously. The tag transmits the corresponding PUF re-
sponse back to the reader which forwards it to the back-end system. The back-end
system compares the received value from the tag against the stored list of challenge-
response pairs. If there is a match, the tag is verified.
PUF technology seems quite attractive as the PUF circuit overhead is quite min-
imal. The PUF based RFID tags are secure against replay attack. PUFs were sup-
posed to be secure against clone attacks. However, Becker [7] has demonstrated a
cloning attack on a commercial PUF-based RFID tag with only 4 protocol execu-
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tions, which takes less than 200 ms. They are also not secure against physical attack
[19, 91, 31, 90].
Juels [37] proposes a XOR Operation-based Scheme where circuit overhead due to
cryptographic primitives is eliminated. It implements a challenge-response scheme
which make use of a XOR operation: Each tag shares a list of secret triples (ai, bi, ci)
m
i=1
with the back-end system. Upon receiving a query by a reader, the tag selects the next
pseudonym ai from its list. A genuine reader (who obtains bi and ci from the back-end
system) authenticates itself by sending bi. By verifying bi, the tag will now send the
shared secret ci in order to authenticate itself to the reader. The scheme releases a
different pseudonym ai upon each query in order to protect against a tracking attack;
each tag has not one single identity ID but uses a list of identities or pseudonyms
ai which are discarded once having been used, this gives track privacy in that RFID
identities remain private so that RFID tags cannot be tracked through the supply
chain by an adversary.
Nevertheless, RFID tags can only store a limited amount of secret triples and
these can be queried and listened to by an adversary during m reader RFID tag
interactions. This allows an adversary to obtain (ai, bi, ci)
m
i=1; the ai values can now
be used to track the product and this violates track privacy, even worse the triples
themselves allow the adversary to program a software clone.
To solve this issue, Juels [37] introduces the following improvement to prevent a
tracking attack: A tag’s pseudonyms are refreshed by legitimate readers; Once an ai is
used, the triple (ai, bi, ci) is zeroed out and the reader refreshes all (aj, bj, cj) (including
the all-zero (ai, bi.ci)) by having the RFID tag XOR each triple with a random string
dj received from the reader. During a next reader interaction the new ai+1 is used
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and the protocol continues as described above. The technique eliminates the use of
an expensive hash or encryption, however, at the cost of extra communication. As
[37] explains track privacy is guaranteed if the adversary can at most listen to m− 1
interactions. If m interactions are eavesdropped, then a linear combination of the
exchanged bit strings can solve for the current triples (aj, bj, cj) and track privacy is
broken. For completeness, this scheme is not secure against desynchronization attack,
however, it can be secured if the values of future pseudonyms are also stored.
Notice that any scheme can be made to preserve track privacy by complementing
solutions with the idea of pseudonyms: Each RFID tag stores, instead of a single
ID, a list of random pseudonyms ID1, ID2, . . .. When asked to authenticate itself,
the RFID tag uses the next (irreversibly) pseudonym in its list which has not yet
been used. The back-end server looks up the pseudonym in its database so that it
can be connected to the actual ID of the tag. Langheinrich and Marti [45] have
proposed the ”Shamir Tag” which is an extension of Juels ”minimalist cryptography”
described above. This method uses shared secrets and bit-throttling in order to
wrap the tag data into several encryption layers which needs continuous read access
for considerable amount of time. At the start node, the tag ID is encoded into
several shares (using Shamir secret sharing [80]) such that the tag ID can only be
reconstructed if a sufficient number of shares are revealed. Even though these shares
are all stored in the tag’s memory, reading the tag’s data has been complicated such
that an attacker needs to spend significant amount of time to read the tag data
(without being detected) while the legitimate owner is able to use caching strategies
to identify the products.
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Evolving Tag Trace based Counterfeit Detection
Evolving tag trace based counterfeit detection mechanisms have been proposed in
[34, 47, 48, 105, 104]. The main idea is to create and store a path history of “reader
events” for each RFID tag; when exiting the supply chain the back-end system verifies
whether the tag went though a valid path which corresponds to the supply chain
graph. Reader events are generally stored in local databases that are synchronized
with the back-end system.
Lehtonen et al. [47, 46] present probabilistic techniques to enable clone detection
in incomplete traces caused by both tag misreading and partners not sharing tag
information. By assuming that events generated by cloned tags are rare, such events
can be detected by understanding the process that generates legitimate reader events.
Mirowski et al. [54] uses an intrusion detection mechanism in order to look for
abnormal behavior that may show whether a change of tag ownership, i.e., stealing
or cloning a tag, has occurred. In this approach the audit log data is stored in the
back-end database. This information is used to analyze tag traces for anomalous
behaviors using the principles of intrusion detection. The approach is able to detect
cloned tags with low false alarm rate from simulated attack scenarios within the
aforementioned data set. However, based on the proposed scheme evaluation, further
research is necessary in order to have effective intrusion detection systems for RFID-
based supply chains.
In [12, 10, 11] the authors propose clone detection mechanism for anonymous
RFID systems using unreconciled collisions. In this method, each time the reader
communicates/reads a tag, it sends a frame size (i.e. the number of time slots which
the tag is allowed to use to respond) and a random seed. Using these two values, all
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the tags in the region of the reader calculate the hash of these two values together
with their tag ID. Based on the hash value, the tag selects a time slot to respond
uniformly at random. Since cloned tags and their corresponding genuine tags have
the same IDs, they both respond at the same time slot which causes a collision.
However, the collision may occur for two tags with different tag IDs as well. In order
to distinguish between these two types of collisions, the reader sends a new frame
size with a new random seed and waits for the response from only the collision tags.
With high probability the tags with two different tag IDs will send their hash value at
different time slots. This time, the collision caused by a genuine tag and its clone(s)
cannot be reconciled. However, since these methods require that genuine tags and
clone tags be present at the same time and in the specific location, they can only be
used in specific scenarios.
Even though the latest two mechanisms are suitable for low cost tags, they need
either to be trained or have in-depth knowledge of the supply chain structure. This
makes them weak solutions against product recall, dynamic supply chain, and product
misdelivery.
Elkhiyaoui et al. [22] and Blass et al. [9] propose methods which make use of
tag memory in order to store verifiable tag paths. These protocols encode the supply
chain paths using an extension of polynomial signature techniques for run-time fault
detection using homomorphic encryption and employ the path encoding to sign tags’
identifiers. Each time a tag reaches a reader, the reader reads the tag data (which
include the tags current state) and computes the new state by adding its informa-
tion to the current state and rewrites it into the tag. At the end point it is checked
whether the tag has gone through a legitimate path or not. The authors claim that
these protocols prevent the traceability attack and clone attack. Even though these
28
protocols are suitable for low-cost tags, they need knowledge of the supply chain
structure. Therefore, they cannot support dynamic supply chain, product recalls,
and misdeliveries. In addition, as mentioned by the authors, since all the crypto-
graphic computations that are required by the scheme are performed by the reader,
the protocols are not secure against the type of clone attack in which the attacker
reads all the information from a legitimate tag and writes it into a cloned tag.
Trace scheme: Zanetti et al. [105] introduced the trace scheme. They presented a
detection mechanism that was based on verifying the correctness of consecutive ship-
ping and receiving operations using process and location information in tag events.
Each time a tag is queried by a reader, an event is created and stored in the reader’s
local database. This approach does not write to the tag memory which only contains
the tag ID. Clone detection is done at the exit point of the supply chain and is defined
as a trace that is not consistent with the supply chain graph.
Zanetti et al. [104] improve [105] by using tag memory together with local
databases. In this method, each tag stores two values: a random variable (called
tail) and a pointer. Whenever an RFID tag reaches a reader, the reader reads all
data in the tag, then creates and stores an event in it’s local database. Each event
includes, the tag ID, a time stamp T , the tail, and the pointer value p. Next the
reader randomizes only the symbol in the tail which is pointed at by p and increases
the pointer value p. These changes are written to the tag memory. At the exit point,
all events of all local databases are aggregated in a centralized server (the back-end
system). Events related to legitimate tags diverge from those of cloned tags; this
is used to decide whether a tag passes authentication or not. Note that the server
evaluates the relationship between a sequence of events. For this reason there is no
29
need to be aware of the supply chain graph to detect a clone attack. Hence, it is
applicable to dynamic supply chains. This approach detects clone injection, however,
one cannot distinguish between a genuine tag and its cloned version. This means
that not only the cloned product but also the legitimate product will need to be
filtered out, which is costly. This method is resilient against physical attack and is
forward secure. It does not provide mutual authentication as only the tag is being
authenticated. Authentication is done only at the end point. However, other types
of attacks are applicable that are based on compromising the readers. If most of the
readers are compromised the attacker is able to successfully pass a cloned tag with
high probability.
Our approach (NVM-based clone detection): This method (see Section 2.4, 2.5.2,
and Appendix A.4) also leverage tag memory to store data related to the visited
readers. It is similar to Elkhiyaoui et al. [22] and Blass et al. [9] methods with the
following differences: First, by storing the encoded tag path in the RFID NVM, it
eliminates the need of local databases. Even though at first glance the need of local
databases may seem a minor problem, nonetheless, having local databases means
that each partner must now hire some computer specialists to setup, maintain and
secure the local database server in addition to providing extra expensive hardware
and software. The security risk and maintenance cost are two main disadvantages of
using local databases. Second, the need to communicate with the back-end server at
each node is eliminated. Third, the tag applies some irreversible computations based
on its secret keys which prevents the traceability attack and clone attack. In this
method the cloned tag is recognized implying that the legitimate tag/product does
not need to be removed. However, because a tag does not authenticate the reader,
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an adversary is able to fill the tag memory with dummy data. Therefore, due to
the implemented irreversible computations, this method is vulnerable to a Denial of
Service attack. Finally, NVM-based clone detection does not resist physical attacks
since key material is stored in each tag’s NVM.
2.3.3 Comparison
Table 2.1 compares the state-of-the-art proposal of six different methods in order to
give the reader a better understanding on the cons and pros of each method. The com-
parison is based on the four different categories (hardware requirement, performance,
security, and privacy) discussed in Section 2.3.1.
The most important issue in RFID-based clone detection methods is to propose
a secure and resistant solution against different common attacks which is compliant
with the RFID tag resource restriction. Therefore, the hardware requirement is the
most important factor to decide whether a state-of-the-art proposal is applicable. If
the proposal is compliant with the resource restriction, ”Yes” is written, and otherwise
”No”. Only the crypto based method is not compliant and is therefore discarded as
suitable candidate.
From the hardware requirement’s perspective, we notice that the Trace method
needs no extra hardware. And we notice that the XOR and NVM-based methods
need extra NVM on each tag which is not available on current cheap EPC RFID
tags, even though nowadays 2-3kb memory is very cheap and will likely be part of
RFID tags in the near future. For this reason we keep the XOR and NVM-based
methods as possible candidates.
When looking at performance, all methods except for the XOR-based scheme have
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Table 2.1: Comparison of RFID tag clone detection schemes







No Yes YesRFID technology
Performance
Memory size on tag (bit) 128-1024 500 0
Memory size per tag on the server (bit) 224-1120 400 8-12kb
Avoid local DB usage/online comm. No No No
Data trans. between reader and server
200-400 250-350 200(bit)
Data trans. between reader and tag
200-400 250-350 200(bit)
Computational operations ⊕,∨,∧,+, Rot ⊕,∨,∧,+, Rot Analog com.
Initialization Fast Fast Slow
Security
Physical Attack Insecure Insecure Insecure **
Replay Attack Secure Secure Secure
Desynchronization Attack N/A§ Secure N/A§
Disclosure Attack Secure Insecure Insecure **
Privacy Track preserving Yes Yes Poss.‡
Trace preserving Yes Yes Yes






2-3kb NVM 2-3kb NVM
Compatibility with low-cost
Yes Yes YesRFID technology
Performance
Memory size on tag (bit) 2-3kb 5 2-3kb
Memory size per tag on the server (bit) 2-3 kb 2-3kb 1296
Avoid local DB usage/online comm. No No Yes*
Data trans. between reader and server
2100 150
rec. = 0;
(bit) aut. < 1296*
Data trans. between reader and tag
2100 112
rec. = 120;
(bit) aut. < 1296*
Computational operations ⊕, Shift None ⊕,+
Initialization Fast Fast Slow
Security
Physical Attack Insecure Secure ‡‡ Insecure
Replay Attack Secure Secure ‡‡ Secure
Desynchronization Attack Secure N/A§ N/A§
Disclosure Attack Insecure N/A§ Secure
Privacy Track preserving Yes Poss.‡ Poss.‡
Trace preserving Yes Yes Yes
* Authentication only needs to happen at exit nodes where back-end server communication is required.
‡ By storing pseudonyms in NVM.
§ N/A means not applicable.
** Current state of the art for PUF based schemes is not secure against physical attack because of recent machine learning modeling
attacks [7, 76, 90].
¶ In NVM-Based method, we can change the PHOTON function with any Software unclonable function. The effect of replacing our
proposed Software Unclonable Functions with PHOTON is shown in table A.1.
‡‡ Even though the method is secure against this type of attack, it is not able to distinguish between a legitimate tag and a cloned one.
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low data tranfer rates. The NVM-based solution with respect to the other solutions is
exceptional in that, in order to store the tag path, it does not require local databases
or online communication with the back-end server during transfer through the supply
chain (notice that ”No” in this row means that the method either uses local databases
or needs online communication with the back-end server at each node). However, the
NVM-based solution and PUF-based method have slow initialization, and (as already
mentioned above) the NVM-based solution and XOR-based scheme require 2-3kb tag
memory.
From the security perspective, since the Trace method does not require any secret
value for authentication, all solutions – except for the Trace method – are vulnerable
to physical attack because they store secret keys in the tag. Even though the Trace
method resists physical attack, a cloned tag and corresponding legitimate tag cannot
be distinguished. As a result both the genuine product with legitimate tag and coun-
terfeit cloned tag need to be either discarded or physically inspected; either incurs
significant cost. We notice that we include PUF-based schemes as being vulnerable
to physical attack due to recent machine learning attacks which allow an adversary
to find a software model which accurately predicts the PUF’s challenge-response be-
havior. This software model effectively captures the analogue ”master key” encoded
by the PUF and is the reason for stating insecurity against physical and disclosure
attacks. As soon as a ”proven” new lightweight PUF construction appears, then the
PUF based scheme will outperform any other scheme on all metrics except initializa-
tion speed and its need for local databases or online communication (oposed to the
Trace method a secure PUF based scheme can distinguish between legitimate and
cloned tags).
All the methods in Table 2.1 are secure against replay attack. In the crypto-
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based scheme, the challenge is changed each time resulting in different responses.
In the key evolving scheme the key evolves after each authentication, therefore, the
response for the same challenge will be different. In the PUF based scheme the
used challenge will not be used twice, hence, it prevents replay attacks. In the XOR
solution, the pseudonym is changing after each authentication, thus replay attacks
are not effective. In the trace solution, applying replay attacks will result in event
chain diverging. Finally, in the NVM-based solution, a unique key is used for every
interaction making a replay attack ineffective.
The desynchronization attack only effects methods where the secret information is
supposed to change after each authentication. Therefore, it is only applicable to key
evolving and XOR-based schemes. In these two methods, an adversary may interrupt
the communication which will result in secret desynchronization. However, these
approaches can be secured against this type of attack by storing old/future secrets
values.
Like the PUF based scheme as explained above, also the key evolving and XOR
based solutions are not secure against the disclosure attack: This is because getting
sufficient data allows the adversary to extract secret key values. On the contrary,
crypto based methods use cryptographic primitives and the NVM-based method uses
one time pad encryption, and are therefore secure against this type of attack. The
trace method has no secret and a disclosure attack is not even applicable.
Privacy is either preserved or achieved by using the pseudonyms idea that has been
described in the XOR operation-based scheme (section 2.3.2). This idea is applicable
to all schemes.
Given the above comparisons, only the Trace and NVM-based solutions survive as
possible candidates since they are secure against replay, desynchronization, and also
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disclosure attacks, satisfy the hardware requirements while having high performance,
and preserve tag privacy.
We notice that if a secure PUF appears, then the PUF based scheme can be
upgraded to a possible candidate solution. Nguyen et al. proposed a secure PUF
design in [59]. However, as noted in the paper, it is an open problem to research
whether the design offers sufficient uniqueness in an ASIC implementation. The
main differences among the Trace, NVM-based, and PUF-based solutions is that
the NVM-based solution does not protect against physical attacks at all while the
Trace and PUF based solutions protect against physical attacks albeit the Trace
based solution at significant extra cost; the PUF and NVM based solutions have slow
initialization compared to the Trace based solution; the NVM based solution is the
only one avoiding local databases or persistent online connections.
2.4 NVM-RFID
As previously stated in section 2.2, the need for a persistent online connection has
been a bottleneck for most RFID-based clone detection mechanisms. To counter this
bottleneck other mechanisms have been introduced which take advantage of local
databases. Local database oriented mechanisms pose extra cost for supply chain part-
ners and introduce their own security concern. We propose to use a small Non-Volatile
Memory (NVM) present in current RFID technology to overcome both problems.
In our approach, at each node, the required data for tracing and authenticating
an RFID tag is stored in the tag’s own memory. The data is obfuscated and made
software unclonable as explained below. Whenever a tag reaches an end-point, the
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tag data is transmitted to the back-end server, decoded, and verified.
2.4.1 Adversarial Model
The adversary’s goal is to inject counterfeit products into the supply chain without
being detected by the back-end server. We assume it is too risky for the adversary
to engage the following physical attacks with legitimate RFID tags while these are in
transit through the supply chain or are at their final customer destination:
• Remove and reapply attack : The adversary removes the legitimate tag from a
genuine product and reapplies it to a counterfeit product [18, 20].
• Side channel attack : The adversary has access to the RFID tag and collects
information over side channels or probes the wires of the tag in order to learn
the tag’s secret data and model it’s behavior [43].
The adversary may engage in interactions with legitimate RFID‘ tags through
their read/write interfaces while they are in transit through the supply chain. The
adversary is able to compromise the readers, block write operation on a tag, and
write whatever he wants. We assume that the trusted server has implemented an
uncompromised back-end server, that the trusted server and readers use a secure
channel for communication if needed, and that a portion of readers before the end-
points are possibly compromised by the adversary, but not all of them. We assume
that manufacturing and initialization of RFID tags is trusted, implying that all le-
gitimate RFID tags behave according to their functional specification (in particular,
the read and write interface is not compromised) and have valid IDs. The adversary
cannot compromise the end-point readers; if an adversary would be able to compro-
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mise end-point readers, then the verification which is done by end-point readers (with
help from the back-end server) has no value as such compromised readers can simply
report “authentication passed” to their users.
We assume that the adversary has black-box access to legitimate RFID tags, that
is, the attacker can learn from interaction with legitimate RFID tags through their
read/write interfaces to program a fake RFID which will pass authentication in the
supply chain. The adversary wins if the fake tag is able to pass the verification
process at the end point. The probability of winning defines the hardness of passing
authentication with a fake RFID tag.
Correctness requirement: Any non-malicious (legitimate) RFID tag should reli-
ably pass authentication whenever being engaged in an instance of the authentication
protocol. Here the authentication protocol should be able to deal with a small fraction
of reader misswrites and missreads in earlier interactions of the RFID tag with read-
ers (before the current interaction with the reader which executes the authentication
protocol).
Finally, since any RFID tag can be destroyed, denial of service attacks are not
part of our adversarial model.
2.4.2 Required Data
In this thesis, we define ”event” as the interaction between an RFID reader and an
RFID tag at a supply chain partner site. For tracking products and clone detection,
data related to each event must be gathered at the back-end server. For tracking
purpose, the following data are required: a reader ID (RID) including the partner
identity, the event time (T ), and the product identity represented by a tag ID (ID).
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In our approach, event data is stored in the tag memory. For this reason, there is no
need to store the tag ID for every event as it is already stored separately in the RFID
tag; it is sufficient to store (RID, T ) per event in the RFID tag.
We assume the writing/reading interface of RFID tags is known by the adversary
who can use the interface to write to and read from RFID tags by using a reader. We
need to make sure to be able to verify whether data is written by a valid supply chain
partner and not by an adversary: Each reader has its own unique key (RK) shared
with the back-end server and computes and adds a keyed-hash message authentication
code HMACRK (RID‖T‖ID) to the event data. This MACs the time of the event, the
reader and the RFID tag involved in the event. Depending on the required security,
it is possible to only store e.g. the first/last n bits of HMACRK (RID‖T‖ID) to save
space. Since the back-end server knows RK it is able to regenerate/verify the HMAC.
Requirement 1. Each reader must have a unique key shared with the back-end
server.
Requirement 2. For each event, the value x = (RID, T,HMACRK (RID‖T‖ID))
must be stored on the tag.
For each RFID tag, xi represents the value of the ith event. Because several events
must be stored on each tag, a ”pointer” functionality must be implemented in the
tags. The pointer specifies the location at which the next new event must be stored.
After each write, the pointer is adjusted for the next write. The pointer starts at the
beginning of the NVM and goes until the end of the NVM. If the pointer reaches the
end of the NVM, no more write operation is allowed.
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Requirement 3. There must be an incremental-only1 pointer inside the RFID tag.
New data is written in the spot which is specified by the pointer. After each write, the
pointer is adjusted to the next free spot.
Let us consider a supply chain with at most 1 million readers, hence, 20 bits is
enough for assigning a unique ID for each reader. If we reserve 20 bits for storing each
event time, it is possible to represent 1 million single-minute intervals from a certain
base time. By only taking the first n = 80 bits of the HMAC, we need 120 bits in
total for storing each event. In practice the number of intermediate partners between
a factory and end-points is less than 10 (i.e. continent → region → country →
state → city). Therefore, a 2-3kb NVM is more than enough for storing all the
events of a tag/product.
2.4.3 Data Obfuscation
Up to this point, we store all the data that is needed for tracing products, but the
approach so far is vulnerable to ”tag tracing” and ”clone” attacks. The tag tracing
attack is possible because events are written in the tag memory without obfuscation.
The clone attack is applicable because there is no relation between what is written in
the RFID tag memory and the RFID tag itself: An adversary has the opportunity to
program fake RFID tags with stored events read from legitimate RFID tags. These
fake/counterfeit tags can be added to (counterfeit) products and injected into the
supply chain. In addition, the privacy of partners is not supported: Each partner is
able to find out where the product has passed through by reading its tag.
1In our scheme a first initialization fills all NVM memory with a random bit string, once this is
completed the pointer should be reset to 0 and irreversibly made incremental-only.
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The main reason for these vulnerabilities is that the data is stored in clear text.
Having tag memory gives us the advantage of applying one-time pad (OTP) encryp-
tion. To do so, we fill the tag memory with random numbers at an initialization
phase. These random numbers are known to the back-end server and stored together
with other tag/product data.
Requirement 4. Each tag memory must be initiated with random numbers which
are known to the back-end server.
In practice the back-end server will store for each legitimate tag, a seed which was
used to generate pseudo random numbers for the tag’s initialization.
We change the write operation as follows. LetRandomNumbers = (M0,M1, ...,Mn),
where eachMi has the same length as a (120-bit) data event x, be the random numbers
initially stored in a tag’s NVM at initialization. Whenever the tag receives a write
command with event data xi, the tag XORs the event data with the corresponding
random number (Mi) specified by the pointer. The result
Mi = Mi ⊕ xi
is stored in the used random number spot. Fig. 2.2 illustrates the idea.
This change prevents the tag tracing attack because the data is not saved as clear
text anymore. When a product reaches an end-point, the content of the tag memory
is read and transferred to the back-end server. Because, the back-end servers knows
the random numbers related to each tag, it is able to extract actual data by XORing
the received data and the related random numbers.
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Figure 2.2: The received event data is XORed with the random number (that is shown
by the pointer) and the result is written at the same memory location.
2.4.4 Software unclonability
Our approach is still vulnerable to clone attacks. If an adversary uses a fake reader
and sends a read command, the tag will send back its pointer value p and all the
data in its memory including the unused part of random numbers i.e. Mp+1, ...,Mn.
After having the content of the tag memory, the adversary can copy the content to
fake tags. This creates clones of valid tags. In order to prevent this from happening,
we apply a slight change to the read operation: Each time a reader sends a read
command (Fig. 2.3), the tag will only send back the value of its pointer and the data
located before the pointer.
Requirement 5. In case of a ”Read” command, an RFID tag must return the written
part of the tag memory, from the beginning up to the position pointed at by the tag
pointer.
However, there is still another way to successfully clone RFID tags. The adversary
may apply the following simple trick in order to extract all the tag’s random numbers
that are not used. First, he reads the tag data and stores it. Next, he writes fake
data, i.e. all-zero values, into the tag and reads the tag data again. This reveals all
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Figure 2.3: Read operation: The data until the pointer is returned.
the random numbers.
We call an event data ”input” and the data which is stored/ read in/from the
tag memory ”output”. An adversary can successfully attack our scheme if (1) he
can find out or successfully guess the tag OTPs (as explained above), or (2) if he is
able to guess/produce valid output for a valid input. Because part of the input is
HMACRK (RID‖T‖ID) which is unique and unpredictable, future inputs of uncom-
promised readers are unknown to any attacker.
An adversary has a chance to issue a write command with an arbitrary input and
read the corresponding output. Also, a strong attacker may use this information to
build a simulator which gets actual inputs from the readers and tries to generate a
valid output. Such a simulator can then be programmed into a fake RFID tag. For
this reason we need to use a function Fk(x) with ”Software Unclonable Response”
instead of one-time pad:
Definition 1. A keyed function Fk(.) is called software unclonable if the probability
of guessing the output of Fk(x) for a randomly chosen input x with knowledge of one
chosen input-output pair (x′, Fk(x
′)) (the adversary chooses x′) is less than negligible
(in the function’s key size).
42
Requirement 6. At least, part of the outputs must be generated by a software un-
clonable function.
The Definition 1 requires resistance against adversaries with unbounded com-
putation – the definition formulates software unclonability in terms of information
theoretic security. This implies that a symmetric key encryption scheme may not
satisfy software unclonability since one chosen plaintext ciphertext pair may reveal
significant information about the underlying secret key in the information theoretical
setting. For a polynomial time adversary a semantically secure symmetric key encryp-
tion scheme will be software unclonable. Therefore, we recast the above definition for
adversaries with polynomial computation by using the software unclonable response
game given in Algorithm 1, where
• λ is a security parameter and Gen(1λ) is a ppt algorithm which generates a
random key k,
• A0 is a ppt adversarial algorithm which allows the adversary to generate exactly
one chosen input value x′
• for which the adversary is allowed to learn the output/response of function
Fk(x
′),
• A1 is a ppt adversarial algorithm which takes just this one input-output pair
(x′, Fk(x
′)) in order to produce a ppt simulator S, and
• where S successfully predicts Fk(x) for a random input x if it outputs Fk(x).
This leads to the following definition:
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Algorithm 1 Software Unclonable Response Game
1: function SoftwareUnclRespGame(A0,A1)
2: k ← Gen(1λ);
3: x′ ∈ {0, 1}λ ← A0(1λ);
4: S ← A1(x′, Fk(x′)); /* S is a ppt algorithm */
5: Random x ∈ {0, 1}λ
6: if Fk(x)← S(x) then b = 1; else b = 0; end if
7: Return b;
8: end function
Definition 2. A function Fk(x) is software unclonable if for any ppt pair (A0,A1), the
probability that SoftwareUnclRespGame(A0,A1) (see Algorithm 1 with security
parameter λ) returns 1 is negl(λ).
Now, based on standard cryptography there are numerous cryptographic functions
which are software unclonable. Notice that the random numbers stored in a tag mem-
ory can be used as a key of a chosen cryptographic function. Given our motivation
we are only interested in light-weight solutions in the sense that at most a couple
100 gates should suffice for implementation. This implies that the primitive (as far
as the best of current understanding) cannot be based on a computational hardness
assumption. And this means that we need to prove information theoretical security
for our constructions after all (in Definition 2 algorithms A0, A1, and S do not need
to be restricted to ppt).
The important point is that for tag verification the back-end server needs to know
the inputs (including reader ID, time, and HMAC). If we just want to use software
unclonable response function it must be a two way function so that the back-end
server be able to extract the inputs by only knowing the keys and the outputs. This
fact limits our approach to some encryption methods and eliminates the power of
using other lightweight cryptographic primitives such as hash functions. To eliminate
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this restriction we combine the OPT solution with the software unclonable response
as follows.
Our solution is to split the input xi into x
0
i = (RID, T ) and x
1
i = HMACRK (RID‖T‖ID).
We store x0i by using the one-time pad method as described in section 2.4.3. We store
x1i by using a function with software unclonable response.
In this way, even though an adversary can find the random numbers related to x0i s,
he cannot clone the tag. On the other hand, the back-end server can easily extract
(RID, T )s and then calculate the corresponding HMACRK (RID‖T‖ID)s which are
the inputs of the cryptographic functions. So, in this way, all the inputs, keys, and
valid outputs are known to the back-end. Fig. 2.4 illustrates the idea.
Figure 2.4: Write operation: (1) First x0i is XORed with the first 40 bits of random
number specified by the pointer (M0i ). (2) Next the software unclonable response function
is applied to x1i by using the second part (last 80 bits) of the random number shown by
the pointer (M1i ).
2.4.5 Verification
Even though tag verification can be done at each partner’s site, it is only needed
at the end-points. For verification, the tag data and the tag ID are being read
and transferred to the back-end server through a secure channel (i.e. SSL internet
connection). The back-end server extracts the random numbers related to the tag
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ID. By using the random numbers it first extracts pairs (RID, T ) giving a sequence of
Reader IDs and event times. Next, it retrieves the readers’ secret keys Rk (belonging
to the retrieved sequence of reader IDs) which are used for HMAC calculations. The
back-end server is now able to reconstruct the expected outputs which should have
been read from the RFID tag. These can now be compared with the actual values
read from the tag. If both of them are equal, then the tag verifies correctly.
Based on supply chain policy, it is possible to also check whether the retrieved
product path (through the readers) is a valid path, to verify whether the amount
of time between events fits pre-defined thresholds, and to tolerate some mismatch
between valid outputs and what is read from the tag in order to account for miss-
writing.
2.4.6 NVM-Based RFID Scheme Steps
In short, our NVM-based scheme implements the following steps:
Initialization RFID tag The NVM of the RFID tag is initialized with a sequence
of keys (k1, k2, . . . , ku) and a pointer p = 1. The back-end server stores the
RFID identity ID together with the sequence of keys.
Initialization Reader Each RFID tag reader is initialized with its own key K. The
back-end server stores the reader identity together with K.
Reader Event The RFID tag is read out by a reader of a supply chain partner:
1. The RFID tage transmits its ID to the reader.
2. The reader creates a message m which has the reader identity and time
stamp of the event.
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3. The reader computes x = MACK(m, ID). This binds the reader to the
event.
4. The reader transmits (m,x) to the RFID tag.
5. The RFID tag receives (m,x). This triggers the RFID tag to read a next
key kp from its NVM and to increment pointer p by 1. Key kp is large
enough in order to be split up into a first part kp,0 and a second part
kp,1. The tag computes the pair yp = (m ⊕ kp,0, Fkp,1(x)), where F is a
software unclonable function. Since kp is unique to the RFID tag, the use
of function F binds the RFID tag to the event. The key part kp,0 serves
as a one time pad which prevents traceability.
6. The RFID tag stores yp at the spot where kp was stored in NVM.
Exit When the tag exits the supply chain, its NVM is read out and communicated to
the back-end server. I.e., the internal logic only allows NVM to be read out up to
but not including the address pointed at by pointer p. This means that the back-
end server receives ID together with (y1, . . . , yp−1). The ID is used to look up
the sequence of keys corresponding to the tag. For each y, this allows the server
to first reconstruct the messages m, second to extract the corresponding reader
identity with key K from its database, third to compute the mac value x =
MACK(m, ID), fourth to evaluate F on x with the appropriate key, and finally
verify that this is part of y. If all checks pass, then the recorded reader events
were not impersonated and they can be verified to correspond to a legitimate




In our architecture we propose using ”PHOTON 80/20/16” as a light weight hash
function. It takes 80 bits input and generates 80 bits output with 40 bits collision
resistance. The hash function needs only 865 gate equivalence (GE)[29]. Before
applying the hash function we first XOR a stored random number to the hash’s
input. Since the hash function is collision resistant, this makes the hash function
outputs software unclonable. Notice that there is actually no need for this much
security in a supply chain which uses RFID-based clone detection mechanisms. For
an economically motivated adversary, even 99% failure (less than 7 bit security) is
enough to give up fake product injection in a supply chain. This motivates as open
problem to invent a very lightweight software unclonable function to save gates and
power-consumption cost at the price of less but still sufficient security for counterfeit
detection in the supply chain.
We use a 120 bits random number for each event; 20 bits as OTP for the Reader
ID, 20 bits as OTP for the time stamp, and 80 bits to be XORed to the first 80 bits
of the HMAC after which application of the hash function produces an 80 bit output.
The resulting 120 bit encoded event data replaces the 120 bits random number in
the RFID tag’s NVM storage. The content of the NVM must be transferred to the
back-end server when tag verification is needed. All the the content of an NVM fits in
one TCP packet. Therefore, the communication cost of our approach is minimal ( 1
TCP packet for a verification request and 1 TCP packet for returning the verification
result). Fig. 2.5 shows the layout of proposed architecture.
In Fig. 2.5, two inputs x0i and x
1
i are received from the antenna, where x
0
i is
40-bis wide and x1i is 80-bit wide. From NVM storage a 40-bit M
0






















Figure 2.5: The proposed architecture: gray blocks indicate the additional hardware
components together with their gate equivalences in the RFID tag for our approach with
PHOTON as chosen hash function.
to M0i ⊕ x0i and M1i which is 80-bit wide will be updated to Hash(M1i ⊕ x1i ).
Since PHOTON 80/20/16 takes 20 bits input per cycle, the control logic has to
read 5 bytes from the NVM, stores them in registers and sends to PHOTON 20 bits
by 20 bits. Also, the serialized PHOTON implementation in [29] takes 3540 clock
cycles to finish computation. This means that, by computing XOR and hash function
in parallel, we are able to hide the computation latency of the XOR operation under
the latency of the hash. By assuming the data from antenna is primary input, this
control logic is implemented and synthesized in NanGate 45nm Open Cell Library[58]
and the gate equivalence is reported in Fig. 2.5.
Note that [14, 97] states “RFID protocols must be lightweight, taking into account
the severe constraints imposed on the available power (induced at the antenna), the
extremely limited computational capabilities, the small memory size, and the char-
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acteristics of the IC design (e.g., the number of gates available for security code)”
and [39] states “A basic RFID tag may have a total of anywhere from 1000-10000
gates, with only 200-2000 budgeted specifically for security.” This indicates that our
solution can successfully be implemented in current RFID technology as it requires
only 1107 gates (< 2000).
2.5 Weak-Unforgeable Tags for Secure Supply Chain
Management
The main take-away of the NVM-based scheme is that in order to bind the identity
of an RFID tag to a reader event, the tag consumes one of its secret keys k stored
in its NVM in order to compute Fk(x) where input x is received from the reader and
cannot be distinguished from a random bit string. The tag overwrites k with Fk(x)
in its NVM – and in this way the tag authenticates its own reader events stored in its
NVM. For completeness, the reader represents the reader event (which includes the
identities of the reader and tag, and a time stamp) as a bit string, which the reader
MACs using its own key and this results in x. The back-end server has in its database
the key sequence of the tag (which includes k) and the reader key; this is sufficient
to verify the binding of the event to the reader (through the MAC) and tag (through
Fk(x)).
In the NVM-based scheme, Fk(.) is PHOTON 80/20/16, a light-weight hash func-
tion costing 865 GE (Gate Equivalent)2. The complete solution (including control
logic etc.) costs 1428 GE. Juels and Weis [39] state (and confirmed by [23]) “A basic
2GE is a metric for comparing the size of hardware implementation regardless of the manufac-
turing technology.
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RFID tag may have a total of anywhere from 1000-10000 gates, with only 200-2000
budgeted specifically for security.” Also every 1000 gates costs approximately one
dollar cent per tag. It is therefore important to further reduce the gate equivalence of
the complete solution. It turns out that collision resistance is not required and this
allows the design of a much more light-weight Fk(.), which is the problem statement
of this section.
In the NVM-based scheme, Fk(.) is used to protect against an adversary who can
only access the tag through its read and write interface in order to gather sufficient
information to construct a ‘tag-simulator’ which can be programmed into a fake tag.
The read and write interface is such that after initialization only the values that have
replaced keys in NVM can be read out. This means that in order to learn about one
specific key k, an adversary can engage in a reader-like interaction with the tag in
order to replace k with Fk(x
′) for some value x′ of his choice. Next Fk(x
′) can be read
out and the pair (x′, Fk(x
′)) can be used to design a simulator for predicting Fk(x) for
random input bit vectors x. Modeling this (very) weak attacker leads to Definition 2
for which a collision resistant hash function is an instance.
2.5.1 Unforgeability
A closer look at Definition 2 shows the relation of a software unclonable function to
a Message Authentication Code (MAC): A MAC is a triple (Gen, Sign, V er) of ppt
algorithms where k ← Gen(1λ) with security parameter λ, t ← Sign(k, x) produces
a tag t for input string x with key k, and V er verifies whether a tag t fits input x
with key k. A software unclonable function Fk(x) plays the role of producing tags
as in Sign. A first small difference is that Fk(.) is a function and not an algorithm.
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This implies that verification of the tag is straightforward in that the corresponding
V er simply verifies whether tag t = Fk(x) (and this directly implies the correctness
property for a MAC).





(x, t)← ASign(k,.)(1λ) where A does not query Sign(k, x),
V er(k, x, t) = accept
 < negl(λ),
where ASign(k,.) denotes that A has access to oracle Sign(k, .).
The second difference with software unclonability is that the adversarial algorithm
is split into A0, which selects an x′ for querying oracle Sign(k, .) = Fk(.), and A1
which, based on the output of the queried oracle, produces a simulator S whose goal
is to produce a valid (verifiable) tag Sign(k, x) = Fk(x) for some random input x.
This means that software unclonability does not allow the adversary to adaptively
choose an x for which a tag is constructed, instead unforgeability is for tags of random
inputs.
The third difference is that software unclonability does not allow the adversary to
have a polynomial number of queries to the oracle, instead only one chosen input-tag
pair can be used. We conclude that a software unclonable function produces tags
as in a MAC with a much weaker unforgeability property: a tag corresponding to a
random input is unforgeable given only one chosen input-tag pair. The motivation
presented in the introduction has led to the name “software unclonable”. From a
crypto perspective, however, a better terminology would be “unforgeable for random
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inputs when given one chosen input-output pair” and call the primitive a “one-time
MAC for authenticating random (not chosen) inputs.”
In a one-time MAC [82] a key is used at most once and can be constructed using
a universal hash function which is pairwise independent. An example light-weight
pairwise independent hash function is defined by tag t = k0x + k1 mod p, where p
is prime. In Section A.1 we analyse the “MULTIPLY-ADD” function where a tag
is computed as k0x + k1 mod 2
λ and the “key” (k0, k1) is chosen at random (not
necessarily odd).
2.5.2 Lightweight Software Unclonable Functions
In this section we provide three very light-weight software uncloneable constructions
that can be replaced with the ”PHOTON 80/20/16” hash function used in Section
2.4.7. The proofs that shows these constructions are software uncloneable function
and the security analysis are provided in [95].
MULTIPLY-ADD: The first construction that we call “MULTIPLY-ADD”
function is:
F(k0,k1)(x) = k0x+ k1 mod 2
λ, for k0, k1, x ∈ {0, 1}λ, (2.1)
where k0 and x are multiplied modulo 2
λ and + modulo 2λ is binary addition with
carry truncated after λ bits, as a software unclonable function. In what follows when
we write + we mean addition modulo 2λ.
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ADD-XOR: we introduce the “ADD-XOR” function
F(k0,k1)(x) = (k0 + x mod 2
λ)⊕ k1, for k0, k1, x ∈ {0, 1}λ, (2.2)
where + modulo 2λ is binary addition with carry truncated after λ bits and where ⊕
represents XOR, as a software unclonable function.
S-Box-CBC The third construction uses the idea of S-boxes in block-cipher
design together with CBC mode [21].
Suppose we have a non-linear mapping
S ∈ {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m,
where m is generally very small (we will propose small powers of two, m = 4 or
m = 8). Mapping S is called an S-Box. Since we use a software unclonable function
for authentication in the NVM-based supply chain management scheme, this means
that the software unclonable function does not necessarily need to be invertible given
knowledge of the keys. It turns out that ADD-XOR and MULTIPLY-ADD are invert-
ible; in this section, however, we will construct a non-invertible software unclonable
function based on a non-invertible S-box mapping S.
Our construction is iterative following the design principle used in CBC mode for
symmetric key encryption (where we replace encryption by our S-box): For n with
nm = λ, we use the vector notation x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}λ with xi ∈ {0, 1}m.
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compute
yi+1 = S(yi ⊕ xi+1 ⊕ k0i+1)⊕ k1i+1 (2.3)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 with y0 = 0. We define
F(k0,k1)(x) = y. (2.4)
In the construction we mask input xi with k
0
i and we mask the output of the S-box
with k1i . The S-box is a kind of non-linear obfuscation mapping. In the proposed
construction, we represent elements in {0, 1}m as finite field elements in GF (2m)
and define S(x) = x3 in GF (2m) for m = 4 and m = 8. Forwarding yi into the
computation of yi+1 corresponds to the main design principle used in CBC mode for
symmetric key encryption.
2.5.3 Implementation
In order to compare the hardware overhead of each scheme, we implemented ADD-
XOR and S-BOX-CBC (for m = 4 and m = 8). We did not implement MULTIPLY-
ADD because, according to our estimation, the lower bound of the gate equivalence
is greater than that of the other schemes given a similar security level.
For a fair comparison, we assume that the NVM is byte addressable and only has
one read port, which is a very commonly used NVM model. In addition, we assume
that the format of input comes as we desire, such that the circuit does not need to
store any input x that is not used in the current clock cycle. All the implemented
functions are synthesized to 45nm technology NanGate library [58] using Synopsys
Design Compiler [89].
55
Figure 2.6: Hardware architecture of MULTIPLY-ADD.
MULTIPLY-ADD
In MULTIPLY-ADD, the integer multiplication is a heavy function to implement.
Since x · k0 can be represented as
∑λ
i=0(x << i) · k0,i, where k0,i represents the i-th
bit of k0, we suggest to use repeated addition and shifting to replace a full multiplier
implementation.
The suggested hardware architecture is depicted in Figure 2.6. Register a stores
the λ-bit value of x or the shifted value of x. Register b is first loaded with λ-bit k1,
then it is updated to the sum of the intermediate values in registers b and a. Register
c is a one byte register, which loads one byte of k0 to control whether the current
content in register a should be added to register b or not. After λ rounds, register b
will contain the final result of x · k0 + k1.
To estimate the hardware overhead, we know that the implementation contains
at least 2λ + 8 bits of registers, λ full bit adders, and λ bit multiplexers to select
loading data from NVM or the adder for register b. Given the conversion factors
3 from different gates to gate equivalence [58], we can conclude that a hardware
32-input NAND gate is 1.00 GE; 2-input AND gate is 1.33 GE; 2-input XOR gate is 2.00 GE;
1-bit register is 6.67 GE; 1-bit full adder is 6.33 GE; 2-to-1 multiplexer is 2.33 GE
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Figure 2.7: Hardware architecture of ADD-XOR.
implementation of the λ bit MULTIPLY-ADD function takes at least 22λ GE, which
is more than the other candidates in our comparison.
ADD-XOR
The most efficient way of implementing ADD-XOR is to use one bit full adder, one
XOR gate and one bit register for carry. But given the practical fact that the NVM
is usually byte addressable, we have to read out one byte of key at once. We suggest
to store 4 bits of k0 and 4 bits of k1 in one byte of NVM, such that we can fetch both
k0 and k1 in one read operation, otherwise 8-bit registers will need to be be added in
the circuit to store the intermediate value and we need to wait for k1 to be fetched
in the next clock cycle.
Figure 2.7 shows the hardware architecture of our implemented ADD-XOR func-
tion, which is extremely compact. It contains only a 4-bit full adder, 4 XOR gates and
one bit register for the carry bit. The function itself takes only 64 gate equivalence4.
This architecture does not require other registers to store intermediate values. As an
4This gate equivalence number does not equal to the sum of different gates times the conversion
factor, because this is the implementation result reported by the synthesis tool, which contains the
area utilization of wire connections as well. This also applies to the gate equivalence number of the
reported S-Box-CBC architectures.
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Figure 2.8: Hardware architecture of S-Box-CBC with m = 4. The S-Box is
implemented as finite field multiplier circuit.
optimal construction, all the values calculated in the current clock cycle are assumed
to be written back to the NVM immediately.
S-BOX-CBC
Our proposed S-Box takes as input x ∈ GF (2m) and outputs x3 ∈ GF (2m). An
implementation can come in two flavors which we discuss below:
Finite Field Multiplier
We use finite field multipliers to implement x3 in circuit. If latency would be a con-
sideration, then we would use an orthonormal basis to represent elements in GF (2m)
which makes squaring x→ x2 a simple rotation operation leaving one more multipli-
cation in order to compute x3 = x2 · x. Since latency is not a consideration, we use
one optimal circuit implementation for a finite field multiplier in GF (2m), which we
reuse, in order to perform two multiplications x2 = x · x and x3 = x2 · x.
We apply Proposition 2, Equation (18), and Remark 1 in [75]: A multiplier in
GF (2m) needs at most 3m 1-bit registers, 2m − 1 2-input AND gates, and (n +
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Figure 2.9: Hardware architecture of S-Box-CBC with m = 8. The S-Box is
implemented as finite field multiplier circuit.
1)(m − 1) + ω − 2 −
∑n−1
i=1 ri 2-input XOR gates, where n equals the number of
nonzero entries in column 0 of the reduction matrix (Q in equation (8) in [75]), ri
is the position of the ith nonzero entry in this column, and ω equals the number of
non-zero coefficients in the irreducible polynomial defining GF (2m).
For m = 4, we can use irreducible polynomial x4 + x + 1 [79] with n = 1, and
ω = 3. This gives 12 1-bit registers, 7 AND gates, and 7 XOR gates. After conversion
to gate equivalence, the finite field multiplication can be implemented in 103 GE.
The complete architecture of this scheme is in Figure 2.8. It contains one 4-bit
S-Box, 8 XOR gates and 4 bit registers for storing yi−1.
For m = 8, we can use irreducible polynomial x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 [79] with
n = 4, r0 = 0, r1 = 4, r2 = 5, r3 = 7, and ω = 5. This gives 24 1-bit registers, 15
AND gates, and 22 XOR gates. After conversion to gate equivalence, the finite field
multiplication can be implemented in 224 GE.
The complete architecture of this parameter setting, see Figure 2.9, is slightly
different from the one with m = 4. It requires one more register to store the output
of the S-Box, because k0 and k1 cannot be fetched at the same clock cycle. Thus this
architecture contains one 8-bit S-Box, 16 XOR gates and 16 bit registers for storing
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Figure 2.10: Hardware architecture of S-Box-CBC with m = 4. The S-Box is
implemented as a lookup table in NVM.
yi−1.
Table Lookup
We store a table of all the values x3 and we implement the S-Box as a table lookup.
The table has size 2m ·m bits.
For m = 8, 2m · m equals 2048 bits. This means we need NVM to store these
bits. However, the NVM storage required for storing key pairs and later reader events
already takes 1360 bits for collision resistance 2−16 (see section A.4). Together, this
makes 3408 bits and makes a table lookup implementation impractical.
For m = 4, 2m ·m equals only 64 bits. So we will need at least two NVM read
operations to compute a 4-bit result. The implemented architecture is depicted in
Figure 2.10. First, k0 and k1 are fetched from one byte, but k1 needs to be stored in a
4-bit register, because it will be used at the next clock cycle. The input of the S-Box
is computed as yi−1 ⊕ k0 ⊕ xi. This input is used as an address to fetch the S-Box
output from the NVM. In the second clock cycle, the S-Box output is XORed with k1
stored in the register. Also, 4 more bit of registers are required to store the value of yi
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to compute yi+1. We implemented this construction, and the total gate equivalence
of this architecture is 518 GE and 557 GE for λ = 60 and 112, respectively. This is
slightly less efficient than the architecture with an S-BOX implemented in circuit as
we reported in Table A.1.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the state of the art clone detection mechanisms utilized in
RFID-based supply chains and compares these with respect to hardware requirements,
performance, security, and privacy aspects. Even though crypto-based solutions are
resilient against most attacks, they require significantly more than the 2000 gates
reserved for security functionality inside low cost RFID tags. The Trace, NVM-
based, and (as soon as literature provides a secure lightweight PUF design) PUF-
based schemes are the most competitive remaining candidates. They can be adapted
to satisfy track preserving and trace preserving properties; they resist replay and
disclosure attacks (desynchronization attacks are not applicable); they satisfy the
hardware requirements for low cost RFID tags. The Trace solution resists physical
attack but cannot distinguish counterfeit products with fake/cloned tags from genuine
products with legitimate tags; a secure PUF based solution would resist physical
attack without having the problem of the Trace solution; our approach, the NVM
based scheme, does not resist physical attacks at all. Both the NVM based and PUF
based solutions have slow initialization. The NVM based solution is unique in that
it is the only method which does not need local databases at supply chain partners
or persistent online connection with the back-end server.
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Next, we introduce a new approach for an RFID monitoring scheme which uses
RFID tag memory to keep tag tracing data. Our approach, NVM-based scheme,
eliminates both the need for having persistent online connection between all partners
and the back-end server, and the cost and the increased security risk of having local
databases on partner sites.
Finally, we introduce three light-weight software uncloneable functions. When
compared to PHOTON, our ADD-XOR and S-Box-CBC (m = 4) constructions sig-
nificantly reduce the circuit size of the implementation of the NVM-based supply
chain management scheme 372 GE for α ≤ 2−16 and 478 GE for α ≤ 2−32. Com-
pared to PHOTON, S-Box-CBC (m = 8) gives the smaller area size of 764 GE for
α ≤ 2−40, while PHOTON 128/16/16 with 1795 GE is the preferred choice for very




An Improved Token Format for
OpenStack
3.1 Introduction
OpenStack is one of the world’s most successful open-source software that has been
developed by tens of thousands of contributors around the world. It offers a robust
and smooth Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud platform, which is utilized by
companies like RedHat, American Express, IBM, AT&T, Adobe, and Best Buy [24].
Modularity and modular thinking and development model are the key for imple-
menting an extensive system, and for a modular system like OpenStack a proper au-
thentication and authorization mechanism is of importance. Modern authentication
and authorization mechanisms utilize the concept of tokens. Usually, in a modular
system, an identity module is in charge of authentication and authorization. Users
present their credentials (usually a username and password) to the identity module
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and are granted tokens in exchange. Other modules only serve users who have a valid
token. Tokens are either a random bit string like a UUID that points to an entry in
an authentication and authorization database, or a crafted piece of data that carries
some authentication and authorization information like Fernet and JWT tokens (see
section 3.3.3).
Using token instead of username and password has three main advantages:
• Users do not need to use their passwords for every system access. Consequently,
the probability of leaking passwords is lower.
• Every token has an expiration time, and a stolen token can only be abused for
a limited time.
• It is possible to limit the scope of a token and let the user ask for a less privileged
token. In this case, if an adversary steals the token, she will have limited access
to the resources of the token owner.
The above features allow a user to get a short-life scoped token from the identity
service and delegate the authority to a third trusted party to accomplish a complicated
task within the scope. For example, in OpenStack, a user can ask the compute module
to create a virtual machine (VM) on a specific network. The compute module is not
in charge of networking. However, having the user token, the compute module can
ask the networking module to add the VM to the desired network on behalf of the
user.
Problem: Although the ability to use a token and make requests on behalf
of a user (authorization delegation) is a vital feature for a highly modular system
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like OpenStack, it is the source of many vulnerabilities [32]. Adversaries can find
bugs in a large scale system. With the current token mechanisms [86, 72, 6], if an
adversary exploits some of these bugs and finds a way to obtain user tokens, she can
do whatever the owners of the tokens can do. This problem is known as the “bearer
token” problem [32].
Scoping down the tokens and reducing their lifetime are two ways that are used
for reducing the impact of the bearer token problem [36]. All the typical token type
like UUID, PKI, Fernet, JWT [6] and ticketing systems like Kerberos [70] have two
main shortcomings:
• First, in current mechanisms, the immediate impact of shortening the lifetime of
tokens or reducing the scope of tokens is that users need to renew their tokens
more often. In practice, if we remarkably shorten the lifetime of tokens and
reduce the scope of tokens, the identity module turns into a bottleneck.
• Second, no matter how much a system shortens the lifetime of a token or limits
the scope of the token, a stolen token can be very dangerous. This is because
there is no relation between tokens and commands. For example, if you get a
1-second life token for deleting a volume in a project and the token is leaked
to an adversary, the adversary can delete all the volumes in the project during
that 1 second.
Considering this problem, system designers make a trade-off between system per-
formance and security. For example, in OpenStack, the default token lifetime is one
hour, and the smallest scope is a project. Summarizing, even shortening the life time
or reducing the scope of a token allows an adversary who can corrupt a module and
observe a token to do tremendous damage. Having a bug free cloud is not realistic,
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but reducing the effects of buggy code (in terms of corrupted modules and services)
is possible. Therefore, it is desirable to have OpenStack guarantee the modularity
security requirement postulated as follows:
Modularity Security Requirement : If an adversary corrupts a module,
other modules just do whatever requested to do by the users, nothing more. For
example, if an adversary corrupts the Image module, he cannot create or delete a
node.
Overview of our Solution: Following the idea introduced in [1], we propose a
novel token mechanism for OpenStack that can be adapted in a backward-compatible
way. Our solution provides the modularity security requirement by developing the
following parts:
1. A novel token that we call Recursive Augmented Fernet Token (RAFT) on
top of which commands can be added to tokens without requiring additional
Keystone interaction. RAFT is an extension to Fernet, which is the current
token format in OpenStack.
2. A blacklist structure that prevents replay attack.
3. A policy enforcer component that prevents malicious command execution.
RAFT has two types: user tied RAFT, and fully tied RAFT. Fully tied RAFT
provides better security guarantees. In Fully tied RAFT, each module needs to have
a secret key shared with Keystone. Hence, it needs a key distribution/renewal mech-
anism, which makes it harder to deploy compared to user tied RAFT.
66
The security of a RAFT and Fernet token relies on HMAC. Each RAFT or Fernet
token can be seen as a pair of a message and the HMAC of the message. HMAC
guarantees that the message part of the token is authentic if the key used for HMAC
remains secure and unpredictable. Keystone uses a random key for the HMAC of
Fernet tokens. By default, the Keystone key is renewed every one hour. Since the
used HMAC is (believed to be) a pseudo-random function, the HMAC of the fernet
token looks like a random number for people who do not know the secret key of Key-
stone. Whenever a user wants to issue a new command, the user adds the command
to the message part of the Fernet token and uses the HMAC part of the Fernet token
he was already granted from Keystone to calculate the new HMAC for the token. In
user tied RAFT, Modules follow the above idea for creating a new token. They take
the HMAC part of the received token and use it as the key of the HMAC for the new
token. In fully tied RAFT, each service has a secret key and uses it to calculate the
HMAC. A detailed security analysis of user tied RAFT and fully tied RAFT is given
in section 3.4.
In this chapter, to make the algorithms and proofs easier to follow, we write
HMAC(k, .) instead of its formal notation HMACk(.).
Our proposal has two important strength:
First, it allows reducing the lifetime of tokens and reducing the scope of a token
without interacting with Keystone. It ties tokens to commands and in fact, limits
the scope of tokens only to the commands issued by users and minimizes the impact
of stolen tokens. Second, it gives users a choice to continue using Fernet or upgrade
to RAFT. Some of the professional OpenStack customers have developed scripts to
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handle their servers. In our solution, Keystone continues issuing Fernet token as
before. If the cloud provider continues accepting Fernet tokens, users do not need
to upgrade their scripts immediately, and all the existing scripts work without any
problem.
We have implemented a RAFT token library that allows issuing a RAFT token
either based on a Fernet token or other RAFT token. Also, we have modified the
identity module of OpenStack to accept and validate RAFT tokens. The experimental
results show that our mechanism adds less than 1 percent to a token validation
time, i.e., less than a microsecond. Usually, cloud commands like creating a server,
migrating a server, and loading an image are very time-consuming tasks (in the order
of several seconds). Hence, the overhead of our mechanism is negligible. Note that in
most cases, a token validation time composes less than one percent of a user request’s
execution time. Also, our experiment showed that generating a RAFT token from
a long life Fernet token is more than 88 times faster compared to getting a short
lifetime Fernet token from the identity module.
Threat Model: A service can be corrupted in two ways:
• Partial corruption: where a service leaks tokens to the adversary, but it does
what is supposed to do.
• Fully corruption: where a service is under control of the adversary and the
adversary can do whatever he wants within the service.
We consider a strong adversary who can fully corrupt some services and observe
all network communications except User-Keystone communications. User-Keystone
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communications must be confidential and authenticated (secured by TLS and a Cer-
tificate). In OpenStack, it is possible to secure User-Service communication by en-
abling TLS and having a certificate for each service. But, since service-to-service
communication is not secure, we also assume User-Service communication is not se-
cure. This allows us to cover a wider range of applications and provide stronger
security.
Organization: We begin with an overview of the history and structure of Open-
Stack in section 3.2. Next, we focus on Keystone in section 3.3 and explain the
authentication mechanism of Keystone. In section 3.4, we provide details of our to-
kening mechanism. In section 3.5, we analyze the security of RAFT. In section 3.6,
we demonstrate a proof of concept for the RAFT and describe some of the results of
using RAFT in our experiments.
3.2 OpenStack
3.2.1 History1
In 2010, Rackspace wanted to redesign its Cloud servers offering infrastructure, while
NASA was interested in a similar project. Negotiation between the two teams led to
a shared program called OpenStack. RackSpace hosted the first OpenStack summit
on July 2010 in Austin, Texas where the first OpenStack design was presented to
more than 25 companies including AMD, Dell, Cloud.com, Intel, and Nebula. A few
days after the summit, RackSpace and NASA with the contribution of more than
1In this section, the three charts and related data were taken from [2]
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25 partners funded OpenStack aiming to produce the ubiquitous Open Source Cloud
Computing platform that will meet the needs of public and private clouds regardless
of size, by being simple to implement and massively scalable.[1] Three months later,
on October first, 2010, OpenStack Austin was released. Austin includes only Nova
and Swift projects. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the amount of effort per person-day
each contributor put to Austin[2]. The figure shows that RackSpace and individual
Figure 3.1: Contributors to OpenStack Austin based on person-day effort
developers put the most effort to the first OpenStack. Figure 3.2 bolds another aspect
of Austin. Nubela had the second contribution from the lines-of-code aspect. This is
due to the fact that the base code of Nova came from Nubela’s previous effort. To
make the long story short, the OpenStack Foundation was established in September
2012, which has been in charge of OpenStack since then. Currently, it has more than
105,000 community members from 187 countries who collaborate to build one of the
most significant open-source projects in the world.
The OpenStack Foundation updated the mission of OpenStack in February of 2016
as follows: “to produce a ubiquitous Open Source Cloud Computing platform that
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Figure 3.2: Contributors to OpenStack Austin based on lines of code
is easy to use, simple to implement, interoperable between deployments, works well
at all scales, and meets the needs of users and operators of both public and private
clouds.” [63] In the updated mission statement, interoperability was added as a new
interest, and satisfying the user needs was emphasized.
Since Austin, OpenStack has been developed and released around 6-month cycles.
The name of the latest stable release (until September 2019) is Stein, and Train is
under development. Figure 3.3 shows that currently, RedHat took first place and
has the most contribution to Stein. Also, it reflects that the tech giants like AT&T,
SUSE, and Intel are actively working on OpenStack.
3.2.2 Structure
OpenStack is a modular system divided into projects(services) at the highest level.
Every project utilizes third-party plugins that must be opensource as well. Usually,
for a use case, OpenStack supports several plugins that can be used interchangeably.
The following projects are the core of OpenStack:
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Figure 3.3: Contributors to OpenStack Stein based on person-day effort
Keystone implements Identity API and is in charge of authentication and autho-
rization.
Nova is the heart of OpenStack and manages computation resources.
Cinder provides block storage (volumes) mainly used by virtual machines.
Glance is the imaging service, which maintains data assets like operating systems.
Neutron enables networking services.
Swift provides efficient block storage and can be used independently. Hence, some
companies take advantage of Swift for storing data.
Horizon resembles the dashboard of OpenStack and provides a web interface for
clients. Although Horizon is not the only way for interacting with OpenStack,
it is the simplest way for clients if they want to manage the system manually.
In addition to Horizon, users can send their request to OpenStack via cURL [88] or
OpenStack Client library. cURL allows a person to send an HTTP/HTTPS request.
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OpenStack Client library is a tool that is developed by Keystone, which converts
users high-level command to corresponding cURL commands.
As mentioned earlier, OpenStack started with two projects. The number of
projects and the variety of services has been growing quickly. OpenStack Stein in-
cludes 42 projects, and Train extended to 45 projects. The functionality and re-
sponsibility of every service have been evolving. Interested readers are refered to the
OpenStack official website to see the updated list of projects and details. A person
does not need to deploy all the services. Only Nova, Keystone, Glance, and Neutron
are enough for having a productive OpenStack with basic functionalities.
Each service implements some Representational State Transfer (REST) APIs,
which are the standard way to communicate with a service in OpenStack. A REST
API is a web service that is callable by HTTP/HTTPS requests. An HTTP request
supports several methods, see [57] for more information. OpenStack uses the following
methods:
GET: The GET method is for retrieving information from a service. The information
must exist in the server, not being computed. For example, we use the GET
method when we want to get the list of images on Glance. Nevertheless, we do
not use the GET method for granting a Token, which Keystone generates in
the response of a token request.
POST: The POST method is for creating objects like tokens, virtual machines, vol-
umes, and uploading an image.
PUT: This method is used for updating objects like editing a network or the name
of an image.
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DELETE: This method is used to delete an object like deleting a virtual machine
or volume.
HEAD: The HEAD method is preferred over the GET method whenever one does
not care about the response body. For example, to check the authenticity of a
token without knowing its privileges, we can use the HEAD method that has
lower communication and process overhead.
The OpenStack REST APIs accept parameters in JSON format. To access Open-
Stack, first, a user must get a token from Keystone by presenting his/her username
and password. Each token has an expiration time, and the user needs to refresh his
token periodically. The user must put the token in his every request header. When-
ever a service receives a request, first of all, it checks the presence of a token in the
header. Then, the service validates the token with Keystone. Sometimes a service
needs to make a request to other services on behalf of the user using the received
token. For example, whenever a user wants to create a virtual machine, in addition
to the virtual machine specification (like the amount of RAM and number of virtual
CPU), he must specify a network. In this case, the user sends his request to Nova.
Nova builds the VM, but it needs to get in touch with Neutron to establish the con-
nection between the VM and the network. Figure 3.4 shows the interaction between
a user and OpenStack modules as described above.
3.3 Keystone
Keystone is the identity service of OpenStack and is mainly used for authentication
and high-level authorization. We should know the following concepts when we want
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Figure 3.4: The interaction between a user and OpenStack modules.
to deal with Keystone:
Project: a project is an abstraction that groups and isolates OpenStack resources
for each OpenStack service. For example, project groups virtual machines in
Nova, and defines a set of users in Keystone.
Users: the term “user” is a little bit confusing for people who are not familiar with
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) concept. Here, a user is an entity that defines
and manages a virtual infrastructure (a virtual network of virtual computers).
Users are not the persons who are using the applications installed on virtual
machines.
User Group: a user group is a set of users who has the same access.
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Role: a role is a set of access policies known by a name or Id. Whenever a user calls
a public API, Keystone checks if the user has an appropriate role. Roles can be
assigned to users and user groups. Each user may have several roles. All the
users of a user group inherit the role of the user group.
Domain: a domain defines a namespace for some projects, users, and user groups.
We can assign two different domains for two organizations and allow them to
use similar user names, user group names, or project names.
Catalog: contains the URLs and endpoints of each service. Users need to know
service catalogs to sends their requests to correct addresses. Each service catalog
may contain several endpoints, and each endpoint may have different URLs for
admin, internal services, and public users.
3.3.1 Identity
One of the primary responsibilities of Keystone is to provide identity service (the
specification of users). Keystone has several options for this purpose:
SQL Keystone supports multiple SQL engines like MySQL, DB2, and Post-
greSQL and allows to store and manage users’ identity internally in a SQL database
through Keystone APIs. Configuring and utilizing this option is convenient, but it is
not the best option in practical deployments for big organizations. That is because
users of big organizations usually use several systems, and it is better to have a central
identity service with a single username and password. Storing and keeping OpenStack
users’ identity in Keystone means another username and password to remember for
76
users.
LDAP Keystone can utilize Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) for
storing and retrieving users and groups. LDAP is a standard opensource application,
which serves as a central identity provider for other applications like email services and
accounting. In this scenario, Keystone does not store or manage users and groups
and acts as a medium between users and LDAP. This option is relatively hard to
configure. Its main disadvantage is that Keystone observes the password of users
that is valid for several applications.
Mixed By introducing Keystone’s V3 Identity APIs, it is possible to have a
different backend for each Keystone domain. Some domains may use SQL backend,
and others may utilize LDAP backend.
Federated Identity Providers Starting from OpenStack IceHouse, Keystone
is able to accept federated identity from trusted providers and handle them like tem-
porary users. The identity provider can be any backends like MongoDB or Social
Logins like Google and Facebook. Keystone uses a suitable plugin to convert these
identities to a standard federated identity protocol format (SAML, OpenID Con-
nect). Configuring OpenStack to consume federated identity is complex. Though,
this ability is of importance when we ant to build a hybrid cloud.
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3.3.2 Authentication
OpenStack modules only execute requests that are accompanied by a valid Keystone
token. Therefore, each user needs to authenticate himself with Keystone and be
granted a valid token. Afterward, the user puts the token in the X-Auth-Token
header of all his API calls. When a service receives a request, first, it checks if there
is a token in the request header. Then, it validates the token against Keystone. In
case the token was valid, Keystone returns the privilege of the owner of the token. If
there was no token in a request or Keystone did not verify the token or the service
recognizes the privilege is not enough for the request, the user gets an HTTP response
with the status code 401, which means ”Unauthorized Request”.
Sometimes, to execute a user request, a service needs to get involved with other
services. For example, assume a user wants to create a virtual machine booted from
a specific image. To do so, the user sends his request to Nova. To fulfill the job, Nova
needs the image. Hence, Nova requests the image from Glance on behalf of the user
by putting the user’s token in the header of its request. Again, Glance validates the
token with Keystone and checks the privilege of the user. If everything was Ok, Nova
gets access to the image, and finish the work.
There are two common ways to grant a token:
Password: Usually, a user grants a token from Keystone by sending his password in
the payload of a token request. A token can be scoped or unscoped. OpenStack
services other than Keystone only accept scoped tokens. A scoped token is
a token that is valid in a determined target, such as a domain or a project.
To get a scoped token, users specify the desired target in the payload of the
token requests. If the user does not specify the target (a project or a domain),
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Keystone returns an Unscoped token in response. Figure 3.5 demonstrates the
token granting process.
Figure 3.5: Granting a Token from Keystone.The left user gets an Unscoped token. The
right user receives a scoped token.
Snippet 3.1 shows the structure of a payload needed for getting a scoped token.
The variables in blue (started with a $ sign) needed to be replaced by the desired
values.
Token: It is possible to grant a new token from an old valid token. A user can get an
unscoped token by representing his password, and later, grant several scoped
tokens using the unscoped one. Also, it is possible to exchange an old scoped
token with a fresh one.






























This format was the first token format used in OpenStack that is no longer supported.
Snippet 3.2 shows a UUID token.
Snippet 3.2: A sample UUID token.
598aed93fefa7bd1c4821fbc53a8b32f
A UUID token is nothing more than a random 32-character string and carries no
information. Whenever Keystone verifies a user’s credentials, it generates a UUID
token, stores it in the token backend (database), and returns the token to the user.
Whenever a service wants to validate a token with Keystone, Keystone looks up in the
token database. If Keystone finds the token, it retrieves the corresponding privileges
and data (like expiration time) and returns them to the service. Otherwise, Keystone
rejects the token. Implementing the UUID token mechanism is straightforward. Its
main disadvantage is the token database. In a practical deployment, a UUID token
database grows fast, and after a while, inserting and retrieving data from the database
turns into a bottleneck for Keystone. Besides, the complexity of establishing multiple
Keystone nodes and scalability are other concerns that convinced the OpenStack
community to look for alternative token mechanisms.
PKI and PKIz
PKI token was the first attempt to utilize Public Key Infrastructure in OpenStack.
A PKI token carries some meaningful data like the owner’s specification, privileges,
issue time and expiration time of the token, and catalog list.
Keystone signs this payload and creates a PKI token. Therefore, PKI tokens are
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very long, and in practice can exceed 8k bytes. The motivation was to minimize the
need for database access in Keystone. At first glance, Keystone does not need to
store PKI tokens. A PKI token can be verified by anyone who has the public key of
Keystone. OpenStack services do not need to get in touch with Keystone to discover
the privileges of a PKI token. However, in practice, this is not accurate: A service
still needs to check a token with Keystone to see if it is not revoked; Keystone has to
keep the revoked tokens in a database (or similar structure); An 8k byte token does
not fit in an HTTP header by default
PKIz is the compressed version of PKI that was an effort to make PKI tokens
small. Nevertheless, this technique did not help much, and PKIz tokens were only 10
percent smaller than PKI tokens in real usages. Because of all the disadvantages de-
scribed above, the OpenStack community abandoned the PKI and PKIz mechanisms.
Fernet
In 2013, Heroku introduced its secure message transmission method that was called
Fernet. They encrypted a message and concatenated the ciphertext with the HMAC
of the ciphertext and called the resultant a Fernet token. In 2015, the Keystone core
team adapted the Fernet token for OpenStack. OpenStack Kilo is the first release
of OpenStack that supports Fernet token, and nowadays, it is the most used token
format.
In OpenStack, Fernet tokens contain a payload that is encrypted and symmetri-
cally signed by Keystone’s secret key. The payload usually includes the expiration
time of the token, the Id of the owner, an Audit Id, and the scope of the token. Any
Keystone node that has the secret key can validate a Fernet token and extracts the
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payload. The main advantage of Fernet tokens is that there is no need for a database
(backend) for storing and validating them. These features made the Fernet format
the most successful token format in OpenStack.
JWS
The latest OpenStack release, Stein, adapts the JSON Web Signature (JWS) token
format that is a subtype of JSON Web Token (JWT)[6]. Each JWS token contains
a header, a payload, and the signature of the token. The OpenStack uses ES256
JSON Web Algorithm with a private key for signing JWS tokens. Hence, who has
the corresponding public key can verify a JWS token. We can say that the JWS
format is the updated version of the PKI format. Unlike PKI tokens, JWS tokens
contain little data, and the payload of a JWS token is not encrypted. Consequently,
a JWS token is much shorter than a PKI token. However, it is still about twice as
larger as a Fernet token. Snippet 3.3 represents a JWS token with its corresponding
header and payload. The token is converted to a base64 string. If a person decodes
it to a UTF-8 string, he can see the header and the payload.



























Like Fernet tokens, JWS tokens are ephemeral; this means we do not need to store
them in a token database and replicate the database across all Keystone nodes.
There is no apparent preference between Fernet and JWS. In some use cases, a
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person may consider the following as advantages of JWS over Fernet:
1. Since we only need the corresponding public key to verify a JWS token, we can
have some Keystone nodes that are only in charge of verifying tokens, and we
do not need to share the secret (private) between all of them.
2. JWT is becoming a standard way for inter-system communication. Hence, using
JWS token may facilitate having a hybrid cloud or federated could.
On the order hand, as mentioned earlier, the payload of a JWS token is not encrypted,
and there are some concerns among the OpenStack community about revealing in-
ternal data to the public by using not encrypted JWS tokens.
3.3.4 A Closer Look at Fernet Token
The Fernet format is the base of our solution, and understanding how it works is
essential. Hence, we describe Fernet in detail. Snippet 3.4 shows a Fernet key, a
Fernet token, and a JSON object. The token is an example of a (project) scoped
Fernet token, which is encrypted and signed by the key and contains the payload
represented in the JSON object. Appendix 3.1 shows a program that extracts the
payload from the token given the key.















Both of the Fernet key and the Fernet token are represented in the base64 URL safe
string format. A Fernet key is a composition of a signing key and an encryption key.
If we decode a Fernet key, we will have a 32-byte array, which the first half (128
bits) is the signing key, and the second half is the encryption key 2. Fernet utilizes
symmetric-key cryptography as follows:
1. SHA256 HMAC for signing.
2. AES 128 in CBC mode with a 128-bit Initialization Vector(IV) for encrypting
the payload of a token
If we have a close look into a Fernet token, we can distinguish five parts:
2It is possible to use larger key. Since OpenStack uses a fresh key every 1 hour, the OpenStack
community believes that a 128 bit key for encryption and 128 bit key for HMAC provide enough
security.
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Version: The first byte of every Fernet token shows the version of the token. The
first version is denoted by 128 (0x80), and since, there is only one version of
Fernet that has been introduced, we can say every Fernet tokens starts with the
number 128.
Issue Time: The second part of a Fernet token is a 64-bit unsigned big-endian inte-
ger that represents the creation timestamp of the token in Linux time format.
IV: IV is a 128-bit random string that is used as the initial vector of AES encryption.
Ciphertext: OpenStack Stein has ten different payload types including unscoped,
domain scoped, project scoped, trust scoped, federated unscoped, federated
project scoped, federated domain scoped, OAuth scoped, and system scoped.
Depending on the type, the data in the payload of a token varies. The payload
of a token at least contains the type, the owner, the method that was used for
authenticating the token owner, the expiration time, and the audit Id of the
token. The length of a payload must be a multiple of 128 bits. Hence, Open-
Stack uses PKCS #7 v1.5 technique [40] to pad the payload. Then, OpenStack
encrypts the payload.
HMAC: The last part of a Fernet token is the HMAC of all the four previous parts,
which is calculated by using SHA256 HMAC. This part is known as the signature
of a Fernet token.
Generation
If Keystone confirms a user’s credential, it creates a Fernet token following algorithm
2. In the algorithm, GetCurrentT ime function returns the current system time;
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Gen generates a 128-bit random byte string; PKCS7 Pad pads the payload using
PKCS #7 algorithm and makes sure the length of the resultant is multiple of 128;
AES.Enc encrypts the padded token using AES in CBC mode; HMAC calculates
the HMAC-SHA256 of the token; and base64.Encode converts the token to a base64
string.
Algorithm 2 Pseudocode of Issueing a Fernet token.
Function CreateToken(Payload)
V ersion = 0x80
IssueT ime = GetCurrentT ime()
IV ← Gen(1128)
Padded Payload = PKCS7 Pad(Payload)
CipherText = AES.Enc(Padded Payload)
Signature = HMAC(V ersion ‖ IssueT ime ‖ IV ‖ CipherText)





Algorithm 3 represents the steps that Keystone follows to verify a Fernet token.
Whenever Keystone receives a token, first, it converts the token to a bit string. Then,
unpacks the bit string into five elements, and assumes:
• The first byte is the version number.
• The bytes 2-9 compose the issue time of the token.
• The bytes 10-25 represent the IV.
• The last 32 bytes are the token signature.
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• The bytes between the IV and the signature are the ciphertext of the token
payload.
After unpacking the token, Keystone makes sure that the version is correct. If so,
Keystone calculates the signature of the given token using the SHA256 function
and verifies if the result is the same as the represented signature. Then, Keystone
decrypts the ciphertext using the IV and gets the padded payload. The function
PKCS7 Unpad removes the padding and returns the pure payload.
Algorithm 3 Pseudocode of validating a Fernet token.
Function ValidateToken(token)
Token = base64.Decode(Token)
(V ersion, IssueT ime, IV, CipherText, TokenSignature) = unpack(token)
if V ersion <> 0x80 then
return null
end
V alidSignature = HMAC(V ersion ‖ IssueT ime ‖ IV ‖ CipherText)
if V alidSignature = TokenSignature then
Padded Payload = AES.Dec(IV, CipherText)






3.4 Recursive Augmented Fernet Token (RAFT)
Mechanism
As mentioned earlier, in the current authentication mechanism, whenever an adver-
sary captures a user token, he can do all the things that the owner of the token can
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do (the bearer token problem). The Recursive Augmented Fernet Token (RAFT)
mechanism is our solution for the bearer token problem in OpenStack. The solution
includes RAFT, a Policy enforcer component, and a Blacklist, which is explained in
this section. The main idea is as follows:
• Each user is granted a Fernet token from Keystone as like as current OpenStack
authentication process, i.e., the user presents his credential to Keystone and
Keystone returns a Fernet token after validating the credential.
• The user keeps the Fernet token secret. For every API request, the user gen-
erates a new RAFT token from the Fernet token. The RAFT token contains
enough information about the API and the user request, and it is unforgeable.
The user puts the RAFT instead of the Fernet token in the header of the API
request.
• Whenever a service receives an API request, it takes the RAFT token and
validates the RAFT with Keystone. Comparing to the Fernet mechanism, if the
RAFT was valid, Keystone returns extra information about the API and user
request. The Policy Checking component verifies if the API request matches
with the information returned by Keystone.
• Also, whenever a service needs to call another service on behalf of the user, it
derives a new RAFT from the RAFT it has received and uses the new RAFT
for its request.
• Each RAFT carries enough information about a user request. Using this info
and a Blacklist, Keystone only verifies a RAFT token pointing to the user
request once for each service.
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3.4.1 RAFT
The core of our solution is RAFT. To explain RAFT, we start with some definitions:
Root token: is a Fernet token that a user gets it from Keystone and uses to generate
RAFTs.
Base-RAFT: is a RAFT that is derived from a Fernet token by a user.
Service-RAFT: is a RAFT that is derived from another RAFT.
Parent token: If a token Ti is derived from Ti−1, we say Ti−1 is the parent of Ti.
Child token: If a token Ti is derived from Ti−1, we say Ti is a child of Ti−1.
RAFT key: In a big picture, a Fernet token or a RAFT Ti is a message mi con-
catenated with the HMAC of the message. Hence, we can represent a token
Ti = mi ‖ HMAC(mi). In our solution, the HMAC of a token is the RAFT key
of its children, and we may write Ti = mi ‖ Keyi where Keyi = HMAC(mi).
Parent Message, Parent Key: Parent key is another term that we use for the
RAFT key of a token. If Ti = mi ‖ HMAC(mi) was derived from the token
Ti−1 = mi−1 ‖ HMAC(mi−1), then HMAC(mi−1) is the parent key of Ti. Also,
mi−1 is the parent message of Ti.
Structure
As mentioned earlier, each RAFT token is derived from a Fernet or another RAFT
token. Therefore, the root of every RAFT token is a Fernet token like T0 = m0 ‖ key0.
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Considering the root token T0, we define the structure of a RAFT token as follows:
V ‖ Lmi−1 ‖ mi−1 ‖ Ei ‖ Ri ‖ Ci ‖ Hi, (3.1)
where
Version (V ): A byte showing the version of the token format. We identify the first
version by 0x91.
Length-of-parent-message (Lmi−1): A short integer (2 bytes) which specifies the
length of parent message in bytes.
Parent-message (mi−1): The parent message of the token.
Expiration-Time (Ei): It is a 64-bit unsigned big-endian integer, which shows the
expiration time of the token. It is calculated based on the number of seconds
past January 1, 1970.
Randomizer (Ri): A 64 bit random number used to randomize the RAFT.
Command (Ci): This is the command that we want to put in the token.
HMAC (Hi): This field is a 256-bit SHA256 HMAC that is used for authenticating
the content of the token. The signing key of the HMAC and the fields included
in the MAC varies based on the token type that are explained in the next
section.
Variations
We introduce two types of RAFT: 1- User-tied RAFT; 2- Fully-tied RAFT. The
structure of both tokens is the same. But, they use different signing keys and includes
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different fields in HMAC as follows:
User-tied RAFT: In this type, to derive a token from a parent token (received
token), we take the first 128 bits of the parent key and use it for signing the
new token. The HMAC field is the HMAC of all the fields prior to it in the
token. This approach guarantees the authenticity of the user command carried
in a RAFT token.
Fully-tied RAFT: In this type, the process of issuing a new RAFT token for a user
is the same as User-tied version. But, each service has a long-term symmetric
key shared with Keystone and uses this key for signing tokens. The HMAC
field is the HMAC of all the fields prior to it in the token plus the parent key
of the token. Consequently, the RAFT is tied to the command and the service,
and Keystone can verify the authenticity of the user and services who have
contributed in a RAFT token.
Figure 3.6 shows the effect of a leaked token in two types of RAFT with an example.
In the example, the user issues the token T1 for her command (request) C1 and sends
T1 to the service A. To accomplish C1, A needs to send the C2 and C3 commands to
B and C, respectively. As shown in the picture, T1 is leaked to the adversary. In the
Fully-tied RAFT, the adversary can not forge any valid RAFT using T1, but in the
User-tied RAFT, the adversary can forge several valid RAFTs. However, the point
is that all of them carry C1, and if the adversary put a command that does not align
with C1, the policy enforcer component (described later in this chapter) will reject
the token.
The advantage of the fully tied token over the user tied token is that:
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(a) Fully-tied RAFT. (b) User-tied RAFT.
Figure 3.6: The effect of a leaked token in two types of RAFT.
• It guarantees stronger security (see section 3.5).
• It is not (computationaly) possible to forge a RAFT on behalf of the module
unless the module was corrupted.
However, since in fully tied RAFT, each module must have a secret key shared with
the Keystone, we need to adopt a proper key distribution and key renewal mecha-
nism, which in turn it induces extra efforts. Although we know how to do key renewal
[44, 99, 3], the problem is that deciding on an appropriate key renewal/management
strategy involves agreement among the OpenStack community to what kind of secu-
rity posture the key renewal methodology should have. The user tied RAFT token
does not require such discussion. The fully tied RAFT token needs this extra dis-
cussion and needs an adaptation/extension of current key renewal practice. Once
the user tied RAFT token gets accepted by the OpenStack community, there will be
interest in starting a discussion on how fully tied RAFT tokens can be adapted (as
these offer better security at no less performance).
Generation
Algorithms 4 and 5 show the steps for issuing a user-tied RAFT, and algorithms
4 and 6 represent the steps for issuing a fully-tied RAFT. In both RAFT variants,
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users run the same algorithm. As shown in the algorithms, given a parent token
Token = Pm ‖ Pkey, a command Cmd, the life time LifeT ime, and the service
keys KeySet (for Fully-tied RAFT), we follow the underneath steps to issue a RAFT
token:
1. Unpack the parent token and get the parent message and parent key.
2. Choose the proper signing key
3. Put the value 0x91 in the version field.
4. Set the Length of parent message field .
5. Set the parent message.
6. Add the token life time to the current time and put the result in expiration-time
field.
7. Choose an eight-byte random number for the randomizer field.
8. Set the command.
9. For user-tied token: Compute the HMAC of all above fields using the parent-
key.
10. For fully-tied token: Compute the HMAC of all above fields plus the parent key
using the secret key of the service
11. Base64url encode the entire token.
In section 3.6, we show the implementation of algorithms 4 and 5 in Python code.
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Algorithm 4 Pseudocode of Issuing a user-tied/fully-tied RAFT by a User.
Function UserIssue(Key, Pm, Cmd, LifeTime)
SignKey = HMAC(Key, Pm)
V = 0x91
L = Length(Pm)
E = GetCurrentT ime() + LifeT ime
R← Gen(1128)
Payload = V ‖ L ‖ Pm ‖ E ‖ R ‖ Cmd
Signature = HMAC(SignKey, Payload)
Token = base64.Encode(Payload ‖ Signature)
return Token
End Function
Algorithm 5 Pseudocode of Issuing a user-tied RAFT by Services.
Function ServiceIssue(Key, Token, Cmd, LifeTime)




E = GetCurrentT ime() + LifeT ime
R← Gen(1128)
Payload = V ‖ L ‖ Pm ‖ E ‖ R ‖ Cmd
Signature = HMAC(PKey, Payload)







Algorithm 6 Pseudocode of Issuing a fully-tied RAFT by services.
Function ServiceIssue(i,KeySet, Token, Cmd, LifeTime)
if Verify(k0 ∈ KeySet,Token)=1 then
(Pm,PKey) = Unpack(Token)
SignKey = ki ∈ KeySet
V = 0x91
L = Length(Pm)
E = GetCurrentT ime() + LifeT ime
R← Gen(1128)
Payload = V ‖ L ‖ Pm ‖ E ‖ R ‖ Cmd
Signature = HMAC(SignKey, Payload ‖ PKey)







Algorithm 7 shows pseudocode of a user-tied token Verification. Given the secret key
of Keystone kkeystone and a token, to verify that the token is a valid user tied token
and recover all the commands embedded in the token, perform the following steps, in
order:
1. base64url decode the token.
2. If the first byte of the token is not 0x91, then the token is not valid. Therefore,
raise an exception error.
3. Unpack the token.
4. Check the expiration time of the token in mi.
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5. Using the length-of-parent-message field (second and third bytes), retrieve mi−1.
If mi−1 is a RAFT-message (i.e. its first byte is 0x91), check the expiration time
of mi−1 and retrieve mi−2 from mi−1. Recursively continue this step until you
get m0 ,which must be a Fernet-message (i.e. its first byte must be 0x80).
6. Calculate key0 = HMAC(kkeystone,m0)
7. Having key0, backtrack step 5 and calculate all parent keys {key1, · · · keyi−1}
computing keyj = HMAC(keyj−1,mj).
8. Having keyi−1, recalculate the HMAC of the given token. If the calculated
HMAC is equal with the HMAC of the given token, then verify the original
Fernet token m0 ‖ key0.
9. Extract the Fernet message from m0 and all commands from {m1, · · · ,mi} and
return them.
Verification of a fully-tied RAFT is slightly different from Verification a user-tied
token. In fully-tied RAFT, each service also has a secret key, and service uses its secret
key to sign tokens. Algorithm 8 is the pseudocode for a fully-tied token verification.
Given all the secret keys of Keystone and other services KeySet = {k0, · · · , kn} and a
token, to verify that the token is a valid fully tied token and recover all the commands
embedded in the token, perform the following steps, in order:
1. base64url decode the token.
2. If the first byte of the token is not 0x91, then the token is not valid. Therefore,
raise an exception error.
3. Unpack the token.
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Algorithm 7 Pseudocode of a user-tied RAFT Verification
Function Verify(Key, Token)
Token = base64.decode(Token)
(V ‖ L ‖ Pm ‖ E ‖ R ‖ Cmd ‖ Tag)← Unpack(Token)
if V = 0x91 then
CheckExpirationT ime(E)
Cmds, PKey = V alidateParent(Key, Pm)
AccomulateCommands(Cmds,Cmd)
if HMAC(PKey, V ‖ L ‖ Pm ‖ E ‖ R ‖ Cmd) = Tag then









if First byte of Message is 0x91 then
(V ‖ L ‖ Pm ‖ E ‖ R ‖ Cmd)← Unpack(Message)
CheckExpirationT ime(E)
Cmds, PKey = V alidateParent(Key, Pm)
AccomulateCommands(Cmds,Cmd)







4. Check the expiration time of the token in mi.
5. Using the length-of-parent-message field (second and third bytes), retrieve mi−1.
If mi−1 is a RAFT-message (i.e. its first byte is 0x91), check the expiration time
of mi−1 and retrieve mi−2 from mi−1. Recursively continue this step until you
get m0 ,which must be a Fernet-message (i.e. its first byte must be 0x80).
6. Calculate tag0 = HMAC(k0,m0), where k0 is the secret key of Keystone.
7. Having tag0, backtrack step 5 and calculate all the tags of ancestor tokens
{tag1, · · · tagi−1} computing tagj = HMAC(kj,mj ‖ tagj1).
8. Having tagi−1, recalculate the HMAC of the given token. If HMAC(ki,mi ‖
tagi−1) = tagi, then verify the original Fernet token m0 ‖ tag0.
9. Extract the Fernet message from m0 and all commands from {m1, · · · ,mi} and
return them.
3.4.2 Blacklist
The Blacklist not only prevents replay attacks, it also guarantees that each module
serves at most once for every user command. Every RAFT is either a base-RAFT
or has been derived from a base-RAFT. Hence, we can say every valid RAFT has a
unique base-RAFT. We want each base-RAFT to be a permit for only one task in
the system. For example, if a user generates a base-RAFT for accessing an image, we
should guarantee that the image will be accessed at most once using this user-RAFT.
To do so, we propose to add a blacklist mechanism in the token validation process.
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Algorithm 8 Pseudocode of a fully-tied RAFT verification
Function Verify(KeySet, Token)
Token = base64.decode(Token)
(V ‖ L ‖ Pm ‖ E ‖ R ‖ Cmd ‖ Tag)← Unpack(Token)
if V = 0x91 then
CheckExpirationT ime(E)
ki = FindServiceKey(Cmd)
Cmds, PTag = V alidateParent(KeySet, Pm)
AccomulateCommands(Cmds,Cmd)
if HMAC(ki, V ‖ L ‖ Pm ‖ E ‖ R ‖ Cmd ‖ PTag) = Tag then









if First byte of Message is 0x91 then
(V ‖ L ‖ Pm ‖ E ‖ R ‖ Cmd)← Unpack(Message)
CheckExpirationT ime(E)
ki = FindServiceKey(Cmd)
Cmds, PTag = V alidateParent(KeySet, Pm)
AccomulateCommands(Cmds,Cmd)







Each entry in the blacklist is a tuple (B, S,E) that is added upon a successful token
validation where:
S: is the service who asked Keystone to validate the token T .
B: is the base-RAFT of T .
E: is the expiration time of B.
When S asks Keystone to validate T , Keystone extracts B out of T . It also extracts
the expiration time E out of B. Since for executing user commends each module
needed at most once, Keystone only validates a token when its corresponding tuple
(B, S,E) was not in the blacklist. Keystone periodically cleans up the blacklist and
keeps only the tuples that have not been expired. A tuple (B, S,E) is expired when
E is less than system time. Since the lifetime of a RAFT is usually very short, a
lightweight memcache structure works fine.
3.4.3 Policy Enforcer
If the adversary obtains a user tied RAFT, he/she can produce children of the token.
Also, in fully tied RAFT, if the adversary knows the secret key of a module (corrupts
the module), he/she can generate children for the tokens sent to the module. RAFT
(either user tied or fully tied) excludes an adversary to produce a token without
knowledge of one of its parents/ancestors. The policy enforcer is used to make sure
that the commands in a RAFT are consistent and obey a proper execution flow
(specified by a policy). This means that even though an adversary can create child
tokens, he/she can only do so using commands that fit the policy enforcer. Figure 3.7
demonstrates the idea. Here, the user creates a token T for the “list image” command
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and sends it to Glance, which is compromised by the adversary. Hence, the adversary
can create a child token like T ′. If the adversary adds an arbitrary command like
“delete a server” to the new token, and sends the token to Nova, since the ”delete
server” command does not fit the “list image” command, the policy enforcer of Nova
will reject the request.
Figure 3.7: Demonstration of the usage of Policy Enforcer
The policy enforcer completes our solution.
3.5 Security Guarantees
The aim of RAFT token is to prevent an adversary from sending a request to Open-
Stack on behalf of the user. At a high level, a RAFT token is an algorithm that gets
a message as an input and outputs a token. Security is formulated by requiring that
103
no adversary can generate a valid token on any new message. For user tied RAFT
token, a new message is considered to be any message that the message itself or its
ancestors was not previously sent by a user or OpenStack modules. For fully tied
RAFT, only the message itself should not be previously sent by user or OpenStack
modules.
In this section we want to define the security that each type of RAFT token
mechanism provides. In order to do this we take the following steps:
• First, we present the technical definition of what a user/fully tied RAFT is.
• Next, we define an experiment as a game between the RAFT mechanism and
the adversary. The experiment shows how an adversary interacts with the
mechanism and in which circumstances the adversary may successfully forge a
RAFT token and win the game.
• Using this game and the technical definition of RAFT mechanism, we provide
the definition of the RAFT token security. The definition states that no PPT
adversary should win the game with non-negligible probability.
• Finally, we construct a secure user/fully tied RAFT using the algorithms defined
in section 3.4.1 and define a lemma which indicates that our construction is
secure and unforgeable against a chosen-message attack.
The RAFT token comes into two flavors, user tied and fully tied RAFT token. In
section 3.5.1 we argue about the security guarantees of user tied RAFT mechanism
while in section 3.5.2 we focus on the security of fully tied RAFT mechanism.
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3.5.1 User Tied RAFT Mechanism Security Analysis
A user tied RAFT token prevents the adversary from impersonating a legitimate user.
Before defining the security features of this mechanism, we first provide a technical
definition of user tied RAFT mechanism. Technically, a user tied RAFT is made
up of four algorithms Gen, UserIssue, ServiceIssue, and V er. The algorithm Gen
generates a secret key; we assume that upon input the security parameter λ, the
algorithm Gen outputs a uniformly distributed string of length λ. The algorithms
UserIssue and ServiceIssue receive a message/token (p/r), a command c and a key
k as an input and generate a token. UserIssue is used by the user dashboard while
ServiceIssue is used by the OpenStack services. Finally, the algorithm V er receives
a token r and a key k and outputs either 1 (meaning valid) or 0 (meaning invalid).
In the following we have the formal definition:
Definition 3. A User-tied Token is a quadruple Π = (Gen, UserIssue, ServiceIssue, V er)
of ppt algorithms where:
• k ← Gen(1λ) , where Gen generates a key k with security parameter λ
• r0 = (m0, t0)← UserIssue(k, p, c0), where UserIssue generates a token r0 for
the root payload p and the command c0 with the key k.
• rj = (mj, tj)← ServiceIssue(k, rj−1, cj), where if rj−1 is internally verified by
V er(k, rj−1) then ServiceIssue generates a token rj for the input token rj−1
and the command cj with the key k; Otherwise it returns nothing.
• b← V er(k, rn = (mn, tn)), where V er takes a key k and a token rn. It outputs
b, with b = 1 meaning the token is valid and b = 0 meaning the token is not
valid.
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• It is called correct if for every k output by Gen(1λ) and every token r generated
by UserIssue or ServiceIssue; it holds V er(k, r) = 1.
A user-tied-token must provide the following properties:
• Represents a user-command.
• Enables a module to extend a token with a command.
• Prevents an adversary to forge any token except some descendants of the eaves-
dropped tokens.
A descendant of a token contains all the commands in the token. If the adversary
adds an irrelevant command to a child token of an eavesdropped token, it will be
rejected by the policy enforcer (see section 3.4.3) of other modules. Hence, the ability
to forge a child token is tolerated.
Now, we define the following game for a PPT adversary A, the security parameter
λ, and a user-tied token Π = (Gen, UserIssue, ServiceIssue, V er):
Game 1. Forge a User Tied Token ForgeUTTA,Π(λ):
1. Gen(1λ) generates a key k
2. The adversary A is given input 1λ and oracle access to V er(k, .), UserIssue(k, ., .),
and ServiceIssue(k, ., .) and outputs r = (m, t). Let Φ represent the set of all
tokens that A has queried.
3. A wins if and only if (1) V er(k, r = (m, t)) = 1 and (2) r and any of its
ancestors are not in Φ.
106
4. The experiment returns 1 if the adversary wins the game, otherwise it returns
0.
The definition of game 1 covers our goal. It ties a token to the user-command
and allows a service to extend the token with a new command. Since the adversary
has oracle access to UserIssue and ServiceIssue, it covers the situation that the
adversary eavesdrops some tokens. It states that no PPT adversary should be able to
generate a valid user-tied token unless he has seen at least one of its ancestors. This
guarantees that the adversary cannot forge a token with a fake user command.
Definition 4. A user tied token Π = (Gen, UserIssue, ServiceIssue, V er) is un-
forgeable under a chosen-message attack, or just secure, if for all PPT adversaries A
there exists a negligible function3 negl such that:
Pr[ForgeUTTA,Π(λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ). (3.2)
Using definition 3 and algorithms 4, 5, and 7 we construct a user tied RAFT
token. We then prove that our construction is a secure user tied RAFT.
Definition 5. We say HMAC is secure and indistinguishable from an random func-
tion, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers D, there exists a negligible
function α such that:
|Pr[DHMAC(k,.)(λ) = 1]− Pr[Df(.)(λ) = 1]| ≤ α(λ) (3.3)
where f(.) is a random function and α(λ) is a negligible function in λ.
3A function f(x) : N → R is negligible, if for every positive polynomial poly() there exists an





Lemma 1. Assume that the HMAC used in the Construction 1 is secure and in-
distinguishable from a random function. Then, Construction 1 is a secure user tied
token that is unforgable under chosen message attacks.
Construction 1. User Tied RAFT
Let HMAC be indistinguishable from a random number. Define RAFT =
(Gen, UserIssue, ServiceIssue, V er) as follows:
• Gen(1λ): Upon input 1λ, choose k ← {0, 1}λ
• UserIssue(k, p, c): Upon input key k , payload p and the command c com-
pute r by running Algorithm 4.
• ServiceIssue(k, r′, c′): Upon input key k ∈ {0, 1}λ, token r′ and the com-
mand c′ compute r by running Algorithm 5.
• V er(k, r = (m, t)): Upon input key k ∈ {0, 1}λ, token r compute b by
running Algorithm 7.
In this section we only present an informal sketch of the proof of this lemma. We
defer to Appendix B for the full proof.
Proof sketch. Our argument proceeds via a reduction approach. That is, we show
how an adversary breaking construction 1 can be used as a sub routine to violate the
assumption that ”HMAC is secure and indistinguishable from a random function.”
To be more precise, we first assume, by contradiction, that a polynomial-time
adversary A manages to forge a user tied RAFT (breaks construction 1), i.e. with
a non-negligible probability ε s/he is able to win the game 1. Next, we build a new
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scheme, RAFT ′ to be the same as user tied RAFT except that instead of using the
HMAC for key k in its algorithms, i.e. in UserIssue and V er, it uses a random
function. We show that this implies the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm,
called distinguisher D, that can distinguish the HMAC from a random one with
advantage O(ε). This will then imply that ε must be negligible; otherwise it will
contradict the assumption that HMAC is secure.
More precisely, we show that the user tied RAFT is secure and the upper bound
on the probability of forging RAFT is about a factor n times ε, where n is the number
of commands added in the forged RAFT token. This upper bound makes sense: Let
us consider that a token can at most contain n commands; we can imagine these
commands leading to a HMAC chain. In the proof methodology, the attacker A can
be successful in impersonating any spot in the chain by using the command ci. This
means that there are n possibilities and thus the upper bound is a factor of n. By
observing that n = poly(λ) for a PPT adversary A the proof is completed.
Discussion. Lets assume that the HMAC which is used in the implementation
has α(λ) = 1
2λ
, then the lemma gives a concrete security statement with ε(λ) ≤
(n+ 1) · 1
2λ
+ 1
2λ−C where n is the number of modules in the system and C = poly(λ)
is the adversary’s maximum number of queries. Note that because of the blacklist
component, n can not be more than the number of modules in a system.
We introduce the notation αC(λ) =
1
2λ−C . This implies that α(λ) < αC(λ). In
the case that the adversary has made C queries to the HMAC(k,.) vs f(.) oracle,
then we can say, ε(λ) ≤ (n + 2) · αC(λ) = (n + 2) · 12λ−C . If key k does not change
for a long time, this implies that the adversary can make more queries to the oracle
O (C gets too large) and therefore, ε gets too large, i.e. the adversary’s chance of
109
winning the game increases. In order to keep ε low, we must implement key renewal
strategy in Keystone. In fact, OpenStack has this strategy implemented and by
default Keystone’s key is changed every one hour.
Statement. The implementation of the discussed and proven secure RAFT mech-
anism provided in section 3.6, is a one-time token
In order to have a one-time RAFT token, we have considered and implemented an
additional component; Blacklist. The blacklist, ensures that each OpenStack service
cannot request a validation for the same token more than one time.The blacklist
component is added to the Keystone and functions as follows. Each time the Keystone
receives a token, first, it checks if the token is valid, i.e. the V er function outputs 1, if
so, then it checks if the pair (base-RAFT(token), service id) is in the blacklist. If not,
then Keystone returns valid, otherwise returns invalid (for more detail on blacklist
functionality see section 3.4.2).
This indicates that each token with the same base-RAFT token can only be vali-
dated once, which implies that the RAFT token implementation is a one-time token.
Since our implemented RAFT token in section 3.6 is a one-time token, then it fits
the security proof of OpenStack given in [32] and we can adopt the proven security.
Hogan et al. [32] provided a universally composable security analysis of OpenStack.
The authors proved that if instead of bearer token a one-time token is used, the
security properties of OpenStack will improve (for more details on OpenStack security
analysis, see [32]).
Therefore, using our RAFT mechanism instead of bearer token will improve the
security of OpenStack. Note that the proof in [32] is done via universal composability
framework. This framework guarantees that a component remains secure even if
arbitrarily composed with other component. This means, that using the RAFT token
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improves the security of OpenStack and won’t be affected if in the future new modules
are added to the system.
3.5.2 Fully Tied RAFT Mechanism Security Analysis
The fully tied RAFT token is similar to user tied RAFT token except it has an
additional feature which prevents the adversary to send a token on behalf of a service.
In other words, if the adversary is able to get access to a fully tied token, s/he is not
able to send a request on behalf of a (uncorrupted) service to another service.
In this section we show the security guarantees of a fully tied RAFT token. We first
provide a technical definition of a fully tied token. Next, we define a game between
the adversary and the fully tied RAFT mechanism: In this game the adversary is
given an oracle access to the RAFT functions and is able to make queries. At some
point the adversary generates a token for a message the he has not queried. The
adversary wins the game if the provided token passes the validation.
We also give the security definition of fully tied RAFT and construct a secure fully
tied RAFT using the algorithms in section 3.4.1. Finally, we wrap up this section
with a lemma that shows our construction is secure against chosen-message attack.
Definition 6. A Fully-tied Token is a quadruple Π = (Gen, UserIssue, ServiceIssue, V er)
of ppt algorithms where:
• K = (k0, · · · , kn−1)← Gen(1λ) with security parameter λ.
• r0 = (m0, t0)← UserIssue(k0, p, c0) generates a token r0 for root payload p and
the command c0 with key k0.
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• rj = (mj, tj) ← ServiceIssue(i,K, rj−1, cj) internally call V er(K, rj−1) and if
rj−1 is invalid then it returns nothing; else generates a token rj for the input
token rj−1, the service id i, and the command cj with the key ki. Note that
ServiceIssue consists of two phases: 1- Verification: in which it calls V er
algorithm and verifies the validity of the token rj−1. For this part K is needed.
2- Token generation: computes a token rj using the key of the service with
service id i (i.e. ki).
• b← V er(K, rn = (mn, tn)), where V er takes a set of keys K and a token rn. It
outputs b, with b = 1 meaning the token is valid and b = 0 meaning the token
is not valid.
• It is called correct if for every K output by Gen(1λ) and every token r generated
by UserIssue or ServiceIssue; it holds V er(K, r) = 1.
According to the above definition, a fully tied token gets a payload and extends it
with a command. This definition looks similar to definition 3. However, an important
difference exists: here, each module has its own secret key, while in definition 3,
modules do not own/use any secret keys. This enable modules to add a new command
to the token and sign the token with their secret keys.
We define the following game for a PPT adversary A, the security parameter λ,
and a fully-tied token Π = (Gen, UserIssue, ServiceIssue, V er):
Game 2. Forge a Fully Tied Token or for short ForgeFTT:
• K = (k0, · · · , kn−1)← Gen(1λ) where n =Number of Services in the system.
• The adversary A is given input 1λ and access to oracles: V er(K, .), UserIssue(k0, ., .),
and ServiceIssue(i,K, ., .) and knows keys ki for i ∈ I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Let Φ
112
represent the set of all tokens that A has requested. Eventually, the adversary
outputs r = (m, t).
• A wins if and only if (1) V er(K, r = (m, t)) = 1, (2) r /∈ Φ, and (3) r is not
an output of ServiceIssue(i,K, ., .) for some i ∈ I.
• The experiment returns 1 if the adversary wins the game, otherwise it returns
0.
This game is exactly the same as game 1 with one extra condition in Step 3, which
is ”r is not an output of ServiceIssue(i,K, ., .) for some i ∈ I”.
Definition 7. A fully tied token Π = (Gen, UserIssue, ServiceIssue, V er) is un-
forgeable under a chosen-message attack, or just secure, if for all PPT adversaries A
there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Pr[ForgeFTTA,Π(λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ) (3.4)
A secure fully-tied token guarantees the authenticity of the user and service com-
mands embedded in a token, i.e., not only the adversary can not forge a token with
a fake user-command, he also can not forge a valid token on behalf of any service,
unless he corrupts the service (knows the secret key of the service).
Lemma 2. Assume that the HMAC used in Construction 2 is secure and indistin-
guishable from a random function. Then, Construction 2 is a secure fully tied token
that is unforgable under chosen message attacks.
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Construction 2. Fully Tied Token RAFT
Let HMAC be indistinguishable from a random number. Define a Fully Tied
Token R̂AFT = (Gen, UserIssue, ServiceIssue, V er) as follows:
• Gen(1λ): Upon input 1λ, choose K = (k0, k1, ..., kn−1) ← {0, 1}λ where
n =Number of Services in the system.
• UserIssue(k0, p, c): Upon input key k0 ∈ {0, 1}λ, payload p and the com-
mand c compute r by running Algorithm 4.
• ServiceIssue(i,K, r′, c): Upon input key K = {k0, k1, ..., kn−1} ← {0, 1}λ ,
token r′ and the command c compute r by running Algorithm 6.
• V er(K, r = (m, t)): Upon input key set K = {k0, k1, ..., kn−1} ← {0, 1}λ,
token r compute b by running Algorithm 8.
We defer to Appendix B for the full proof. Here, we simply highlight the main
ideas involved in the proof.
Proof sketch. The intuition behind the proof of this lemma is the same as lemma 1.
Here, our argument also proceeds via reduction approach.
We argue that the only way for an adversary to win the game is to either generate
a valid token which is a result of UserIssue or a valid token which is the result of
ServiceIssue. Next, we show that a tokens generated by UserIssue can be repre-
sented as a user tied RAFT token with exactly one command and tokens generated
by serviceIssue can be represented by a user tied RAFT token with no command.
This argument enables us to use lemma 1 to prove the security of the fully tied RAFT
and show its upper bound.
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Discussion. For fully tied RAFT the upper bound on the probability of success-
fully forging a token is much more tight than the upper bound for user tied RAFT.
This is reasonable because in this type of RAFT mechanism, each service has its own
secret key for applying the HMAC. This means, even if the adversary gets access
to a valid token, he is not able to generate a valid token on behalf of an uncorupted
service.
3.6 Proof of Concept
To represent a proof of concept, we have developed a python library, which enables
us to:
• Issue a user tied RAFT given a Fernet token or another user tied RAFT.
• Validate a user tied RAFT given the Fernet key and return all commands inside
the user tied RAFT.
We also modified Keystone to accept and validate user tied RAFTs. In the rest of
this chapter, we explain the details of our experiments.
3.6.1 Experiment platform
Using KVM, we set up a Virtual Machine (VM) with 4 vCPUs and 8GB vRAM. The
physical host was a DELL XPS 9530 laptop taking advantage of an Intel Core(TM)
i7-4712HQ CPU @ 2.30GHz with 16GB memory and 250GB SSD. The operating
system of the host and virtual machine were Ubuntu 18.04.3 LTS. We had installed
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OpenStack Stein on our VM using DevStack script; this is what OpenStack developers
usually use.
3.6.2 Installing OpenStack
We use DevStack to install OpenStack. DevStack is a bunch of scripts that are pro-
vided for developers and installs the main modules of OpenStack on a single machine.
If someone follows the official steps for using DevStack, it may get stuck for several
months, and many people complain about it. Bumgardner in [13] says, ”The same
DevStack instructions might fail on Monday but work on Friday.” Here, I reveal the
following tips that help people to use DevStack easily:
1. Do not install the latest OpenStack. If you follow the official instruction, De-
vStack is supposed to install the latest OpenStack on your system, which is the
underdevelopment version.
2. Do not install OpenStack on the most recent Linux. If you do, prepare yourself
for handling enormous incompatibility errors.
3. Use the latest stable OpenStack release name and the latest LTS Ubuntu older
than it.
As OpenStack community recommended, first, I set up a virtual machine in KVM.
I installed Virtual Machine Manager (known as virtmngr) using the following com-
mand:
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sudo apt-get install virt-manager
VMM provides a graphical interface for KVM, which helps to install and configure
virtual machines easily.
At the time, the latest stable release of OpenStack is Stein, and the latest LTS
Ubuntu that is published before Stein is 18.04.03. After installing the Ubuntu on the
virtual machine, we installed Stein. To Install Stein, we recommend the following
steps:
1. Open the Linux terminal and install git :
sudo apt-get install git
2. Create a non-root user stack by the following command:
sudo useradd -s /bin/bash -d /opt/stack -m stack
As you may noticed, the home directory of the Stack user is /opt/stack.
3. Since the user is going to execute lots of scripts, it must be a sudoer user without
a password. To do so, execute:
echo "stack ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL" | sudo tee
/etc/sudoers.d/stack↪→
4. switch to the stack user:
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sudo su - stack
5. Download the DevStack repo:
git clone https://opendev.org/openstack/devstack
--branch=stable/stein↪→
After successfully downloading the repo, there must be a directory named devs-
tack in /opt/stack/devstack. Switch to this directory and create a configuration
file with the name local.conf. The file must contain some configuration data.







In the above code, put your password instead of your PASSWORD. I recom-




stack.sh contains several thousand scripts that finally set up OpenStack after
20 minutes (on my laptop).
3.6.3 RAFT Library
Snippet C.2 represents the user tied RAFT library. It contains two classes:
• KeystoneRaft: this class encapsulates several methods to validate RAFT tokens.
Some of its important methods are:
– isRAFT: gets a token and returns true if the token was a RAFT.
– CheckExpirationTime: gets a token and cheks its expiration time. If the
token is expired, then it raises an exception error.
– GetKey: This method is used internally to find the key of the token.
– ValidateRAFT: gets a RAFT and checks if it is valid or not. If the token
was valid, this function returns all the commands inside the token. Also,
it sets the fernet token property of the class.
• ClientRaft: this class allows clients and other modules to create a new RAFT
for their requests. The main methods of this class are:
– init : this is the constructor of the class and allows us to define the
parent token of the RAFT, which we want to create.
– SetParentToken: Allows to set or change the parent token.
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– SetCommand: Is used to set the command that will be a part of the token.
– Finalize: generates and returns a RAFT token based on the parent token
and the command that had been set.
3.6.4 The required changes
If a person installs OpenStack following the instructions we provide in section 1, the
source code of Keystone will be at /opt/stack/keystone folder. Let’s call this folder
the base folder. We added our library to the following folder:
base folder/keystone/token
The source code of Fernet token is at:
base folder/keystone/token/providers/fernet
In the fernet folder, there is a file token formmater.py, which contains the entry point
for the Fernet library. We added the following code at the library importing section
of the file (at the beginning of the file):
import RAFT
Then, we modified the validate token function of TokenFormatter class, as shown in
snippet C.3. When this function is called, we first check the input token. If it is a
RAFT, then we process it using an instance of KeystoneRAFT class. Upon successful
validation, we extract the original Fernet token and assign it to the token. In this
way, the rest of the function checks the privileges of the root Fernet token. At the
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end of the function, if the input token was a RAFT, we adjust the expiration time of
token according to the shortest expiration time in the RAFT.
After applying the changes to source code, we must restart the Keystone service.
Never restart the virtual machine. If you do so, you need to uninstall OpenStack and
try to install it again. In order to restart the Keystone service execute the following
command in the Linux terminal.
systemctl restart devstack@keystone.service
3.6.5 Comparison Between RAFT and Fernet Tokens’ Cre-
ation and Validation Time
The RAFT solution puts a negligible processing overhead over the Fernet processing
time. Since many processes were running on the OpenStack server, this negligible
overhead was not measurable using OpenStack. Hence, we calculated the overhead
locally. In our platform 3.6.1, issuing 100 RAFTs (excluding granting a Fernet token
from Keystone) took 8.1 milliseconds, and verification of just the RAFTs (excluding
the verification of the base Fernet) took 13.2 milliseconds. These numbers show the
extra processing time needed for a RAFT compare to Fernet token.
Table 3.1 shows the summary of the first set of our experiments (see the source
code in Snippet C.4) that focuses on the creation and validation time of user tied
RAFT and Fernet token 4. The first set includes the following seven experiments:
4The process of issuing and validating a fully tied RAFT with one command and a user tied
RAFT with one command is exactly the same. The only difference between issuing and validating a
fully tied RAFT and a user tied RAFT for more than one commands is that they use different keys
for the HMAC of second and more commands. Hence, we do not expect any considerable change in
the result if we repeat them for fully tied RAFT.
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• Row #1 shows the execution time for getting 100 Fernet tokens from Keystone.
• Row #2 represent the execution time for getting a Fernet token and generating
100 RAFTs using the Fernet token.
• Row #3 exposes the execution time for getting and validating of 100 Fernet
tokens.
• Rows #4 to #7 demonstrate the execution time of getting a Fernet token and
issuing 100 RAFTs with hypothetical commands with 0, 30, 60, and 200 lengths
(in character).
To get more reliable results, we repeat each experiment several times, but because
space limitation, we only represent the result of five of them.
# Experiment title First Second Third Forth Fifth Avg
1 Fernet Generation 4.3519 4.3519 4.3593 4.4529 4.4897 4.4011




















4.6302 4.6704 4.7203 4.5572 4.6420 4.6440
Table 3.1: Execution time in seconds for generating and validating of 100 RAFT and
Fernet tokens. For creating RAFT, we only interact with Keystone one time and then
create 100 RAFTs locally.
As mentioned earlier, one idea for mitigating the bearer token problem is to
shorten the lifetime of Fernet tokens in a way that there is no time to use it twice.
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From row #1 and #2, we can conclude that for token generation, if a user issues
more than one command in a specific period, the RAFT solution is faster than the
short-life Fernet token idea. But the creation time is only one side of the problem.
Each token needs to be validate by Keystone. If we include the validation time (rows
#3 to #7), the RAFT solution still works at most 50 percent better if each user issues
several commands.
The length of the command that we add to a RAFT has unnoticeable overhead,
as understood from rows #4 to #7. In fact, we repeated the experiment #4 to #7
much more than five times, and each time we got very close results.
3.6.6 RAFT and Fernet in Action
In the second set of experiments, we examined the effect of using user tied RAFT
instead of Fernet in the execution time of four different commands as follows:
Create volume: is a moderate workload command that creates a volume, i.e., a
permanent memory like a physical disk. Snippet 3.5 shows the sample command that
we used for creating a volume. We did not load any image to the volume. If we want
to load an image to the volume, it can be considered as a high load task.














cmd += " " + str(data)
return cmd
Create VM (server): is a typical command in OpenStack that consumes significant
resources. Snippet 3.6 shows the sample command that we used for creating a VM. In
this sample, we used cirros that is an ultra-lightweight operating system. The cirros
operating system (OS) includes a few core functionalities of a Linux OS and only be
used for tests.
















cmd += " " + str(data)
return cmd
Image list: is a light load command that does not need any parameter.
Project list: is another light load command that returns the list of projects that
are available for the owner of the token. This command also does not need any
parameters.
Table 3.2 represents a comparison between the execution time (in seconds) of
the four different commands using RAFT and Fernet tokens. We put the result of
five execution for each command in the table. Based on the result, the overhead of
using RAFT instead of Fernet in typical create-server and create-volume commands
is less than 1 percent. Here, we used cirros OS to create a server that is a very small
nonpractical operating system. In a real deployment, usually creating a VM using an
operational OS takes several seconds, and the RAFT overhead is not noticeable. In
general, typical cloud operations like creating servers, migrating servers, and taking
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back up of servers are very time consuming compare to token verification. Hence, we
expect that this overhead will be much less than 1 percent for a real deployment.
Experiment title First Second Third Forth Fifth Avg Ratio
Creating a volume
(Fernet)




0.3583 0.4021 0.4140 0.4313 0.4211 0.4054
Creating a VM
(Fernet)




0.7032 0.7740 0.8938 2.0452 0.6831 1.0198
Getting image list
(Fernet)




0.0548 0.0598 0.0616 0.0553 0.0620 0.0595
Getting project list
(Fernet)




0.0303 0.0323 0.0296 0.0311 0.0305 0.0307
Table 3.2: Comparison between the execution time of four different commands using
RAFT and Fernet tokens
Snippet C.5 shows the source code that we developed for the second set of exper-
iments.
3.6.7 Future work
To present a proof of concept, we use DevStack, which is the developer version of
OpenStack. The OpenStack that is commercially used needs several servers and
some specific hardware [73]. Due to the resource limitation of DevStack, we can not
simulate the effect of RAFT in a real-world deployment. Based on our experiments
and knowledge, since the time that a module needs to accomplish a request is much
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longer than the time that the module needs for creating a RAFT, we can reasonably
expect that using RAFT does not affect the performance of none-Keystone modules.
To have a better understanding of the effect of RAFT, we need to get a statistical
report that shows the type and number of commands that each user issues in the
practical deployment. Having this report, we can calculate the performance of RAFT
compared to the idea of using short life Fernet tokens in practice.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a tokening mechanism for OpenStack. OpenStack is an
open-source cloud platform that has gained lots of attractions. OpenStack supports
four token mechanisms, which all of them suffer from the bearer token problem, i.e., if
an adversary captures a token, he can impersonate a user (the owner of the token) and
do whatever the user can do. Here, we proposed the RAFT authentication mechanism
that includes three elements:
• A new token format that ties commands to tokens and enables scoping down a
token without bothering the identity module.
• A lightweight blacklist mechanism that prevents replay attacks.
• A policy checking component that guarantees a token can only be used for a
purpose which it was issued for.
In our method, a user grants a Fernet token from Keystone, but the user never
passes the token to any services. Whenever the user wants to issue a service request,
he derives a new RAFT from the Fernet token and uses the new token. Similarly,
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whenever a service wants to make a request on behalf of the user, the service derives
a new RAFT from the RAFT it has received. Implementing the proposed solution
including RAFT token, the Blacklist, and the Policy Enforcer, provides the one-time
used token defined in [32], and guarantees the modularity security requirement in
presence of adversaries.
We have implemented a RAFT token library that allows issuing a RAFT token
either based on a Fernet token or other RAFT token. Also, we have modified the
identity module of OpenStack to accept and validate RAFT tokens. The experimental
results show that our mechanism adds less than 1 percent for a token validation time,
which is negligible considering the whole time needed to handle a user request. Also,
our experiment showed that generating a RAFT token from a long life Fernet token





No matter what a system is, a proper authentication mechanism is the key to securing
the system. An authentication mechanism may control who can operate the system
or modify the data, distinguish a fake object or user from the legitimate one, verify
the origin of a request, and so on. In this dissertation, I focus on the two use-cases
of authentication.
The first use-case is about supply chains. A supply chain is a network of partners
that cooperate in the production, delivery, and sale of particular products. Using
Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags is the most adopted strategy in develop-
ing a counterfeit product detection mechanism for supply chains. Here, I introduce
the Connectionless method, a new direction for RFID based counterfeit product de-
tection mechanism, that utilizes the memory of modern RFID tags to eliminate the
need for having local databases on the premise of partners. Then, I propose a cryp-
tographic solution based on the connectionless method, which significantly improves
the availability of the system and costs less.
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The second use-case is about OpenStack, the prevalent open-source cloud com-
puting platform. OpenStack has a prominent position among all Cloud computing
platforms. It uses a token-based authentication and authorization mechanism. Until
now, OpenStack has utilized four token formats, which all of them have suffered from
the bearer token problem. The bearer token is a token whoever gets it, can use it
on behalf of the owner of the token. OpenStack is a highly modular system with a
massive codebase. Hence, as like any other software, an adversary can find some bugs.
If the adversary can capture user tokens by exploiting the bugs, he can cause intoler-
able damages to users and the cloud. To mitigate this problem, I introduce Recursive
Augment Fernet Token (RAFT), a new tokening mechanism for OpenStack, which
improves the security guarantees of OpenStack in the presence of compromised mod-
ules. The heart of this authentication mechanism is a cryptographic self-descriptive
token that does not need persistent storage. RAFT allows users to issue very short
life tokens with determined privileges.
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Appendix A
Security analysis of the proposed
Software Unclonable Functions
Software unclonable functions are meant to be applied in RFID-based secure supply
chain management. Rather than just proving asymptotic results in the form of the
probability of a successful attack being negligible in λ, we want to know a concrete
upper bound on this probability as a function of λ. This will allow us to suggest
concrete parameter settings.
As we will explain below, Definition 2 talks about the average over ‘queries x′ ←
A0(1λ) to oracle Fk(.)’ of the probability of a successful prediction by the simulator
computed by S ← A1(x′, Fk(x′)). In asymptotic terms, if this average is negligible,
then it is not possible to have a significant worst-case probability γ0 of selecting an
oracle query which leads to a simulator which also has a significant probability ≥ γ1
of success, because γ0γ1 is at most average p which is negligible,
γ0γ1 ≤ p. (A.1)
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In other words, either γ0 or γ1 must be negligible.
In this argument we did not specify the pair (γ0, γ1) and we note that there are
many possibilities. In the concrete non-asymptotic setting, we want an achievable
pair (γ0, γ1) for which both the probability γ0 of having a ‘lucky’ query as well as the
probability γ1 of succesfull prediction by a simulator originating from ‘normal’ queries
to be equally small: If we find such a pair, then we know that both the worst-case
probability γ0 is small as well as the probability γ1 of success in the normal case
is small. This is not captured by studying the concrete asymptotic behavior of the
average as a function of λ.
For example, if p = 2−λ, then the minimum α of max{γ0, γ1} over all possi-
ble/achievable pairs (γ0, γ1) could be realized by γ0 = γ1 = 2
−λ/2 which meets (A.1)
with equality (the argument is in essence the application of the birthday paradox
to our problem setting). This leads to a very different concrete parameter setting
compared to ‘just’ considering the average case.
So, we are still not entirely satisfied with Definition 2 when considering concrete
parameter settings for the following reason: For A1 and x′ ∈ {0, 1}λ, let
p[A1](x′) = Probx←{0,1}λ(Fk(x)← S(x)|S ← A1(x′)). (A.2)
In Definiton 2 the probability p[A0,A1] that SoftwareUnclRespGame(A0,A1)




Prob(x′ ← A0(1λ))p[A1](x′). (A.3)
In Definition 2 we only require that the average p[A0,A1] should be negligible in λ. As
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explained above, we need to formulate security in terms of a worst-case analysis. We
may ask whether the adversary can be lucky (the worst-case) and somehow select in
A0 a x′ which “fits” k well in that p[A1](x′) is (much) larger than the average p[A0,A1].
In order to analyze this we introduce αh[A0,A1] as the probability (over coin flips used
in A0 and A1) that game SoftwareUnclRespGame(A0,A1) produces a simulator
S which correctly predicts Fk(x) ← S(x) with probability (over random x and coin




Prob(x′ ← A0(1λ)). (A.4)
We want both 2−h small and αh[A0,A1] large as this implies that (1) the probability
that the adversary is able to construct a “lucky” simulator is equal to 1−αh[A0,A1],
which is small, and (2) when the adversary constructs a “normal” (i.e., “not lucky”)
simulator, then the simulator correctly predicts Fk(x)← S(x) with small probability
≤ 2−h. We can think of 1−αh[A0,A1] as the probability mass of the tail of distribution
p[A1](x′) that describes the lucky scenarios x′ for the adversary, i.e., the worst-case
scenarios from a security point of view.




max{1− αh[A0,A1], 2−h}. (A.5)
α[A0,A1] is the smallest value α with the property that the probability that game
SoftwareUnclRespGame(A0,A1) produces a simulator S which correctly pre-
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dicts Fk(x)← S(x) with probability > α is at most α, in formula,
α[A0,A1] = min
α : Prob
 S ← A1(x′) such that
Prob(Fk(x)← S(x)) > α
 ≤ α
 ,
where the inner probability is over random x ← {0, 1}λ and the outer probability is
over x′ ← A0(1λ).
Definition 8. For a software unclonable function Fk(x) we define the ‘average expo-
nential growth factor’





and we define the ‘worst-case exponential growth factor’





where p[A0,A1] is a function of λ given by (A.2,A.3) and α[A0,A1] is a function of
λ given by (A.2,A.4,A.5).
A software unclonable function Fk(x) has better security if a is larger, and is more
light-weight if the gate equivalence of its circuit implementation is smaller. In this
paper we propose three constructions and compare them along these metrics.








(since h can be any real number; in the analysis of our constructions we consider only
integers h). This proves that the exponential growth factors p and a satisfy a ≥ p/2.
This argument is in essence the birthday paradox. In the next section we analyze for
several candidate software unclonable functions both p[A0,A1] as well as α[A0,A1]
together with their exponential growth factors. It turns out that for these functions
the probability mass of the tail of distribution p[A0](x′) is large so that a ≈ p/2.
A.1 MULTIPLY-ADD
Below we prove that the “MULTIPLY-ADD” function
F(k0,k1)(x) = k0x+ k1 mod 2
λ, for k0, k1, x ∈ {0, 1}λ, (A.6)
where k0 and x are multiplied modulo 2
λ and + modulo 2λ is binary addition with
carry truncated after λ bits, is a software unclonable function. In what follows when
we write + we mean addition modulo 2λ.
Theorem 1. For the MULTIPLY-ADD function defined in (A.6),
p[A0,A1] ≤ (λ+ 2)2−λ−1 and α[A0,A1] ≤ 2−b(λ−1)/2c
for all algorithm pairs (A0,A1) (unrestricted, the theorem does not require (A0, A1),
and produced simulators to be ppt). These upper bounds can be met with equality, this
implies average and worst-case exponential growth factors
p = 1 and a = 1/2.
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Proof. We will first translate the problem of creating a simulator with maximum
possible successful prediction probability to an equivalent problem which we are able
to analyze precisely:
Suppose the adversary knows the pair (x′, F(k0,k1)(x
′)) and wants to built a simu-
lator which predicts F(k0,k1)(x) for random x. We notice that for
z = F(k0,k1)(x)− F(k0,k1)(x′), v = k0, and w = x− x′,
z = vw mod 2λ. (A.7)
Also, notice that given x′, since x is random, w is random; and since k0 is random,
v is random. These observations can be used to show that predicting F(k0,k1)(x) for
a randomly selected input x based on (x′, F(k0,k1)(x
′)) where F is defined by (A.6)
is equivalent to (notice that k1 is unknown and random) predicting z in (A.7) for a
randomly selected input w and unknown/random v. This implies that the probability
of SoftwareUnclRespGame(A0,A1) returning 1 is equal to the probability of
ZWGameMA(A), see Algorithm 9, returning 1. This probability is maximized for
A outputting a simulator S which on input w outputs a z that maximizes |{v : z =
vw}|. In other words, z maximizes the number of collisions v that yield the same
z = vw. In formula, p[A0,A1] (where A0 and A1 are derived from A according to the












|{v : z = vw}|
2λ
. (A.8)
We will now analyze (A.8) by distinguishing the cases w 6= 0 and w = 0.
Let w 6= 0. If 2λ−h is the largest power of 2 dividing w, then z = vw mod 2λ
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Algorithm 9 Finding z based on w
Function ZWGameMA (A)
v ∈ {0, 1}λ is a random input;
S ← A(1λ);
w ∈ {0, 1}λ is a random input;







/*On input w, an optimal S outputs a z which maximizes |{v : z = vw}|.*/
is equivalent to z = v(w/2λ−h) mod 2h. Since w/2λ−h is an odd integer, it has an
inverse modulo 2h. This implies that there is exactly one v = z(w/2λ−h)−1 mod 2h
for which z = v(w/2λ−h) mod 2h. Therefore there are 2λ−h possible v for which
z = vw mod 2λ (these v are equal to z(w/2λ−h)−1 mod 2h plus some multiple of
2h).
If w = 0, then only for z = 0 there exists a v such that z = vw; in this case all 2λ
possible v satisfy z = vw.
Let Wh, 1 < h ≤ λ, be the number of integers w, 0 < w < 2λ, for which 2λ−h is






We notice that Wh = 2




2−1) = (λ+ 2)2−λ−1.
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This proves p[A0,A1] = (λ+ 2)2−λ−1 and p = 1.
The above derivation also proves that the number of w for which maxz Probv←{0,1}λ [z =









i−1) for h ≥ 2. The
probability that such a w is selected is equal to
∑λ
i=hWi/2






λ = 1− (1 +
h−1∑
i=1
2i−1)/2λ = 1− 2−(λ+1−h),
which in turn proves
α[A0,A1] = min
h
max{2−(λ+1−h), 2−h} = 2−b(λ−1)/2c and a = 1/2.
A.2 ADD-XOR
Below we prove that the “ADD-XOR” function
F(k0,k1)(x) = (k0 + x mod 2
λ)⊕ k1, for k0, k1, x ∈ {0, 1}λ, (A.9)
where + modulo 2λ is binary addition with carry truncated after λ bits and where ⊕
represents XOR, is a software unclonable function.
Theorem 2. For the ADD-XOR function as defined in (A.9),
p[A0,A1] ≤ 2−0.234·λ and α[A0,A1] ≤ 2 · 2−0.141·λ
for all algorithm pairs (A0,A1) (unrestricted, the theorem does not require (A0, A1),
and produced simulators to be ppt). This implies average and worst-case exponential
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growth factors
p ≥ 0.234 and a ≥ 0.141.
The proof of Theorem 2 consists of several steps. We will first translate the prob-
lem of creating a simulator with maximum possible successful prediction probability
to an equivalent problem which we are able to analyze precisely:
Suppose the adversary knows the pair (x′, F(k0,k1)(x
′)) and wants to build a simu-
lator which predicts F(k0,k1)(x) for random x. We notice that for
z = F(k0,k1)(x
′)⊕ F(k0,k1)(x), v = k0 + x′, and v = x− x′,
z ⊕ v = w + v. (A.10)
Also, notice that given x′, since k0 is random, v is random, and since x is random,
w is random. These observations can be used to show that predicting F(k0,k1)(x) for
a randomly selected input x based on (x′, F(k0,k1)(x
′)) where F is defined by (A.9) is
equivalent to (notice that k1 is unknown and random) predicting z in (A.10) for a
randomly selected input w and unknown/random v. This implies that the probability
of SoftwareUnclRespGame(A0,A1) returning 1 is equal to the probability of
ZWGameAX(A), see Algorithm 10, returning 1. This probability is maximized for
A outputting a simulator S which on input w outputs a z that maximizes |{v : z⊕v =
v + w}|. In other words, z maximizes the number of collisions v that yield the same
z = (v+w)⊕v. In formula, p[A0,A1] (where A0 and A1 are derived from A according
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|{v : z ⊕ v = v + w}|
2λ
.
Algorithm 10 Finding z based on w
Function ZWGameAX(A)
v ∈ {0, 1}λ is a random input;
S ← A(1λ);
w ∈ {0, 1}λ is a random input;







/*On input w, an optimal S outputs a z which maximizes |{v : z ⊕ v =
v + w}|.*/
We will design an algorithm which given w finds the z which maximizes proba-
bility (A.11); this algorithm can be directly translated in an optimal simulator S in
ZWGameAX(A) and SoftwareUnclRespGame(A0,A1).
Algorithm 11 computes for input (z, w) the set {v : z ⊕ v = v + w} represented
as either the empty set ∅ or a string v ∈ {0, 1, ∗} where ∗ can take on any bit value.
So, the cardinality of set {v : z ⊕ v = v + w} is equal to 2c where c is the number
of ∗ symbols in the output v of the algorithm. The algorithm shortens the initial
bit string w and z to smaller substrings of w and z of equal length throughout the
recursive calls while producing a representation v ∈ {0, 1, ∗}.
The algorithm distinguishes between the following cases. First, if |w| = |z| = 1,
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then w = α and z = β for some α, β ∈ {0, 1}. In order to satisfy (A.10) β⊕v = α+v.
Since + is addition with carry with truncation, α + v = α ⊕ v. Hence, {v : z ⊕ v =
w + v} = {0, 1} which is represented by the string ∗.
Second, if |w| = |z| ≥ 2, then w = w′α1α0 and z = z′β1β0 for some bit strings w′
and z′, and bits α1, α0, β1, β0 ∈ {0, 1}. Similarly, let v = v′γ1γ0. Then, z ⊕ v = v +w
is equivalent to
β0 ⊕ γ0 = α0 ⊕ γ0 and (A.12)
(z′β1)⊕ (v′γ1) = (w′α1) + (v′γ1) + (0|w
′|(α0 · γ0)), (A.13)
where α0·γ0 represents bit multiplication and is equal to the carry of α0+γ0. Equation
(A.12) is the projection of z ⊕ v = v + w on the first bit and equation (A.13) is the
projection of z ⊕ v = v + w on the remaining bits. If β0 6= α0, then (A.12) cannot
be satisfied and {v : z ⊕ v = v + w} = ∅. If β0 = α0, then we distinguish the cases
β0 = 0 and β0 = 1.
For β0 = α0 = 0, any γ0 solves (A.12) and equation (A.13) simplifies to
(z′β1)⊕ (v′γ1) = (w′α1) + (v′γ1).
This means that application of SolutionSpace(z′β1, w
′α1) yields a representation
v ∈ {0, 1, ∗} of all the solutions for (A.13). Concatenating v with the wild card ∗
(expressing that γ0 can be any bit value) in line 17 gives a representation of {v :
z ⊕ v = v + w}.
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Algorithm 11 Outputs the set {v : z ⊕ v = v + w}
Function SolutionSpace(z, w)/* defined for |z| = |w| ≥ 1 */
if |w| = |z| = 1 then
α = w; β = z;






/* n = |w| = |z| ≥ 2 */
w′α1α0 = w with α1, α0 ∈ {0, 1};
z′β1β0 = w with β1, β0 ∈ {0, 1};
if α0 6= β0 then
Return ∅;
else
/* α0 = β0 */
if β0 = 0 then
















For β0 = α0 = 1, any γ0 solves (A.12) and equation (A.13) simplifies to
(z′β1)⊕ (v′γ1) = (w′α1) + (v′γ1) + (0|w
′|γ0). (A.14)
The projection of (A.14) is equivalent to the equation β1 ⊕ γ1 = α1 ⊕ γ1 ⊕ γ0, i.e.,
γ0 = β1 ⊕ α1.
Substituting this in (A.14) gives the equivalent equation
(z′β1)⊕ (v′γ1) = ((w′α1) + (0|w
′|(β1 ⊕ α1))) + (v′γ1).




yields a representation v ∈ {0, 1, ∗} of all the solutions for (A.13). Concatenating v
with γ0 = β1 ⊕ α1 in line 21 gives a representation of {v : z ⊕ v = v + w}.
As an invariant of algorithm 11 one can prove by induction in the length λ = |z| ≥
1 that, if {v : z ⊕ v = v + w} 6= ∅, then
|{v : z ⊕ v = v + w}| = 2λ−wt(z̄), (A.15)
where wt(z̄) is the Hamming weight of z̄ and z = α′z̄ with α′ ∈ {0, 1}. Maximizing the
probability in (A.11) given w is therefore equivalent to finding, given w, the minimal
wt(z̄) among all z for which {v : z ⊕ v = v + w} 6= ∅.
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Let w = w′01j0a with a ≥ 0 and j ≥ 1. We distinguish two cases: j = 1 and
j ≥ 2. If j = 1, then w = w′010a. By applying lines 12-17 a times and applying lines
18-19 the (a+ 1)th time for α0 = β0 = 1 and α1 = 0 shows that z must have the form
z = z′β110
a otherwise no solution for z ⊕ v = v + w exists. The recursive call in line
20 uses a new z = z′β1 and w = w
′β1. If β1 = 1, then the new w equals w = w
′1 and
wt(z̄) = 2 + wt(z̄′) if |w′| = |z′| ≥ 1, and wt(z̄) = 1 if |w′| = |z′| = 0. If β0 = 0, then
the new w equals w = w′0 and wt(z̄) = 1 + wt(z̄′) if |w′| = |z′| ≥ 1, and wt(z̄) = 1 if
|w′| = |z′| = 0.
If j ≥ 2, then w = w′01i110a for some i ≥ 0. By applying lines 12-17 a times
and applying lines 18-19 the (a + 1)th time for α0 = β0 = 1 and α1 = 1 shows
that z must have the form z = z′β110
a for some bit β1 otherwise no solution for
z ⊕ v = v + w exists. The recursive call in line 20 uses a new z = z′β1 and a new
w = w′01i1 + 0|w
′|+1+i(β1 ⊕ 1). If β1 = 1, then the new w equals w = w′01i1 and
wt(z̄) = 2 + wt(z̄′) if |w′| = |z′| ≥ 1, and wt(z̄) = 1 if |w′| = |z′| = 0. If β0 = 0,
then the new w equals w = w′10i+1 and wt(z̄) = 1 + wt(z̄′) if |w′| = |z′| ≥ 1, and
wt(z̄) = 1 if |w′| = |z′| = 0.
For both cases, one can show that wt(z̄) is minimized for β0 = 0 and z = z
′010a.
Given the above analysis the number of ones in z̄ as a function f(.) of w is equal to
f(w′01j0a) = 1 + f(w′0) for j = 1 and f(w′01j0a) = 1 + f(w′10j−1) for j ≥ 2. By
using similar arguments we can also derive f(1j0a) = 0 for j = 1 and f(1j0a) = 1 for
j ≥ 2. Since a ≥ 0 is arbitrary, we obtain the recursion f(w′01j0a) = 1 + f(w′) for
j = 1 and f(w′01j0a) = 1 + f(w′1) for j ≥ 2. Since f(w′) ≤ f(w′1) (the recursion
shows that if w′ = w′′1 then f(w′) = f(w′′1), and if w′ = w′′0 then f(w′) = f(w′′) =
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f(w′′01)− 1 = f(w′1)− 1), we get the inequality
f(w′01j0a) ≥ 1 + f(w′) for j ≥ 1
with f(1j0a) = 0 for j = 1 and f(1j0a) = 1 for j ≥ 2. So, the minimal weight of
z̄ as a function of w is at least the number of maximal length substrings 1j0 with
j ≥ 1 in w̄ where w = β′w̄ with β′ ∈ {0, 1} . (Notice that the number of maximal
length substrings 1j0 with j ≥ 1 in w̄ is at most λ/2.) For completeness, algorithm
12 computes the z of minimal weight given w; this algorithm will be used by the
adversary to construct a simulator.
Algorithm 12 Computing a z̄ with {v : z ⊕ v = v + w} 6= ∅ of minimal weight
Function MinimalWeightSol(w)
if w = 1j0a for some j ≥ 1 and a ≥ 0 then






if w = w′01j0a for some j ≥ 1 and a ≥ 0 then








Let Wh, h ≤ λ/2, be the number of bit strings w = βw̄ with β ∈ {0, 1} and
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w̄ ∈ {0, 1}λ−1 of the form
w̄ = 0a011+a101+a2 . . . 11+a2h−10a2h
where ai ≥ 0 for all i. The previous analysis shows that for w ∈ Wh, wt(z̄) ≥ h.












We notice that the mapping from w̄ with βw̄ ∈ Wh to
0a010a110a21 . . . 0a2h−110a2h ∈ {0, 1}λ



















































≈ 0.85λ = 2−0.234λ.
This can be interpreted as
p[A0,A1] ≤ 2−0.234λ.
The above derivation also proves that, for 0 ≤ h ≤ λ/2, the number of w for which






























)/2λ−1 ≈ 1− 21−(1−H(2(h−1)/λ))λ,




Let ω = 0.141 be the solution of 1 − H(2ω) = ω and set h = 1 + bωλc, then
21−(1−H(2(h−1)/λ))λ ≤ 21−(1−H(2ω))λ = 21−ωλ and 2−h ≤ 2−ωλ, hence,
α[A0,A1] ≤ 2 · 2−ωλ.
This also shows that a ≥ ω. Simulations with the optimal simulator derived from
Algorithm 12 show that these bounds are tight.
A.3 S-Box-CBC
In this section we introduce a construction which uses the idea of S-boxes in block-
cipher design together with CBC mode [21].
Suppose we have a non-linear mapping
S ∈ {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m,
where m is generally very small (we will propose small powers of two, m = 4 or
147
m = 8). Mapping S is called an S-Box. Since we use a software unclonable function
for authentication in the NVM-based supply chain management scheme, this means
that the software unclonable function does not necessarily need to be invertible given
knowledge of the keys. It turns out that ADD-XOR and MULTIPLY-ADD are invert-
ible; in this section, however, we will construct a non-invertible software unclonable
function based on a non-invertible S-box mapping S.
Our construction is iterative following the design principle used in CBC mode for
symmetric key encryption (where we replace encryption by our S-box): For n with
nm = λ, we use the vector notation x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}λ with xi ∈ {0, 1}m.




2, . . . , k
0




2, . . . , k
1
n) and input x, we recursively
compute
yi+1 = S(yi ⊕ xi+1 ⊕ k0i+1)⊕ k1i+1 (A.16)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 with y0 = 0. We define
F(k0,k1)(x) = y. (A.17)
In the construction we mask input xi with k
0
i and we mask the output of the S-box
with k1i . The S-box is a kind of non-linear obfuscation mapping. Forwarding yi into
the computation of yi+1 corresponds to the main design principle used in CBC mode
for symmetric key encryption. Below we will prove (in a couple of steps) that the
S-box construction leads to a software unclonable function.
We start with analyzing the average case:
Theorem 3. Let F(k0,k1)(x) be defined by the S-Box-CBC construction in (A.16,A.17)
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for λ = nm. For the S-box mapping S used in F , we define
ρ[S](w) = max
z∈{0,1}m





Then, for all algorithm pairs (A0,A1) (unrestricted, the theorem does not require (A0,
A1), and produced simulators to be ppt),
p[A0,A1] ≤ ρ[S]n with p = −(log ρ[S])/m.
Proof. We will first translate the problem of creating a simulator with maximum
possible successful prediction probability to an equivalent problem which we are able
to analyze precisely:
Suppose the adversary knows the pair (x′, y′ = F(k0,k1)(x
′)) and wants to built a
simulator which predicts F(k0,k1)(x) for random x. We notice that for z = F(k0,k1)(x
′)⊕
F(k0,k1)(x) the recursive definition of F in (A.16,A.17) implies zi+1 = y
′
i+1 ⊕ yi+1 =
S(y′i⊕x′i+1⊕k0i+1)⊕S(yi⊕xi+1⊕k0i+1). If we define vi+1 = y′i⊕x′i+1⊕k0i+1, and wi+1 =
(y′i ⊕ yi)⊕ (x′i+1 ⊕ xi+1) = zi ⊕ (x′i+1 ⊕ xi+1), then
zi+1 = S(vi+1)⊕ S(vi+1 ⊕ wi+1). (A.18)




i+1 is random and y
′
i only depends on k
0
j for
j ≤ i, vi+1 is random. Therefore, by induction on i, given x′, v is random. We also
notice that given x′i+1 and zi, since xi+1 is random and zi only depends on xj for
j ≤ i, wi+1 is random. Therefore, by induction on i, given x′, w is random.
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The above observations can be used to show that predicting F(k0,k1)(x) for a ran-
domly selected input x based on (x′, F(k0,k1)(x
′)) where F is defined by (A.16,A.17)
is equivalent to (notice that k1 is unknown and random) predicting z in (A.18) for
a randomly selected input w and unknown/random v. This implies that the proba-
bility of SoftwareUnclRespGame(A0,A1) returning 1 is equal to the probability
of ZWGameSB(A), see Algorithm 13, returning 1. This probability is maximized
over A outputting a simulator S which on input w outputs a z that maximizes
|{v : ∀i zi+1 = S(vi+1) ⊕ S(vi+1 ⊕ wi+1)}|. In other words, z maximizes the number
of collisions v that satisfy the same set of equations zi+1 = S(vi+1)⊕ S(vi+1 ⊕ wi+1).
In formula, p[A0,A1] (where A0 and A1 are derived from A according to the trans-


























m = ρ[S]n. (A.19)
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
According to Theorem 3, the smaller ρ[S], the larger the average exponential
growth factor p. The next lemma shows a lower bound on ρ[S] and describes an
S-box S which meets this lower bound leading to the largest possible p for the S-Box-
CBC construction:
Lemma 3. (i) For any S-box S, ρ[S](w) ≥ 2/2m for w 6= 0. If w = 0, then ρ[S](w) =
1. As a consequence ρ[S] ≥ (3 − 1/2m−1)2−m. This lower bound can be met with
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Algorithm 13 Finding z based on w
Function ZWGameSB(A)
v ∈ {0, 1}λ is a random input;
S ← A(1λ);
w ∈ {0, 1}λ is a random input;







/*On input w, an optimal S outputs a z which maximizes |{v : ∀i zi+1 =
S(vi+1)⊕ S(vi+1 ⊕ wi+1)}|.*/
equality: (ii) Let m ≥ 3. If we represent elements in {0, 1}m as finite field elements
in GF (2m) and define S(x) = x3 in GF (2m), then ρ[S](w) = 2/2m for w 6= 0 and
ρ[S] = (3− 1/2m−1)2−m.
Proof. Let z, v, w ∈ {0, 1}m (in the proof of the previous theorem z, v, w ∈ {0, 1}λ).
The first part of the lemma follows immediately from the observation that if z =
S(v) ⊕ S(v ⊕ w) then v′ = v ⊕ w also satisfies this equation. If w 6= 0, then v 6= v′
and this shows that if a solution v for z = S(v) ⊕ S(v ⊕ w) exists, then there also
exists a second different solution, hence, ρ[S](w) ≥ 2/2m. If w = 0, then S(v) ⊕
S(v ⊕ w) = S(v) ⊕ S(v) = 0 for all v. As a consequence ρ[S](0) = 2m/2m = 1 and
ρ[S] ≥ 1/2m + (1− 1/2m)2/2m = (3− 1/2m−1)2−m.
In the second part of the lemma we take S(x) = x3 where we consider binary
vectors x ∈ {0, 1}m to represent elements in GF (2m). Notice that ⊕ becomes addition
in GF (2m). This means that the equation z = S(v) ⊕ S(v ⊕ w) translates to z =
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v3 + (v + w)3 = v2w + vw2 + w3 in GF (2m). This is equivalent to
wv2 + w2v + (w3 + z) = 0,
a quadratic equation in v for w 6= 0 (notice that w2 does not reduce to a linear
expression in w since the irreducible polynomial defining GF (2m) has degree ≥ 3 for
m ≥ 3). If w 6= 0, then the equation becomes v2 + wv + (w2 + zw−1) = 0 which has
at most 2 solutions, hence, ρ[S](w) = 2/2m.
Corollary 1. For the S-Box-CBC construction in (A.16,A.17) for λ = nm and the
S-box specified in Lemma 3(ii),
p[A0,A1] ≤ (3− 1/2m−1)λ/m2−λ and p = 1−
log(3− 1/2m−1)
m
for all algorithms pairs (A0,A1) (unrestricted, the theorem does not require (A0, A1),
and produced simulators to be ppt). There exist algorithm pairs for which the upper
bound holds with equality.
Theorem 4. For the S-Box-CBC construction in (A.16,A.17) for λ = nm and S-box










for all algorithms pairs (A0,A1) (unrestricted, the theorem does not require (A0, A1),
and produced simulators to be ppt). There exist algorithm pairs for which the upper
bound is almost tight. Notice that a is only slightly larger than p/2.
In order to prove Theorem 4, let us have a closer look at the derivation leading
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to (A.19). Either ρ[S](wi+1) = 2/2
m = 2−(m−1) if wi+1 6= 0, or ρ[S](wi+1) = 1 if





(2m − 1)n−j vectors w with exactly
j different i for which wi+1 = 0. For these vectors w, p[A0](w) (let A0 and A1 be





Notice that p[A0](w) ≤ 2−h for (m− 1)(n− j) ≥ h, i.e., j ≤ n− h/(m− 1). This















































































2−mj · 2−m(n − j)/(j + 1) for (n −
2m)/(2m+1) ≤ j. This inequality holds true if j ≥ n−h/(m−1) and n−h/(m−1) ≥
(n− 2m)/(2m + 1), or equivalently (n+ 1)(m− 1)2m/(2m + 1) ≥ h. Notice that this
is implied by h ≤ n(m− 1) if and only if 2m ≥ n. So, for
h ≤ h′ = min{n(m− 1), (n+ 1)(m− 1)2m/(2m + 1)}
=
 (n+ 1)(m− 1)2
m/(2m + 1), if 2m ≤ n,
n(m− 1), if 2m ≥ n,















































































Our theorems state for unbounded adversaries (we prove information theoretical se-
curity as opposed to PHOTON which assumes computational hardness)
α[A0,A1] ≤ 2−b(λ−1)/2c for MULTIPLY-ADD,







Table A.1 lists for which λ the different constructions give rise to upper bounds
approximately equal to 2−16, 2−32, 2−40, and 2−64.
α[A0,A1] MULT.-ADD ADD-XOR S-Box-CBC S-Box-CBC PHOTON
m = 4 m = 8
λ = 33 λ = 121 λ = 60 λ = 48 N/A
≤ 2−16 1200b NVM 2960b NVM 1680b NVM 1360b NVM
≥ 726 GE 372 GE 440 GE 726 GE
(308+64) (277+163) (261+465)
λ = 65 λ = 243 λ = 112 λ = 88 N/A
≤ 2−32 1840b NVM 5360b NVM 2640b NVM 2160b NVM
≥ 1430 GE 478 GE 748 GE
(315+163) (283+465)
λ = 81 λ = 291 λ = 140 λ = 112 λ = 80
≤ 2−40 2160b NVM 6320b NVM 3280b NVM 2640b NVM 1200b NVM
≥ 1782 GE 764 GE 1428 GE [51]
(299+465) (563+865)
λ = 129 λ = 461 λ = 216 λ = 168 λ = 128
≤ 2−64 3120b NVM 9680b NVM 4720b NVM 3760b NVM 1680b NVM
1795 GE
(673+1122)
Table A.1: Comparison light-weight constructions.
Since we want to prevent an adversary from successfully cloning an RFID tag in
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order to tag and insert a counterfeit product into the supply chain, we are actually
fine with very small unconditional collision resistance. Even 2−16 is acceptable for the
following reason: Our constructions are unconditional secure in that even an adversary
with unbounded computational resources cannot create a cloned RFID tag which can
do better than answering future reader queries with probability > 2−16. This implies
that only one out of 64K inserted counterfeit products makes it successfully through
the supply chain. This is an economical impractical proposition for the adversary.
One reason to have a higher collision resistance like 2−32 is if fake trapdoored
products are very cheap and the adversary wants to disrupt consumers of these prod-
ucts, e.g., the military. In this case the adversary is not economically motivated, he
simply wants to be able to get a hardware footprint in order to be able to launch
future attacks. In this case a collision resistance of 2−32 would imply an enormous
number (4 billion) fake products needed by the adversary making such an attack quite
impractical.
For each solution, it is important to verify whether it fits the 2-3K bit NVM
requirement. A reader event is 40 bits (see Section 2.4.7 with a λ-bit output of the
software unclonable function, which will replace one 40-bit key for a one time pad in
the NVM based scheme and two λ-bit keys for our software unclonable constructions
– while PHOTON only needs one λ-bit key. Since the RFID NVM is assumed to be
read out per byte, we will round λ bits up to a multiple of bytes. Hence, for each
reader event, a total of 5 + 2dλ/8e} bytes in NVM are needed. Based on discussion
given in Section 2.4.2 , we expect at most 10 reader events per path through the
supply chain. This gives a total of 10 · 8 · (5 + 2dλ/8e) required NVM bits. In bold
are indicated which entries violate the 2-3K bit requirement.
Table A.1 also compares constructions (that do not violate the 2-3K bit NVM
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requirement) with respect to the Gate Equivalence (GE) – measured in number of
2-input NAND gates – of their circuit implementations. In the table “261+465”
under e.g. the S-Box-CBC entry for m = 8 and λ = 48 indicates that 465 GE is
spend on the software unclonable function with its own control logic and another 261
GE is spend on general control logic for a full NVM-based supply chain management
scheme implementation; 261+465 GE makes a total of 726 GE. Section 2.5.3 lists and
explains the optimal implementations of each construction – we list the implemented
results for ADD-XOR and S-Box-CBC, and the estimated lower bound ≥ 22 · λ GE
for the MULTIPLY-ADD construction.
PHOTON [29] has two light-weight variations: we used PHOTON 80/20/16 as
software unclonable function. It takes 80 bits input and generates 80 bits output with
40 bits collision resistance considering state-of-the-art attacks. Table A.1 also shows
PHOTON 128/16/16 with 64 bits collision resistance.





B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Based on Game 1 we define two other games which we will need for the proof of
Lemma 1:
• Consider ForgeUTT iA,Π to be the notion for forging a token with exactly i
commands. For this, we can define a game that is exactly as game 1 with one
extra condition in Step 3, which is ”m contains exactly i commands”
• Consider ForgeUTT≤iA,Π to be the notion for forging a token with at most i
commands. For this, we can define a game that is exactly as game 1 with one
extra condition in Step 3, which is ”m contains at most i commands”
Proof. The intuition behind the proof of this lemma is that for a PPT adversary,
forging a user tied RAFT without observing any of its ancestors involves distinguish-
ing the HMAC from a random function.We simplify the descriptions of algorithms 4,
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5, and 7 as follows:
• For the key k and input payload p and the command c
UserIssue(k, p, c) = HMAC(HMAC(k, p), p ‖ c)
• For the key k, input token r = (m, t), and the command c
ServiceIssue(k, r = (m, t), c) =

HMAC(t,m ‖ c) if V er(k, r) is valid
nothing if V er(k, r) is invalid
• For the key k, and the input token r = (m, t), first, V er(k, r) decomposes m
and gets {p, c1, · · · , cn}, then calculates:
h0 = HMAC(k, p)
h1 = HMAC(h0, p ‖ c1)
...
hn = HMAC(hn−1, p ‖ c1 ‖ · · · ‖ cn)
Then, if hn = t, returns valid ; otherwise, returns invalid.
Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary and let ε(.) be a function such
that:
Pr[ForgeUTTA,RAFT (λ) = 1] = ε(λ) (B.1)
and let Φ represent the set of all tokens that A has queried. Now, we define a
new scheme RAFT ′ = (UserIssue′, ServiceIssue′, V er′), which is similar to RAFT
except a random function f(.) is replaced with the first HMACs in UserIssue and
V er algorithms. In other words, HMAC(k,p) is replaced by f(p).
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We show that this implies the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm that can
distinguish the HMAC from a random one with advantage O(ε). This will then imply
that ε must be negligible, as required.
We define the notation RAFT (k, p, c1, . . . , ci) respectively RAFT
′(k, p, c1, . . . , ci)
to stand for a RAFT/RAFT’ token with i commands and define RAFT and RAFT ′
as follows:
RAFT (k, p, c1, . . . , ci) =

HMAC(RAFT (k, p, c1, . . . , ci−1), p ‖ c1 ‖ . . . ‖ ci) = hi i > 0
HMAC(k, p) = h0 i = 0
and
RAFT ′(k, p, c1, . . . , ci) =

HMAC(RAFT ′(k, p, c1, . . . , ci−1), p ‖ c1 ‖ . . . ‖ ci) = hi i > 0
f(p) = h0 i = 0
From A we will now construct a polynomial-time distinguisher D that is given an
oracle O that is either of HMAC(k, .) or a random function f(.). The construction
D works as follows:
• Upon input λ, adversary D passes λ to A.
• When A queries its oracle UserIssue(k, ., .) with a message m′ = (p′, c′), D
queries O with p′ and receives the result h′. Next, it calculates the value t′ =
HMAC(h′,m′) and hands it to A and continues.
• When A queries its oracle V er(k, .) with a message r′′ = (m′′, t′′), D runs
algorithm 14. Algorithm 14 is exactly the same as algorithm 7 except that
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instead of using HMAC to compute h0, it uses the oracle O. Upon receiving b′′
from algorithm 14, D hands it to A.
• When A queries its oracle ServiceIssue(k, ., .) with a message (r′ = (m′, t′), c′),
D runs algorithm 14 with r′ and gets the response b′. If b′ = 0, D does nothing.
However, if b′ = 1, D hands HMAC(t′,m′ ‖ c′) to A and continues.
At the end, when A outputs r = (m, t), D runs algorithm 14 and receives b. If b = 1
and r and any of its ancestors are not in Φ, then D outputs 1. Otherwise it outputs
0.
Algorithm 14 Pseudocode of verifying
Function Verify(r)
(p, c0, · · · , cn, t)← Unpack(r)
i = 0
h0 = O(p)
while i ≤ n do
hi = HMAC(hi−1, p ‖ c0 ‖ · · · ‖ ci)
i = i+ 1
end






Since A runs in polynomial time, D also runs in polynomial time. From the
construction of D, it is clear that depending on O, A either plays ForgeUTTA,RAFT
or ForgeUTTA,RAFT ′ , and we have:
Pr[ForgeUTTA,RAFT (λ) = 1] = Pr[D
HMAC(k,.)(λ) = 1] (B.2)
Pr[ForgeUTTA,RAFT ′(λ) = 1] = Pr[D
f(.)(λ) = 1] (B.3)
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From 3.3, B.2, and B.3:
|Pr[ForgeUTTA,RAFT (λ) = 1]− Pr[ForgeUTTA,RAFT ′(λ) = 1]| ≤ α(λ) (B.4)
The analysis presented so far can be repeated in exactly the same way for the
game ForgeUTT i. This gives:
|Pr[ForgeUTT iA,RAFT (λ) = 1]− Pr[ForgeUTT iA,RAFT ′(λ) = 1]| ≤ α(λ) (B.5)
Let β(.) be a function so that Pr[ForgeUTT 0A,RAFT (λ) = 1] = β(λ). Since for i = 0,
RAFT (k, p) = HMAC(k, p) and RAFT ′(k, p) = f(p) this indicates that:
Pr[ForgeUTT 0A,RAFT (λ) = 1] = Pr[D
HMAC(.) = 1] = β(λ)
and
Pr[ForgeUTT 0A,RAFT ′(λ) = 1] = Pr[D
f(.) = 1] =
1
2λ − C
where C = poly(λ) is the maximum number of queries distinguisher D applies. There-
fore,
α(λ) ≥ |Pr[DHMAC(.) = 1]− Pr[Df(.) = 1]| ≥ β(λ)− 1
2λ − C
.
By the assumption that HMAC is secure (i.e. α(λ) is negligible) and because C =
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poly(λ), it follows that β(λ) is also negligible in λ. To be more precise:




Consider some adversary Ai+1 in ForgeUTT i+1Ai+1,RAFT ′(λ). This adversary produces
a token r with a chain of ancestors hi, where h0 = f(p). We can write r =
([p, c1, ..., ci+1], t) where t is a recursive function G of [p, c1, ..., ci+1] and f(p):
t = G([p, c1, ..., ci+1], f(p)), where
G([p, c1], f(p)) = HMAC(f(p), p ‖ c1), and
G([p, c1, . . . , ci+1], f(p)) = HMAC(G([p, c1, ..., ci], f(p)), p ‖ c1 ‖ · · · ‖ ci+1).
In order to help creating a token r that verifies correctly, only information about f(p)
can help. Since f is a random function,f(q) for q 6= p does not give any information
about f(p), which also means that G(., f(p)) and G(., f(q)) are statistically indepen-
dent. Thus, the information that the distinguisher D provides to the adversary A
gives no useful information unless oracle O uses f(p) for its computations. We can
therefore neglect all the oracle accesses that do not relate to computations with f(p).
This gives a new adversary Ai such that:
Pr[ForgeUTT i+1Ai+1,RAFT ′(λ) = 1] = Pr[ForgeUTT
i+1
Ai,RAFT ′(λ) = 1] (B.7)
A closer look at the structure of RAFT and RAFT ′ shows that, for i ≥ 0,
Pr[ForgeUTT i+1Ai,RAFT ′(λ) = 1] = Pr[ForgeUTT
i
Ai,RAFT (λ) = 1], (B.8)
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which follows from the following induction argument: Let k = f(p), p′ = p ‖ c1, and
c′j = cj+1 for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i}. As a base case notice that
RAFT ′(k, p, c1)
= HMAC(f(p), p ‖ c1)
= HMAC(k, p′)
= RAFT (k, p′).
Let i ≥ 1. As an induction hypothesis assume
RAFT ′(k, p, c1, . . . , ci) = RAFT (k, p
′, c′1, . . . , c
′
i−1).
In exactly the same way as before we can prove the induction step
RAFT ′(k, p, c1, . . . , ci+1)
= HMAC(RAFT ′(k, p, c1, . . . , ci), p ‖ c1 ‖ c2 ‖ . . . ‖ ci+1)
= HMAC(RAFT (k, p′, c′1, . . . , c
′
i−1), p
′ ‖ c′1 ‖ . . . ‖ ci)
= RAFT (k, p′, c′1, . . . , c
′
i).
By using induction in i, we conclude that the induction hypothesis holds for all i ≥ 1,
and (B.8) follows.









Ai,RAFT ′(λ) = 1] (B.9)
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we conclude from equations (B.5) and (B.9)
|pi − p′i| ≤ α(λ)
which in turn proves
pi ≤ α(λ) + p′i.
From equations (B.6) and (B.9) we have
p0 = β(λ)
and from equations (B.8) and (B.9) we have:
p′i+1 = pi.
These properties of pi and p
′
i can be combined to prove
pn ≤ α(λ) + p′n = α(λ) + pn−1 ≤ . . . ≤ n · α(λ) + p0 ≤ n · α(λ) + β(λ).
We can now conclude that
Pr[ForgeUTT≤nAi,RAFT (λ) = 1] = maxi≤n
Pr[ForgeUTT iAi,RAFT (λ) = 1]
≤ Pr[ForgeUTT nAi,RAFT (λ) = 1]
≤ n · α(λ) + β(λ). (B.10)
Since the adversary can at most call the oracle poly(λ) times, n = poly(λ). In fact,
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because of the policy enforcer, n can not be more than the number of modules in a
system. Since α(λ) and β(λ) are negligible functions in λ and n = poly(λ), (B.10)
proves the lemma.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Based on Game 2 we define two other games which we will need for the proof of
Lemma 2:
• Consider ForgeFTT iA,Π to be the notion for forging a token with exactly i
commands. For this, we can define a game that is exactly as game 2 with one
extra condition in Step 3, which is ”m contains exactly i commands”
• Consider ForgeFTT≤iA,Π to be the notion for forging a token with at most i
commands. For this, we can define a game that is exactly as game 2 with one
extra condition in Step 3, which is ”m contains at most i commands”
Proof. The intuition behind the proof of this lemma is that for a PPT adversary,
forging a fully tied RAFT (i.e. R̂AFT ) without observing the input message before
involves distinguishing the HMAC from a random function.
Lets introduce the notation R̂AFT (K, p, c1, . . . , ci) (where K = (k0, k1, . . . , kn−1)
and n is the number of services) to stand for a fully tied RAFT token with i commands
and define R̂AFT as follows:
R̂AFT (K, p, c1, . . . , ci) =

HMAC(HMAC(k0, p), p ‖ c1) = h1 i = 1
HMAC(ki−1, p ‖ c1 ‖ . . . ‖ ci ‖ R̂AFT (K, p, c1, . . . , ci−1)) = hi n ≥ i > 1
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Let us also simplify the descriptions of algorithms 4, 6, and 8 as follows:
• For the key k0 and input payload p and the command c:
UserIssue(k0, p, c) = HMAC(HMAC(k0, p), p ‖ c) = h1 = R̂AFT (K, p, c1)
(B.11)
• For the key ki−1 (i ∈ {2, . . . , n} where n is the number of services), input token
r = (m, t) = (p ‖ c1 ‖ . . . ‖ ci−1, hi−2), and the command ci:
ServiceIssue(i− 1, K, r = (m, t), ci) = HMAC(ki−1,m ‖ ci ‖ t)
= HMAC(ki−1, p ‖ c1 ‖ · · · ‖ ci−1 ‖ hi−1)
= hi
= R̂AFT (K, p, c1, . . . , ci) (B.12)
• For the key set K = (k0, k1, . . . , kn−1) where n is the number of services, and the
input token r = (m, t), first, V er(K, r) decomposes m and gets {p, c1, · · · , ci},
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then calculates:
h1 = HMAC(HMAC(k0, p), p ‖ c1)
Find corresponding key k1 for c2
h2 = HMAC(k1, p ‖ c1 ‖ c2 ‖ h1)
Find corresponding key k2 for c3
h3 = HMAC(k2, p ‖ c1 ‖ c2 ‖ c3 ‖ h2)
...
Find corresponding key ki−1 for ci
Extract kn from cn
hi = HMAC(ki−1, p ‖ c1 ‖ · · · ‖ ci ‖ hi−1)
Then, if hi = t, returns valid ; otherwise, returns invalid.
Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary and let ε(.) be a function such
that:
Pr[ForgeFTTA,R̂AFT (λ) = 1] = ε(λ) (B.13)
and let Φ represent the set of all tokens that A has queried. We want to show that
ε(λ) is negligible.
According to the game 2, the adversary A wins the game ForgeFTTA,R̂AFT if he
can forge a token that is either an output of UserIssue or ServiceIssue for the case
which the ki is not leaked.
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In other words,






Pr[ForgingFTT iA,R̂AFT (λ) = 1] (B.14)
where i /∈ I.
A closer look at the structure of user tied RAFT token (RAFT ) and fully tied
RAFT token (R̂AFT ) shows that, for i = 1,
R̂AFT (K, p, c1) = HMAC(HMAC(k0, p), p ‖ c1) = RAFT (k0, p, c1) (B.15)
and for 1 < i ≤ n, if we consider k′ = ki−1 and p′ = p ‖ c1 ‖ c2 ‖ . . . ‖ ci ‖ hi−1 then,
R̂AFT (K, p, c1, . . . , ci) = HMAC(ki−1, p ‖ c1 ‖ . . . ‖ ci ‖ hi−1)
= HMAC(k′, p′)
= RAFT (k′, p′) (B.16)
From lemma 1 and equation (B.15) we have:
Pr[ForgingFTT 1A,R̂AFT (λ) = 1] = Pr[ForgingUTT
1
A,RAFT (λ) = 1] ≤ α(λ) + β(λ)
(B.17)
where α(λ) and β(λ) are negligible functions in λ (for more details see equation (B.6)).
From lemma 1 and equation (B.16) we have (for 1 < i ≤ n):
Pr[ForgingFTT iA,R̂AFT (λ) = 1] = Pr[ForgingUTT
0
A,RAFT (λ) = 1] ≤ β(λ) (B.18)
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From equations (B.13), (B.14), (B.17) and (B.18) we have
ε(λ) = Pr[ForgeFTTA,R̂AFT (λ) = 1] ≤ α(λ) + β(λ) (B.19)




Snippet C.1: The python code for extracting the payload of a project scoped token given
a Fernet key and token.
# this code is adapted from the source code of Keystone Stein




mod_returned = len(token) % 4
if mod_returned:
missing_padding = 4 - mod_returned










print("Token Length = %d" % len(token))
token = restore_padding(token)
serialized_payload = f.decrypt(token.encode('utf-8'))
print("Payload Length = %d" %len(serialized_payload))
versioned_payload = msgpack.unpackb(serialized_payload)
version, payload = versioned_payload[0], versioned_payload[1:]
print("version = %d" % version) # prints 2 which means Project
Scoped Token↪→
(is_stored_as_bytes, user_id) = payload[0]
if is_stored_as_bytes:
user_id = uuid.UUID(bytes=user_id)
print("User Id = %s" % user_id)





print("Project Id = %s" % project_id)
print("Expiration Time %s " % payload[3])
print("Audit Id = %s"% payload[4])
Snippet C.2: The source code of user tied RAFT Library.




from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
import base64
from cryptography import fernet
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hmac import HMAC
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography import utils
from struct import pack,unpack, unpack_from
#KeystoneRAFT is developed to be added to Keystone. It allows






"""Restore padding based on token size.
:param token: token to restore padding on
:type token: six.text_type
:returns: token with correct padding
"""
# Re-inflate the padding
mod_returned = len(token) % 4
if mod_returned:
missing_padding = 4 - mod_returned
token += '=' * missing_padding
return token
#the function which is used for initialization of new object
def __init__(self, backend=None):






Checks the first byte of the given token to find out
if it is a RAFT or NOT.↪→












Check the expiration time of a token adn rise an
exception if the token is already expired↪→
"""
exp_time, = unpack_from(">Q",token,pos)
if self.expirationTime > exp_time:
self.expirationTime =exp_time
if exp_time < time.time():





This function recursively extracts the parent messages









#it must be a RAFT
lenId, = unpack_from(">H",token,1)
OriginalId, = unpack_from(">" + str(lenId)+"s", token,3)
cmd = token[19+lenId:]
self.CheckExpirationTime(token, 3+lenId)
keys, cmds = self.GetKey(OriginalId)
cmds.append(cmd)
sign_key = keys[:16]



















This function get a token and using GetKey function
rebulds the HMAC of the message part of the token.↪→
If calculated HMAC fits with the token signature, then





























raise Exception("Error: Not a RAFT token (MAC)")
else:
raise Exception("Error: Not a RAFT token (Format)")
return ""
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#ClientRaft is used for creating a new RAFT from either a Fernet
or other RAFT.↪→
class ClientRAFT(object):
_lifeTime = 1 #feault lifetime for a RAFT
#the function which is used for initialization of new object
def __init__(self, parent_token=None, backend=None):
if backend is None:
backend = default_backend()
self._backend = backend




"""Restore padding based on token size.
:param token: token to restore padding on
:type token: six.text_type
:returns: token with correct padding
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"""
# Re-inflate the padding
mod_returned = len(token) % 4
if mod_returned:
missing_padding = 4 - mod_returned









#the last 32 bytes of the parent token is the HMAC, which














def Finalize(self, life_time = None):
"""
Packs all the items needed to be in the token,
specifies the lifetime,
calculates the HMAC of the packed message,
and convert the result to a base64 string, which is
the new RAFT token↪→
"""
if life_time is not None:
self._lifeTime = life_time
















Snippet C.3: The validate token function of the TokenFormatter class after applying the
required changes.
def validate_token(self, token):
# The following code is added to check if the token is RAFT, then








except Exception as ex:
template = "An exception of type {0} occurred.
Arguments:\n{1!r}"↪→
message = template.format(type(ex).__name__, ex.args)
#End of processing a RAFT.
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#The old code for processing Fernet Token
serialized_payload = self.unpack(token)
versioned_payload = msgpack.unpackb(serialized_payload)
version, payload = versioned_payload[0],
versioned_payload[1:]↪→
for payload_class in _PAYLOAD_CLASSES:
if version == payload_class.version:















issued_at = ks_utils.isotime(at=issued_at, subsecond=True)







expires_at = ks_utils.isotime(at=expires_at, subsecond=True)
# end of expiration adjustment
return (user_id, methods, audit_ids, system, domain_id,
project_id,↪→
trust_id, federated_group_ids, identity_provider_id,
protocol_id, access_token_id, app_cred_id, issued_at,
expires_at)






from RAFT import ClientRAFT,KeystoneRAFT
base_url = "http://192.168.122.29" #The IP address of our OpenStack
server↪→






























url = base_url + "/identity/v3/auth/tokens"
h = {"X-Auth-Token" : token,"X-Subject-Token" : token}
r = requests.get(url, headers=h)
return r
def firstExp1():
print("Creating 100 Fernet tokens")
start_time= time.time()




execution_time = time.time() - start_time
print(execution_time)
def firstExp2():
print("Creating 100 RAFTs + a Fernet token")
start_time= time.time()
fernet_token = get_scoped_token("admin","123","Default","admin")




execution_time = time.time() - start_time
print(execution_time)
def firstExp3():
print("Creating and validating 100 Fernet tokens")
start_time= time.time()








print("Creating and validating 100 RAFTs with no command")
start_time= time.time()
fernet_token = get_scoped_token("admin","123","Default","admin")





execution_time = time.time() - start_time
print(execution_time)
def firstExp5to7(CmdLength):




cmd = "a" * CmdLength






execution_time = time.time() - start_time
print(execution_time)
def firstExpIssueTime():
print("Locally Creating 100 RAFTs experiment")
fernet_token = get_scoped_token("admin","123","Default","admin")
cmd = "a" * 20
start_time= time.time()




execution_time = time.time() - start_time
print(execution_time)
def firstExpVerificationTime():
print("Locally creating and validation 100 RAFTs experiment")
fernet_token = get_scoped_token("admin","123","Default","admin")
cmd = "a" * 20
total_time = 0








execution_time = time.time() - start_time
total_time+=execution_time
print(total_time)






from RAFT import ClientRAFT,KeystoneRAFT
base_url = "http://192.168.122.29" # the IP address of our
OpenStack server↪→
def get_project_list(token):
url = base_url + "/identity/v3/projects"
h = {"X-Auth-Token" : token,"X-RAFT-Token" : token}
r = requests.get(url,headers=h)
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url = base_url + "/compute/v2.1/servers"



















# the default values used in the following function are only valid
in our server.↪→





url = base_url + "/volume/v2/" + project_id + "/volumes"



















url = base_url + "/image/v2/images"
h = {"X-Auth-Token" : token,"X-RAFT-Token" : token}
r = requests.get(url,headers=h)







print("Creating a Volume using Fernet")




for i in range(0,1):
create_Volume(fernet_token, "vreza"+str(i))
execution_time = time.time() - start_time
print(execution_time)
def SecondExp2():
print("Creating a Volume using RAFT")
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execution_time = time.time() - start_time
print(execution_time)
def SecondExp3():
print("Creating a Virtual Machine using Fernet")




for i in range(0,1):
create_VM(fernet_token, "vm"+str(j))




print("Creating a Virtual Machine using RAFT")










execution_time = time.time() - start_time
print(execution_time)
def SecondExp5():
print("Getting image list using Fernet")




for i in range(0,1):
get_imagelist(fernet_token)




print("Getting image list using RAFT")










execution_time = time.time() - start_time
print(execution_time)
def SecondExp7():
print("Getting project list using Fernet")




for i in range(0,1):
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get_project_list(fernet_token)
execution_time = time.time() - start_time
print(execution_time)
def SecondExp8():
print("Getting project list using RAFT")
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Dijk, “The interpose puf: Secure puf design against state-of-the-art machine
learning attacks,” IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embed-
ded Systems, pp. 243–290, 2019.
206
[60] OECD and E. U. I. P. Office, Trends in Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods,
2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/
g2g9f533-en
[61] OECD/EUIPO, “Trade in counterfeit and pirated goods:mapping the economic
impact,” 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/
illicit-trade 26175835
[62] M. O’Neill et al., “Low-cost sha-1 hash function architecture for rfid tags,”
RFIDSec, vol. 8, pp. 41–51, 2008.
[63] OpenStack, “Openstack wiki,” https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Main Page, ac-
cessed: 2019-11-15.
[64] ——, “Tokens,” november, 2019. [Online]. Available: https://docs.openstack.
org/security-guide/identity/tokens.html
[65] P. Peris-Lopez, J. C. Hernandez-Castro, J. M. Estévez-Tapiador, and A. Rib-
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